---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> Date: 26 May 2017 at 02:13 Subject: Re: Answers to David 4 To: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>, Bruno Marchal < bruno.fernand.marc...@gmail.com>
On 26 May 2017 at 01:24, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 5/25/2017 4:11 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot call it > simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in mechanism, he should > tell us what is his explanation for consciousness. But here, he clearly > dismiss the problem when saying that once machine will be intelligent, the > "hard" problem will dissolve. But he never explained why and how. > > > Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing, but > something that can be implemented in different ways having different > relations to memory and emotions. > > > Sure, but you betray your implicit conclusion. Consciousness is just a > 'thing' in this view - a neurological thing supervening on a physical > thing. Parse it how you will, the 'explanation' will always be in terms one > thing or another. > > > Exactly my point - leading to a virtuous circle of explanation. > > > > > > > I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism, which is > that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain the appearance of > the physical universe. > > > I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. "Invoke" is > a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an *inference *to > explain appearances (and a very successful one at that). > > > Vocabulary. > > > ?? Your point is that you should be allowed a pejorative characterization > of what Newton, Einstein, et al have done? Would it have been better to > invoke arithmetic? What would that explain? > What would that explain? I'm frankly astonished that you continue to pose this question as though we hadn't all been discussing it these many years. Surely even if you don't agree with a theory you can understand what it sets out to explain? We invoke (or infer) arithmetic, assuming mechanism, because it (or its combinatorial equivalent) is the minimal ontology (with +&*) that we need to 'explain' computation. The issue has been raised because computation, as CTM, is the basis of the default mechanistic theory of mind. As soon as we have done this, the specific computations we need to explain physics immediately 'get lost' in the computational plenitude. To 'find' them again we need to develop an effective theory of observation, perception, or subjectivity (I'm not being over-particular about vocabulary here) in terms of which stable, consistent and pervasive physical appearances will, so to speak, reappear. This idea in itself is hardly unfamiliar since it plays a central explanatory role in any theory based on observer selection. David > > > The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if you're > reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a particular > *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude. And why is > that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they really? Are those > computations - in and of themselves - really capable of 'explaining' why or > how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected for our delectation? > Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how those selfsame > appearances come to be present to us? > > > Good questions. > > > Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it doesn't > exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever those computations > are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit of what we can ask in > explanation. But if that's the way it is, I can't help being put in mind of > that old huntsman John Peel, who would assert, with a remarkable > satisfaction in the virtue of invincible ignorance, "What I don't know > ain't knowledge." > > > It ain't so much what you don't know that gets you into trouble, as what > you know that ain't so. > --- Josh Billings > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
