On 06 May 2017, at 18:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/6/2017 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't think so. Everett uses only Mechanism.
What exactly is "mechanism"? Is it not that mind supervenes on
the brain.
It is a bit ambiguus, but it is OK here, unless you mean supervene
on the material consistution of the brain (in which case it is
better to say no the doctor).
Don't say it is "OK here" when I've asked you what you mean. It's
your term.
Computationalism, or Digital Mechanism is, precisely, "it exists a
level of description of my physical generalized brain such that my
consciousness is invariant for a digital, physical and functional
substitution made at that level".
The generalized brain is the portion of the physical universe which
should be used to for that invariance.
So non-comp, for example, is entailed by the following theories:
a) The physical universe is infinite (or non Turing emulable) and my
consciousness supervene on the entire physical universe.
b) My consciousness supervene on my physical brain, and on a non
Turing emulable, *nor FPI recoverable* part of it.
c) My consciousness supervenes or not on something through the will of
some supernatural and non Turing emulable entity.
There is no bound on the granularity corresponding to the substitution
level chosen. If someone claim that his generalized brain needs a
gigantic (bit still finiteley describable in principle) part of the
physical universe, the conclusions are still getting through.
What I said was that I can accept the shorter "mind supervenes on
brain" as a pointer to that longer and more precise, and very eak
version of Mechanism.
Note that my version of Mechanism is weaker than all version in the
literature, and this means that the conclusion I get are valid for all
those other versions. The proof/result is very general.
Bruno
Brent
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