On 05 May 2017, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/5/2017 1:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 May 2017, at 22:35, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/4/2017 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 May 2017, at 17:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/3/2017 2:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 May 2017, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of
digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose. But
thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well
you just don't see how it could be.
Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to
the primary matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-
recoverable.
The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't.
I don't know anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's
what is not UD emulable.
To reify something for which we have no evidence, just to avoid
a problem,
You mean something like other worlds, just to make your theory
simpler. I would never accuse you of religious dogma for that.
There is no "other worlds" with computationalism. The ontology
contains only the natural numbers, structured by + and *. The
existence of all computations is a logical consequence of + and
*. They become "dream" by the Digital Mechanist assumption.
Now, adding a "primary physical world" to select some
computations is simply magical thought.
It's not magical thought to say somethings exist and some don't and
we don't know why.
It is magical when the thing which exists is metaphysical, and it is
claim that it does a magical thing, like making the people emulated in
arithmetic into zombies.
That's scientific modesty. Hubris is assuming the world must
satisfy our theories instead of the other way around.
Yes, but here you add a metaphysical idea to prevent the testing of a
widely believed theories. That is what creationist do with the theory
of evolution. Adding fairy tales to avoid scientific conclusions.
We must first compare the physics given by the statistic on first
person views (given by S4Grz1, or the Z and X logics), and the
physics inferred from the local observation before. If there is a
discrepancy, then we get some evidence for that magic. To bring
the magic to avoid the math and the experimental data, is
equivalent as invoking god to avoid research. Up to now, no
discrepancies have been found. on the contrary, Everett QM
confirms the most startling consequence of computationalism, the
*apparent* "many-worlds/dreams".
But Everett only confirms this under the assumptions that
consciousness supervenes on physics.
You can't both deny that premise and cite it as evidence for your
theory.
I don't think so. Everett uses only Mechanism.
What exactly is "mechanism"? Is it not that mind supervenes on the
brain.
It is a bit ambiguus, but it is OK here, unless you mean supervene on
the material consistution of the brain (in which case it is better to
say no the doctor).
Then, like I do in the though experiences, he consider physical
duplication (in this case made through the terms of the universal
superposition).
The duplication isn't very "physical" it's just the movement of the
state vector so that two possible brain states become
(approximately) orthogonal.
OK. And?
Everett miss that his move forces him to derive the wave itself
from the superposition in arithmetic, and that is the weakness, OK.
Not OK. How does that "forces him to derive the wave itself from
the superposition in arithmetic".
What step in UDA don't you agree with?
But then he was doing physics, and not mind-body theory. His
weakness is an implicit physicalism, which indeed cannot work
without some derivation of physics from all computations.
is a bit like a pseudo-religious move, like invoking a miracle
or a god. You have to explain more on how that primary matter
succeeds in linking the computational histories with
consciousness. If it is non Turing emulable, I don't see why we
could remain confident in a digital brain transplant.
You're the one that says physics is non-Turing emulable - a
consequence of assuming an infinite number of worlds.
Not "world", or only in some abstract sense. better to say
computation, or dreams (computation + computationalism and the
machine povs).
So it is a consequence of the laws of addition and
multiplication, only. Nowhere is even one world assumed.
Then neither is any world predicted. A rather great failing for a
TOE.
Unless there is no "world".
Yet there is duplication of persons who then perceive themselves to
be in different worlds.
Worlds, states, computations, etc.
I think you equivocate. You rely on DeWitt's many worlds to explain
FPI, but then say no world is predicted.
With comp, worlds are phenomenological object. They do not exist at
the base level of the ontology. They are sharable appearances, and we
have to explain their apparent persistence.
Just computations, and a reality above (which does not need to be
more than the arithmetical reality).
I don't know what "need" means in that context.
We try to assume as less as possible, by Occam. As a primaty material
universe cannot select the computations, it cannot have any role in
the physical appearances. So better to not add them, like it is better
to not add the invisible horses.
Bruno
Brent
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