On 08 May 2017, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 6:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> If a proper noun is not the referent of the personal
pronouns Bruno Marchal loves to through around with abandon then
WHAT IS? When Bruno asks "what city will you see?" who exactly is
Bruno asking the question of?
> 1) See my post of last week where I have replaced "you" by BM.
I remember it,
Thanks God!
and if the definition of BM is someone who answers to the name "BM"
and who remembers being BM in Helsinki then BM will see BOTH Moscow
AND Washington as can be verified by taking inventory of all the
things that meet the aforementioned criteria after the duplication.
In the 3p description. Sure. But for the million times, that is not
what is asked.
2) "you" mean here the guy in Helsinki,
If that's what "you" means then "you" will see nothing but
oblivion because after the duplication there will be NO GUY in
Helsinki;
False according to your acceptation that the "Guy-in-Helsinki"
survives in both place. You repeat yourself.
Look, you make difficult something super-easy. If you cannot make the
specific city lived from the 1p pov prediction, there is a first
person indeterminacy. If you can make a prediction, then give it to
us, but not the "W & M" which is refuted immediately in both diaries.
however if "you" means someone who remembers being BM in Helsinki
then "you" will see both cities.
I ask both the M-guy and the W-guy: -- did you saw both cities when
opening the door? Answer they both give to me: "No sir, I saw only one
city".
> I thought you would know that, as we have agreed on this
since years.
John Clark thought so too but apparently we agree that you will
survive but disagree on what "you" means.
I think we agree, but you seem to forget the 1p-3p distinction each
time we would get the indeterminacy by taking it into account..
John Clark is no longer certain what Bruno Marchal means by "you".
The question is about the future 1-you.
After the duplication, there are two 1-you,.
Any possible "1-you" or "1-me" , or 1-BM, or 1-JCK, or any 1p-
whatever, cannot have the experience of being at two places at once in
the 1p perspective, for that protocol, it is easy to predict that the
guy in Helsinki will find itself in once city, without having any
means to predict which one in advance. Both copies confirms this.
> >> as the two copies will easily confirm.
>> Then what is the the name of the one and only goddamn
city that the two copies agree the Helsinki man ended up
seeing??? If that question can't be answered with ONE WORD that
proves the question is gibberish. And don't tell me it can't be
predicted, I'm not talking about prediction
> Then you change the subject. Step 3 asked for the prediction
done in Helsinki,
That is more than ONE WORD, and it most certainly IS the subject
if the prediction asked for in Helsinki is pure 100% triple
distilled gibberish.
Reread my preceding post. There are no ONE WORD answers to describe
the 1p-you after a duplication experience. The ONE word answer is the
one word given by both copies, and the protocol makes it different for
each 1-you obtained. One will write Moscow in its diary, the other
will write "Moscow", and that is exactly why in Helsinki he was unable
to predict if he will be the one in Moscow, or the one in Washington.
In the 1p obtained, those two views are simply incompatible.
You seem to only eliminate the meaning of the two 1p-result obtained
by the duplication.
> and with the first person discourse defined by the diary
One question, who wrote that idiotic diary, the man who now lives
in Washington or Moscow?
The guy bought it in Helsinki, before the experience, to write his
prediction. As we both have agreed that he survived in both city: the
M-guy and the W-guy can say "I am the one who buy it in Helsinki, but
of course, now there are two exemplars, with different answer about
the city that me and my doppelganger have seen".
If that book is to have any use that question must be answered
with the name of one and only one city,
Of course not. The diary has been duplicated.
and if that can't be done then it's of no use in an experiment, not
even a thought experiment.
>> I'm talking about history; you insist the Helsinki man will
end up seeing Moscow OR Washington but not both, so now that the
experiment is over tell me what one and only one city the Helsinki
man ended up seeing.
> Very simple, dear John.
If it were very simple (and not gibberish) that could be answered
with one word.
No, what is very simple, is to understand that "one word" will always
be false, and that this is the reason why there is an indeterminacy.
It is strictly isomorphic with asking to a guy playing with a perfect
coin: "tell me what you will obtain with one word".
> As the guy in Helsinki guy survived in both cities, in two
incompatible first experiences, we have to look at both diaries, and
we see that one wrote "I predicted that I will see both W and M, but
I have to admit that I see only W, so I was mistaken; it is only
W" , and the other diaries contains "I predicted that I will
see both W and M, but I have to admit that I see only M, so I was
mistaken; it is only M". So Bruno ws right,
That is still more than one word. It's strange that as a logician
Bruno says the statement "X or Y is true" is true even if you
have proof that X is false AND you also have proof that Y is false.
Well yes in a way that is very simple, as in very stupid.
The coin provides again a counter-example. That "one word" you ask me
would suppress the indeterminacy. You are the one who disbelieve in
the indeterminacy, and so believe you can answer by one word.
What is clear is that "W v M" is certain, and "W & M" is impossible.
The one word "W" or "M" will both be true for one of them, and false
for one of them, and the point is that this lakes W and M both
possible, but not necessary for the H-guy.
