---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> Date: 27 May 2017 at 23:12 Subject: Re: Answers to David 4 To: meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
Brent, why are y ou still PM'ing me ? Please let me know if you have read this. On 27 May 2017 21:36, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 5/27/2017 6:24 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > >> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> >> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. "Invoke" is >> a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an *inference *to >> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that). >> >> >> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if >> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a >> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude. >> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they >> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of >> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected >> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how >> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us? >> >> >> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I >> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation" >> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time >> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology >> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to >> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes >> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the >> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to >> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity >> from this ontology. >> >> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my >> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British >> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and >> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show >> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic >> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- >> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the >> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the >> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of >> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that >> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence, >> "Epistemology precedes ontology". >> >> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we >> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish >> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the >> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his >> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn >> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the >> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the >> creation of effective AI. >> >> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says, >> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than >> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the >> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more >> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of >> the nature of reality. >> >> >> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has >> led to some success. But that does not make it true, >> >> >> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern. >> What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The >> scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the >> underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this >> being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism. >> >> and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem >> (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent >> existence of the physical reality, >> >> >> Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be just >> a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is explore >> and attempt to understand how it works. >> >> and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but with the price that a lot of >> work remains for all details. We are at the beginning of the "reversal" >> only. >> >> >> I think there is reason to think that the "reversal" cannot succeed. >> > > Forgive me for the flurry of posting today, but I feel it may again be > useful to rearticulate a view of the 'reversal' at this point, since it > seems to lead to endless miscommunication. I'm afraid it's going to lean on > an explanatory style deriving from an explicit ontological commitment, so > if that's going to be your objection there isn't anything I can do about it. > > Bruno usually phrases the reversal as that between physics and machine > psychology. What is the justification for this claim? In my understanding, > what is 'reversed' is explanatory priority. That is, on the assumption of a > 'pre-existing' physical ontology, 'machine psychology' - which here is > taken to mean the computational emulation of a subjective point of view - > is assumed to be derivative solely on that physics, although with the > critically determinative but implicit additional assumption of digital > mechanism. Putting the thing more neutrally, we might say that > psychological explanation is derivative on physical explanation, with no > further ontological assumptions than are implied by the latter. This > doesn't seem to me FAPP to be substantially different from what is > conventionally supposed. The problem here is that this construction tends > to lead - when examined rigorously and without evasion - to > instrumentalism or eliminativism with respect to consciousness. IOW it is > simply accepted without further explication as a 'brute' physical fact or > 'identity'. > > But with the assumption of a computational ontology the key point is that > the emergence of a prototypical machine psychology *precedes*, in an > explanatory sense, the point at which the phenomenology of any physical > observable in particular can be isolated. Hence, again in an explanatory > sense, that isolation must subsequently be justified 'observationally' in > terms of a generalisation of the characteristics of the 'depth psychology' > in terms of which it emerges. I think you commented, on a previous attempt > on my part to articulate this explanation of the reversal, to the effect > that it was 'wishful thinking'. It is indeed a wish rather than a fact at > this stage that the detailed matching of the consequences of this view with > 'conventional' physics haven't advanced beyond the preliminaries (although > these are in themselves already interesting and indicative). But my > intention at this point is not to pursue that line, but rather to attempt > to establish what is, in the first place, intended by the notion of > 'reversal' and just what it is that has been reversed: namely, the > direction of explanation. As I remarked elsewhere, this shouldn't really be > a surprise. It's just what's implied by the assumption of mechanism in the > mind-body problem and consequently in the problem of 'causal' explanation > tout court. > > Comments - of course - are welcomed. > > David > > > I think what is meant by the reversal is clear enough. The forward > hypothesis, mechanism, is that the realization of some information > processing in the brain, or other physical system, instantiates > consciousness. The reverse, platonism, is that all computations exist and > hence among them will be computations that instantiate all possible > conscious thoughts. > > And among all those thoughts there will be some that instantiate exactly > those thoughts we have, including those thoughts of perceiving and > inferring a physical world and other people. Thoughts are related by > threads of computation and consequently they can be classified into some > that can be proven and some that are true but can't be proven. One might > hypothesize that this division corresponds to what is thought and is > communicable versus what is thought but can't be communicated, i.e. the > internal thoughts of consciousness. > Yes, although I think you could be more explicit that "those thoughts of perceiving and inferring a physical world and other people" must encompass the entire spectrum of observable physical phenomena. The relevant computation must also precisely mirror the transformational schemas of physics. If so, in this characterisation there would indeed be an explanatory reversal between physics and the psychology of the machine, as Bruno phrases it. Of course there is an assumption here that the modes of perception we are attempting to explain depend in some critical way on just that physics whose phenomena we observe and whose mathematical transformations we hypothesise. And further that the measure of such a physics would typically predominate over any other physics that might produce either different modes of perception or a different spectrum of 'probabilities'. These are, to say the least. open problems although as you are aware they have begun to figure even in 'conventional' physical speculation. David > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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