On 25 Jul 2016, at 22:40, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 1:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> So which one will become the Moscow Man? The one that will
see Moscow. What more is there to say?
> That it confirms the prediction "W v M" made in Helsinki,
But there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is
known after the experiment but not before,
In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view. Yes, in
*that* sense. NO, if we stay in the 3p or 3-1p picture.
but before the experiment the Helsinki Man already knew that t
he one that will see Moscow will become the Moscow man;
Yes, but he know also that the one in Washington will see Washington.
And he knows that in the 1p picture, from Helsinki to either cities,
that first person picture will only see W, or M.
so what exactly is that one new bit of information?
W for the H-guy feeling being in W.
M for the H-guy feeling being in M.
No bits of information in that 3-1 picture, but, obviously, one bit in
the HW first person picture, and one bit in the HW picture.
> and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".
I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was the "W &
M" prediction about?
About the future first person experience expected by the guy in
Helsinki, who, believes he will survive the experience, as he assumes
computationalism, + the correctness of the choice of the substitution
level, etc.,
I magine the guy in Helsinki saying "don't tell me if I am in W *or*
in M, just give me the cup of coffee, and I will try to guess, from
the coffee taste, if I am in W *or* if I am in M.
Obviously that guy manage to use its own 3-1 description, but still
refer to the two indexical "I", whose meaning depends on the location
of the person we interview (to go forward extracting the probability
calculus from the domain of the sound computational extensions).
> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) =
1/2.
OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability of who
seeing what?
Of seeing W.
Or of seeing M.
In this very simple and particular protocol, the H-guy is arguably
(using computationalism) 100% ignorant. That's why P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.
>>So what was that one bit of information do you have after
the experiment that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and
Washington is one is that one bit of new information that you have
now but didn't have before a zero or a one?
> The M-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to M
(that gives him one bit of first person information, that it can
write in his personal diary), and likewise the W-man lived the
apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to W, giving him one bit of
information too.
That's nice, but Bruno Marchal didn't answer the
question, what was that one bit of information do YOU have
after the experiment that YOU didn't have before?
Please, don't forget that in this duplicating experience, we get two
person views, and thus your question admits two different answers. The
first person "you" surviving in W get the W bit, and the first person
"you" surviving in M get the M bit.
If this really is a question and is not gibberish then it has a one
word answer, all John Clark wants to know is if that one word is
zero or one. Is that so hard?
Yes, because that is just impossible. In a duplicating person
experience, the first person is duplicated, in the 3-1 picture, and
remains one and unique in the 1-pictures.
So, we get two answers, and in the general case (step 7) we get
infinitely ma,ny answers, and that is why it is crucial to find the
right statistics, or uncertainty measure.
In the paper and most posts, I quickly insist that the relevant
difference between the 1p and the 3p view, is that the 1p view is
described in memories or diaries which are duplicated with the
observer, and so of courses the 1-views get multiplied, and that is
what the statistic is all about.
> In the 3p description, we go from 0 bit to 0 bit, but in the
1p experiences we go from 0 bit to 1 bit.
Irrelevant. What one new bit of information did YOU get after the
experimental that YOU didn't have before?
As we have both agree that YOU became two different guys seeing
different cities, the answer has to be relative to the indexical
meaning of "I", and thus, from the HM, and from the HW guys, they get
one bit of information, that they were not disposing before pushing on
the button and opening the reconstitution box.
In this post, it seems you ask me something which is obviously
impossible, and indeed is why the duplication brings an indeterminacy.
I can invite you to do the experience, and if I was able to tell you
in advance that bit of information, well, there would no FPI, wouldn't
it?
You just *never* read the diary of the Washington and Moscow copies.
One said, "goddam, I see only Washington and not Moscow, I got that
one bit of information predicted by computationalism!", and the other
said "goddam, I see only Moscow and not Washington, I got that one bit
of information predicted by computationalism!".
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