> after all, given that the personal diary is not about all
possible first experience, but the specific one [...]
But that's exactly what I want to know! Which specific one wrote
the idiot diary, the Washington man or the Moscow man?
Both. That entails the 3-1 "W & M", and the two incompatible 1-1 (=
1) "W" for one of them, "M" for the other.
All you need is to remember the 3/1 difference, and listen to the 1p
obtained after the duplication. Both confimrs "W v M", and both
refutes the "W & M", given that they are both in two incompatible
state of mind of seeing only one city.
>>Let me put it another way, if after the experiment was over
and you observed all the results you then got into a time machine
and went back to Helsinki before the duplication and the Helsinki
man asked you "what city will I end up seeing?" what one word would
you utter in reply, Moscow or Washington?
> First person experience are personal, and non communicable. I
can only answer that both guy have suddenly understand the question,
But were back in Helsinki BEFORE the duplication and there are no
"both guys" there is only one guy, so when that one guy says to
Bruno "as a visitor from the future that knows everything what one
and only one city will I end up seeing after I walk into that I
duplicating machine?" Bruno has no coherent answer to give the one
guy because the question is ambiguous due to the foggy nature of the
personal pronoun "I" in a world that contains people duplicating
machines.
NO, I will say, you did end up in two cities, because, in that
setting, I can only be a third person (not entering in any box). So,
the way you ask let me only the possibility to describe the 3-1
situation. What I still can say, is that both confirms that they have
seen only one city, and both admit at last that they were not able to
predict which one, and that they got the point.
BTW, we see also that both are fustrated, because the W-guy cannot
claim "you know I am the real JCK and I am in Moscow", because that
"real sensation" is, by mechanism, lived by both. They can each ask
themselves "why am I the guy in M", and "Why am I the guy in W", but
if they think about this, mechanism makes that question unanswerable,
confimining the utter strong form of that 1p-indeterminacy.
> and both concluded that they should have predict "M v W", as
both agreed that they definitely see only one city.
I'm not talking about both guys I'm talking about one guy, the
Helsinki guy,
OK? but he will be duplicated. The helsinki guy will survived in both
cities.
and I'm talking about how to answer his "question". You say after
the duplication "both guy have suddenly understand the question" ,
but that implies that before the duplication nobody understands the
question, even a time traveler from the future can't explain the
question (much less give the answer) to the single Helsinki man
because the "question" is not a question at all, it's gibberish.
Why. There is a best prediction on which every copies agree, and can
remember for a future duplication. It is gibberish only when you
forget the 1p-3p distinction. What you are really telling us is that
the notion of 1p is gibberish, but that makes the point: if you keep
computationalism, then you have to eliminate the 1p to keep
determinacy in the self-duplication experiment/experience.
>> How can it be indeterminate when a correct prediction
has just been made?
> The correct, but uninteresting and trivial, prediction was
"The Washington man will see Washington and the Moscow man will see
Moscow".
I agree that prediction is uninteresting and trivial, BUT AT LEAST
IT'S NOT GIBBERISH, and, as a time traveler could attest, the
prediction even turned out to be true .
Yes, but as explainled above, the time traveller never enter the box,
and so can only give the 3p prediction on the two incompatible views.
> Yet, the Helsinki-guy cannot know in advance if he will feel
to be the Washington man, or the Moscow man,
Forget "in advance", the Helsinki guy can NEVER know.
But then you must drop your idea that the H-guy survived in both
cities, where suddenly he knows the answer, in each city. But then, he
dies in that duplication experience, and if that is case, he dies in
the simple teleportation case, and thus should say no to the doctor.
You make my point all the times, John. It is enough to re-inject the
1p-3p distinction, and your argument precisely lead to the 1p-
indeterminacy. Of course, by not taking that distinction, you get the
gibberish. But you are the one introducing it by your persistent
refusal of listening to both copies' first person account of the
duplication. It really looks like the copies are become some zombie,
and that when they told us, in both W and M: "Bruno was right, I see
only one city, not both, and I could not have predicted it in
advance", you are unable to listen to any of them.
Bruno
The Helsinki guy also can't know for sure if that radioactive atom
will decay in the next minute, the best Quantum Mechanics can do is
give him the odds, but if time travel is possible then someone
from the future can tell the Helsinki man with 100% certainty
if the atom will decay or not. In contrast even the time
traveler can't answer the Helsinki guy's question "what one and
only one city will I see after I am duplicated?" in fact the
time traveler can't even give odds because the Helsinki
man's "question" is not a question, it's just a string of words
with a question mark at the end.
>> Counting argument? What on earth are you going to count?
There is no way to ever tell if a prediction turned out to be right
or wrong.
> It is an easy exercise for anyone capable of distinguishing
the diary out of the boxes,
It's an IMPOSSIBLE exercise to distinguish if the Washington
man wrote the diary or if the Moscow man did, which means the entire
diary is a waste of paper.
John K Clark
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