On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:25 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> O
> n Sat, Jul 30, 2016 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
>
>> >
>> You have a set of memories
>>
>> about your past that we can refer to as your "diary".
>
>
> But there is nothing in the laws of physics to prevent somebody else from
> having those exact same memories. You say that diary is mine, but that other
> guy would disagree.
>
>>
>> >
>> Let's call this
>> D.
>> We make a copy of you.
>> [...]
>
>
> OK stop right there! Bruno says
> "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of
> view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense. It
> duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture."
So you are saying that, for comuptationalism to be true, then the
future diary must also be identical? If this is the case, then you
believe that computationalism and duplicating machines (or the MWI)
cannot be both true. But if you do believe this, I would ask why?
>
> So although both I and that other fellow (neither of us have any way of
> knowing which one of us is the copy and which is the original)
Consider the case of duplication with destruction at the source. There
is no original and we don't have to worry about that anymore, it's
irrelevant to the argument.
> have equally
> strong memories of writing that diary only one of us has "
> a first person view from its first person point of view
> ", whatever that means.
My first person view at this moment is that I am Telmo Menezes,
sitting at my desk writing this email. I can see people walking on the
street through my window, but I do not feel that I am them. I assume
they feel they are them. This is the most undeniable thing I can
imagine about my existence. Don't you have this experience? Notice
that I use personal pronouns here because it doesn't matter which one
of your clones answers.
> So that
> diary
> only belongs to one of us,
No, the diary belongs to both because there was only one person before
the duplication.
> but neither of us knows which one and nobody knows how to find out.
You both know that it belongs to you and you are both correct.
>>
>> >
>> At time t_{-1} you are John Clark (JC_a with
>> diary Da_0), at time t_0 there is also John Clark
>> [...]
>> Can we agree on this?
>
>
> I would agree but Bruno wouldn't, according to him there is something about
> me that a physical machine can't duplicate, Bruno is clear as mud about what
> that something is but apparently it's important.
The future cannot be duplicated. Don't you agree?
> So one of us is NOT John
> Clark but is instead a impostor; maybe I'm the phony, maybe that other guy
> who looks like me is. Nobody knows.
>
>>
>> >
>> The argument does not hinge on the identity of anyone.
>
>
> Then why does Bruno insist on using so many personal pronouns when talking
> about people duplicating machines and personal identity ?
He uses "the Brussels man", "the Moscow man" etc, and he defines what
these things mean: "the man who saw Moscow after coming out of the
machine" etc. Otherwise, he uses personal pronouns when such things
don't matter and normal human language is less distracting.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> Bruno says that as
>>>
>>> good as the duplicating machine is "Nothing can duplicate a first person
>>> view from its first person point of view, with or without computationalism.
>>> It just does not make any sense. It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1
>>>
>>> view picture." If Bruno is correct then even after the duplication no
>>> more
>>>
>>> than one person wrote " What one and only one city will I, that is to say
>>> my
>>>
>>> first person view from my first person point of view, see after I am
>>>
>>> duplicated?"
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>> Clark just wants to know if that one person is in Moscow
>>>
>>> or Washington. The question has a one word answer, so which word is it,
>>> Moscow or Washington?
>>
>>
>> >
>> If you ask any of them, they will say "I did".
>
>
> Certainly they would both say they wrote the diary, and they both would even
> think that what they say is true, but if Bruno is right then one of them is
> mistaken because according to him there is a mysterious "something" about
> John Clark that a physical machine can't duplicate.
Yes, the future cannot be duplicated. That makes sense right?
>
>>
>> >
>> If you ask an external observer, he will say "the person before the
>> duplication did".
>
>
> Well sure, but the key question is, where the person before the duplication
> is now.
>
> I would say that person MUST be in 2 different places because now is after
> the duplication and that's what the word "
> duplication
> " means.
If you insist in using that definition of person in a world with
duplication machines (I would say most people would find it
unnatural), then we need another word for entities that came out of
duplication machines, have their own first person perspective in the
world but happen to share their histories up to point t_0 with an
entity that entered a duplication machine. Still their futures can
diverge and still they experience individual first person experiences
from their various points of view. It's this that Bruno is talking
about, you are just playing tricks with language.
>>>
>>> >>
>>> If
>>>
>>> John Clark is right
>>> [...]
>>
>>
>> >
>> Are you suffering from depersonalization?
>
>
> John Clark thinks that when discussing matters of this sort the use of
> personal pronouns should be minimized.
I don't see how that helps. If you have a duplication machine hiding
in the closet and have been playing with it, your clones would also
come here and use then name "John Clark".
>
>> >
>> So you believe that if you are duplicated, then you will experience
>> being two persons at the same time?
>
>
> And that is an example of why
> John Clark thinks that when discussing matters of
> this
> sort the use of personal pronouns should be minimized
Alright.
Do you believe that it is possible for someone to experience being two
persons at the same time, given that a rational external observer
would agree that these two persons exist?
Telmo.
.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
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