On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > > there are two 3-1 "I", > No idea what " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth knowing. > > > Turing emulable telepathy. > No idea what " Turing emulable telepathy " is and very much doubt it is worth knowing. > > >>> >> >>> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view >>> pov. >> >> > >> >> >> Why on earth not? > > > > Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H-guy, > Yes, both are the H-guy, but they are not equal to each other. > > > but now living incompatible first person experience. > Obviously if they see different things, like different cities, then they will have different experiences and diverge, but I'm talking about the capabilities of the duplicating machine itself and you said " The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov. " And why are they incompatible first person experience ? Because the duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov . And round and round we go, you're assume what you're trying to prove. If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that then computationalism is wrong, but you can't just assume computationalism can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim you've proven something about computationalism. > > >>> >> >>> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture >> >> > >> >> This gets to the >> very >> key of the issue! If true then it's not a people duplicating machine, >> there is something about consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can >> produce > > > > Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7. > Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you just assume it's not true ( by assuming " The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something. >> >> and computationalism is >> >> dead wrong. >> >> > > > Why? > Because if computationalism is right then the duplicating machine *CAN* duplicate the 1-view from the 1-view pov , if it can't then computationalism is wrong. It's as simple as that. > > > On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from computationalism, and > "yes" consciousness is not something produced by any arrangement of atoms. > No, you've derived this not from computationalism but from the assumption that computationalism is wrong, if you do that it's easy to reach the conclusion that no arrangement of atoms can produce consciousness. I'm surprised it took you 7 steps, you must work slow. >> >> >> Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all because >> until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist. >> >> > > > Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and so > you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is obviously > ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of absurdum. Before the coin toss I can tell you exactly who I want to make a prediction about the outcome but in your scenario you tell me, if it's not the Helsinki Man then who on earth is it that you want to make a prediction before the duplication about what's going to happen afterward? If it's the Helsinki Man (who else could it be?) then the correct prediction would be "the copy that sees Moscow will become the Moscow Man and the copy that sees Washington will become the Washington Man". What more is there to say? What more is there to predict? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
