---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Nyman <[email protected]> Date: 27 May 2017 at 22:43 Subject: Re: Answers to David 4 To: meekerdb <[email protected]>
On 27 May 2017 9:19 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: On 5/27/2017 5:36 AM, David Nyman wrote: > It might. But ISTM that the entire project of explanation itself entails > at least a hesitation before assigning anything to the category of 'brute > fact'. Bruno sometimes likes to metaphorise whatever we accept without > explanation as God, or at least as an aspect of a generalised notion of > theology (as indeed did Einstein, leading to not dissimilar > misunderstandings in his case). So on that basis you are suggesting that we > accept a physical universe (assuming that this is what you mean by reality > being what it is) exclusively in that role. Trouble is, computationalism as > a theory of mind closes that option. > That's not true. It hides a lot of assumptions about the reification of arithmetic and the UD and modal logic. Well, I have to say from my perspective this debate over reification is getting a mite tedious. I really don't understand why you think that the assumption of arithmetic as an explanatory ontology is any more a 'reification' than that of any other mathematical schema. They're all essentially inferences to an explanation of the observables. I'd hoped my recent posts might possibly take the conversation in a more interesting direction. Part of the problem in these discussions is that they started with a definition of computationalism = "consciousness arises when some class of computations is implemented" I think part of your difficulty is encapsulated by the vocabulary you adopt here. ISTM you have a tendency to talk about consciousness in implicitly ontological terms, for example as something that "arises". For me what's interesting is the relinquishing of such ineffectual notions in exchange for the analysis of the characteristic modes of a reflexive epistemology. It opens up a quite novel conceptual space for thinking about perception. Instead of worrying about what sort of thing or process it might be, we can think rather in terms of what is perceptible and what isn't, what is doubtable and what isn't, what is communicable and what isn't and so forth. Then we may begin to discern how such aspects might represent effective points of contact with the specifics of what we ordinarily call consciousness and consequently also what the natural limits of any such representation might be. By conceiving the thing in this way we also 'vaccinate' it against any reduction in ontological terms. but then it starts to be used to encompass Bruno's whole theology as though we accept not only the premise but also his whole argument. We're not required to accept it, only to adopt it provisionally. But seriously. In point of fact though, speculative though it may be, in the last analysis it's a theory of everything or else a theory of nothing (pace Dr Standish). Sometimes you have to push a thing to the limit to see what it's really about. David Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
