On 03 May 2017, at 17:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/3/2017 2:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 May 2017, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of
digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose. But
thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well you
just don't see how it could be.
Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the
primary matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-
recoverable.
The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't. I
don't know anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what
is not UD emulable.
To reify something for which we have no evidence, just to avoid a
problem,
You mean something like other worlds, just to make your theory
simpler. I would never accuse you of religious dogma for that.
There is no "other worlds" with computationalism. The ontology
contains only the natural numbers, structured by + and *. The
existence of all computations is a logical consequence of + and *.
They become "dream" by the Digital Mechanist assumption.
Now, adding a "primary physical world" to select some computations is
simply magical thought. We must first compare the physics given by the
statistic on first person views (given by S4Grz1, or the Z and X
logics), and the physics inferred from the local observation before.
If there is a discrepancy, then we get some evidence for that magic.
To bring the magic to avoid the math and the experimental data, is
equivalent as invoking god to avoid research. Up to now, no
discrepancies have been found. on the contrary, Everett QM confirms
the most startling consequence of computationalism, the *apparent*
"many-worlds/dreams".
is a bit like a pseudo-religious move, like invoking a miracle or a
god. You have to explain more on how that primary matter succeeds
in linking the computational histories with consciousness. If it is
non Turing emulable, I don't see why we could remain confident in a
digital brain transplant.
You're the one that says physics is non-Turing emulable - a
consequence of assuming an infinite number of worlds.
Not "world", or only in some abstract sense. better to say
computation, or dreams (computation + computationalism and the machine
povs).
So it is a consequence of the laws of addition and multiplication,
only. Nowhere is even one world assumed.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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