On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
> > >> > >> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If computationalism is true >> >> then the machine will be able to make 2 copies that are identical to >> each other in every way and will remain identical until the outside >> environment >> >> or perhaps random quantum variations changes one but not the other. > > > > > I agree and never argued the opposite. > I'm glad to hear we agree on that, then we both disagree with Bruno because Bruno said: *"Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view, with or without computationalism." * I think that is the key to Bruno's confusion; that and trying to establish personal identity by looking from the present to the future rather than by remembering the past from the present. > > >> > >> Bruno asks "before the duplication what is the >> >> probability that "YOU" will be inside the house looking out?". That is >> not a >> >> question that is gibberish because Bruno isn't asking about what will >> happen >> >> to Telmo Menezes, in a world with personal pronoun duplicating machines >> >> Bruno wants to know about the one and only one thing that will happen to >> >> YOU. And that's just silly. > > > > > We discussed this before. The MWI introduces the same problem. And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem. Before *you* perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be gibberish to ask* you* "After the experiment what do *you* expect to see?", because both before and after the experiment the meaning of the personal pronoun "*you*" is crystal clear unique and unambiguous, "*you*" is the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way. And because things are stated so clearly after it's all over we can check and see if the prediction *you* made about *you* turned out to be correct or not; it might have been right and it might have been wrong but it wasn't gibberish. It's entirely different with a duplicating machine, "What one and only one city will *you* see after *you* are duplicated?" is just words with a question mark at the end and is not a question because after "*you*" is duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way . > > > If I am about to > > open Schrödinger's cat box, then one branch of me will see a live cat > > and another one a dead one. OK, and personal pronouns cause no confusion because with Schrödinger's cat box there is only one "me" per multiverse branch; a situation that is not true with duplication machines. And I might add that if "me" is defined as the person having this thought right now then "me" will have no future at all and has had no past. > > > By your reasoning, the probability of > > Telmo Menezes seeing a dead cat is 1, Correct. And by my reasoning the probability of Telmo Menezes seeing a live cat is also 1 , always assuming that MWI is correct and we don't know for a fact that it is. > > but from the first person > > perspective > > of any of the branches it is 1/2. Yes but you almost make that sound like a contradiction. All the above means is that if the experiment is performed many times about half the time "*you*" , that is to say the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way , will see a live cat and about half the time the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way will see a dead cat. > > Bruno's argument only move this to a scenario where both copies can > > coexist in the same branch, which can lead to some social awkwardness > > but does not fundamentally change the first person / third person > > distinction One thing does change when both copies coexist in the same observable universe, "What will you see next?" changes from a meaningful question into a meaningless sequence of words with a question mark at the end. > > Duplicating a first person view is the same as doing nothing. 1=1. No, something has changed. Before the duplication only one chunk of matter in the observable universe behaves in a Telmmenezesian way, but after the duplication there are two chunks of matter in the observable universe that behave in a Telmmenezesian way . > > > If you are > > facing your clone, the content of your respective experiences is > > already different. Do you disagree? > Yes I disagree. Your clone is also facing its clone so you both change in exactly the same way, so both chunks of matter still behave in the same identical way. > > >> > >> Until that divergence there is no Moscow man or Washington man, there is >> still only the Helsinki man regardless of how many bodies are around. > > > > > True. > Then if the definition of the Helsinki man is the man who is currently seeing Helsinki right now it would be rather silly to ask the Helsinki man what one and only one city the Helsinki man expects to see tomorrow. Do you agree? > > > Again this stems from ignoring the 1p / 3p discussion. Well then educate me and cure my ignorance. I duplicate you in a symmetrical room and from my 3p perspective the two of you look and behave identically, from your 1p perspective what is the difference between the two of you? I have a switch that can instantly exchange the position of you two in that symmetrical room, and when I use that switch from my 3p perspective I notice absolutely no difference even when I use the most sensitive instruments available, explain how from your 1p perspective you can tell that something has changed. And if you can't tell, if nothing has changed for you, if you notice no subjective difference and I notice no objective difference then what has that switch actually done? How can a change be neither objective nor subjective? > > >> > >> Then call my bluff and just stop using that goddamn personal pronoun! That >> >> would be the easiest way to prove me wrong, if I was wrong, which I'm >> not. > > > > > I did that already, > > some time ago. Just search the archives. Can't find it, must have been a very very long time ago! If Telmo Menezes has clearly described Bruno's thought experiment without personal pronouns or "*THE* 1p" John Clark would very much like to see it. > >> >>> > >>> There's really no need for you to say things like "John Clark is going >>> >>> to >>> eat a ham sandwich". >> >> > > >> > >> There most certainly is if eating a ham sandwich is involved in a >> >> thought experiment >> >> with people duplicating machines in it! > > > > True, but when you are stating your opinion in the mailing list, which > > exists in a world without duplicating machines, it is not really > > necessary. > It is necessary if John Clark is on a mailing list that discusses thought experiments with 1p duplicating machines in it. > > > What I'm asking is: if John Clark > > follows Bruno's protocol and enters a duplicating machine, and then > > both copies look out of the window in different places, do you think > > that John Clark will experience being two in two places at the same > > time? It's not important what I think, this question can be answered experimentally by simply asking each of the two experimental subjects 3 questions: 1) Are you John Clark? 2) Did you look out the window at exactly 9am? 3) What city did you experience? If the answers to question #1 are yes and yes, and the answers to #2 are yes and yes, and the answers to #3 are Moscow and Washington then John Clark will experience seeing and doing and being in 2 places at exactly the same time. I have a hunch if the experiment was actually performed those are the answers you would get from the experimental subjects. Do you have a similar hunch? > > > Notice that "experience" is a first person phenomena. Yes, and in our everyday world or even in Everett's MWI it is obvious who is experiencing that first person phenomena , but it is not obvious if "you" duplicating machines are involved because then the personal pronoun is ambiguous. > > > Yes, it is > > true that two entities with legitimate claims to being John Clark > > will, among them (third person) experience being in the two places, > > and it is also true that each one will experience being only in one > > place. Correct? > Correct. And before the duplication it would be meaningless to ask "which one city of the two cities will *you *end up seeing ?". Correct? And if the MWI is true and if "you" means any chunk of matter that behaves in a Telmomenesesian way then it is *NOT* meaningless to ask "which city will *you* see next?". Correct? > > > Then it follows that, from the first person, > > a 1/2 probability of > > b > eing in one of the places There is a 100% probability of *A* first person being in one the places, *THE* first person has no probability at all associated with it because after the duplication no such thing exists. > > assuming computationalism and an infinite multiverse, this is > > already happening. My current observer moment is realized infinitely > > many times, but it still only amounts to a single observer moment And in Bruno's thought experiment the only time there was a single observer moment occurred before the duplication and it consisted of Helsinki, not Moscow, not Washington, just Helsinki. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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