On 18 May 2017, at 01:15, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 5:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> A model is the math version of a reality.
A model could be accurate or inaccurate.
This makes no sense with the technical sense of model by the logician.
Accuracy is defined by using the notion of model.
What do you mean by "model"?
> A theory
A theory could also be accurate or inaccurate.
> is a finite object
A theory is a "finite object" but a model is not?
In general it is not. All theories/machines discussed here are
effective extension of PA, which has no finite models. All models of
PA contains the standard model, which is the infinite structure (N, 0,
+, x).
> Note that this is false for some higher order logic.
If true, if logic can sometimes say something is false and
sometimes say the same thing is true (that's true or false not
proven or unproven, and there is a difference) if sometimes logic
say yes that bridge will carry your weight if you cross it and
sometimes logic says no it won't carry your weight then physics is
the final arbiter about what will happen when you cross it.
Reality is the final arbiter. (and this does not necessarily means
physical reality, although it is all what we have to refute a theory).
No theories can be an arbiter. Today's fundamental physics does not
exist. Attempts to get both GR and QM fails up to now.
If what you say is true true then physics doesn't care what logic or
mathematics say, you've just got to cross the bridge and see what
physics decides to do.
I think you are ambiguous. I am not sure if by physics you mean the
theory, or the possible reaiilty that physics attempt to describe, and
which is fundamental or not (an open problem).
>> So what is the correct purely mathematical theory that
would avoid the paradoxes I described? After 2 minutes is that Zeno
lamp on or off? How many balls are in that box, a infinite number
or zero? According to you the fact that nobody can physically make
such a lamp or box makes no difference, so there is an answer, so
let's have it!
> You need to make it mathematically clear before.
Thomson's lamp problem is perfectly clear,
?
but mathematics can not provide a clear answer.
Well, with mechanism, Thomson's lamp does not exist. Nor any lamp ...
> >>Mathematics is not a language.
>>Most mathematicians would disagree.
> ? Most mathematician agree with that idea,
I Googled "Mathematics is a language" and got many thousands of
hits,
That is not a lot, but in science, we don't work with pools.
the oldest quote I could find came from Galileo who said
1623 "the universe is written in the language of
mathematics".
the fact that mathematics has some language does not make it into a
language itself.
> especially after Gödel proved his incompleteness theorem,
Godel always believed in Platonism, he thought things
like Goldbach's conjecture were either true or they were not and I
do too,
but Godel prove that the language of mathematics will not always
be able to say if things like Goldbach's conjecture are true or
not.
Gödels shows that theories (rich enough to add and multiply) are
necessarily incomplete. Theories use language, but are not language.
> Read hardy "a mathematician's apology".
I did, I read it when I was a kid.
>> You still need energy, you can make the amount of
energy arbitrary small with a reversible computer if you can
also keep the computer arbitrarily well isolated from unwanted
interactions, but the less energy you use the slower the
calculation and if you use zero energy the calculation will
grind to a halt. And besides energy you certainly need matter
to perform calculations.
> I need energy to impolement the computation, but the
computation itself will not need energy. Of course, I will need
energy for the read and write, and any use of the computation.
Energy is needed to implement a calculation but calculations need
no energy? That makes no sense.
It means that once the program is implemented (which has cost some
energy, if only to erase the memory so that we can put the program),
then, after pushing "enter", the computation will run without using
any energy. In the billiard model, you need to kick some balls, but,
assuming perfect smoothness of the table, and perfect elasticity of
the ball, the computation will run without needing extra-energy. Same,
and more realizable, with a quantum computer.
> The need of energy in our physical implementation of computer
Or to say the same thing with different words, information
is physical.
That does not follow. Using information is physical.
But information itself is mathematical, and physical is reduced to
information, if mechanism is correct (and my reasoning, but that is
what we discussed)
> is thus not relevant,
Only if the physical world isn't relevant, and that's the road
to madness.
> If everett is false, and if QM is correct, information and
mind have to be physical
And if Everett is correct and QM is correct then information
and mind have to be physical too.
Why?
> to reduce the wave packet at a distance, and many
magic thing like that. Of course, that is the main reason to believe
in Everett,
No it is not, and that's the only reason I'm a Everett fan! Unlike
most other quantum interpretations Everett has no need to explain
how the mind works
He assumes explicitly Mechanism in his long text. All theories in
physics assumes at some level some theory of mind. The problem is that
most materialist assumes mechanism, but they are incompatible
(ontologically or epistemologically, this depends a bit of the
technical nuance used in the presentation of that fact).
or say what consciousness or a observation is because those things
have nothing to do with it. Everett says a conscious observer obeys
the same laws of physics as a rock, if there is a change the
universe splits and if there isn't it doesn't.
>> Screw peepee screw baby talk.
> Well, this is not convincing,
Neither is your peepee baby talk.
>> There are a infinite number of axioms that mathematicians
could have started out with, why did they pick the particular ones
that they did?
> It depends on the application,
If the application is to figure out if that bridge will carry your
weight if you cross it then you had better pick the axioms in number
theory such that they allow you to correctly count out the number of
pounds things weigh.
> or, in pure mathematics, from their taste. The mathematical
reality is ample. it contains many structures obeying to different
theories.
That's true, a language can do a amazing variety of things, the
English language for example can be used to write a treatises on
bridge building and that same language can also be used to write a
Harry Potter novel.
>> In every case physics leads and mathematics follows.
> If that is true, computationalism is false.
Bullshit.
> You present physicalism like if it was metaphysically proved.
Obviopusly, that is not the case, and there are no evidences at all
for it, only evidences of the contrary, unless you eliminate
consciousness, person, etc.
If my physical brain changes my consciousness changes.
Not necessarily. All change made below your substitution level, if
they respect the functionality above, will not change your
consciousness. Indeed, that is what explain the quantum nature of
physics with computationalism.
If my consciousness changes my physical brain changes.
With mechanism, there is no ontological physical brain. The physical
brain and body, and any piece of matter I can touch, is only a first
person plural map of your accessible histories. I predicted, before
knowing anything on the quantum weirdness, that if we look at a piece
of matter, we should see that it is only a statistical map on your
possible next states, and we can say that the quantum orbitals somehow
confirms that consequence of Mechanism.
What more evidence in favor of physicalism do you need? What more
evidence could there even be?
You would have given evidence for the existence of a physical reality,
not for physicalism or for the existence of a primary physical reality.
Bruno
John K Clark
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