On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote: > > On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < <meeke...@verizon.net> > meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. "Invoke" is > a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an *inference *to > explain appearances (and a very successful one at that). > > > Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if > you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a > particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude. > And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they > really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of > 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected > for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how > those selfsame appearances come to be present to us? > > > I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I > understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation" > originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time > both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology > of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to > Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes > epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the > ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to > be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity > from this ontology. > > As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my > position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British > empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and > others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show > its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic > occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- > the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the > dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the > citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of > relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that > is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence, > "Epistemology precedes ontology". > > Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we > shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish > between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the > disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his > antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn > to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the > understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the > creation of effective AI. > > This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says, > this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than > the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the > scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more > successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of > the nature of reality. > > > Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has > led to some success. But that does not make it true, > > > For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern. > Assuming that you're describing your own stance in this way, it would hardly be surprising that you can then find little sympathy for 'digging' on fundamental issues, as Bruno likes to put it. Trouble is, that tends to mire these conversations in procedural preliminaries rather than substantial argument. What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The > scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the > underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this > being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism. > But it is quite unnecessary to interpret 'realism' in this way. Realism need entail only taking a provisional (or assumptive) ontological commitment sufficiently seriously to discover what can be inferred from it. How else could any explanatory schema be refuted or corrected if inadequate? And if that incorrectness is a function of the inadequacy of the assumptive ontology, then that too would have to be corrected. As indeed has occurred many times in the history of science. ISTM that the supposed necessity of a dichotomy between instrumentalism and so-called realism or reification in science is merely an unhelpful distraction. As indeed I think is being sufficiently demonstrated in the present conversation. > > and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem > (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent > existence of the physical reality, > > > Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be just > a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is explore > and attempt to understand how it works. > It might. But ISTM that the entire project of explanation itself entails at least a hesitation before assigning anything to the category of 'brute fact'. Bruno sometimes likes to metaphorise whatever we accept without explanation as God, or at least as an aspect of a generalised notion of theology (as indeed did Einstein, leading to not dissimilar misunderstandings in his case). So on that basis you are suggesting that we accept a physical universe (assuming that this is what you mean by reality being what it is) exclusively in that role. Trouble is, computationalism as a theory of mind closes that option. Of course one can dissent from this particular theory at the outset. But its acceptance entails an analysis of the consequences of a generalised computational, as distinct from an already particularised physical, ontology. Chief amongst these, quite naturally, is the requirement to understand physics in terms of a stable, pervasive and consistent set of appearances (i.e. observables) that are 'observationally selected' from the assumptive ontological plenitude. This is of course very much an open problem, a direct consequence of the opening assumptions, although one for which there are already some interesting and suggestive leads. I have recently posted some remarks on this in an attempt to draw out some of the issues. But if your philosophical stance already precludes your taking such issues seriously that conversation won't get very far. > > and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but with the price that a lot of > work remains for all details. We are at the beginning of the "reversal" > only. > > > I think there is reason to think that the "reversal" cannot succeed. > Well, for my money, you haven't yet succeeded at making your objections stick. ISTM that your approach is rather scattergun and tends to be an attack on a series of straw men rather than a determination to get to grips with any argument of substance (of which there are many in a topic in such an open state). No doubt your recent remarks on your preferred explanatory style give a clue to why this might be. > You have to get a lot more than you currently have for computationalism to > rival conventional science. > But that's hardly a reasonable aim at this stage, so I'm afraid your criticism is rather wide of the mark. Of course the theory must proceed hand in glove with 'conventional' science since at the very least the latter may furnish evidence for its possible refutation at any point. But on the constructive side, the intention is to open up a fresh insight into the mind-body problem, at least for those of us who see existing formulations as fundamentally obfuscatory rather than enlightening. After a rather lengthy reflection (these conversations, at least on my side, have been proceeding, off and on, for over 10 years!) I have come to agree with Bruno that he is not in fact presenting a new theory, but rather putting forward a more explicit and rigorous examination of the time-worn theory of mechanistic causation itself. The latter has indeed proved so far the only viable alternative to 'magic' yet discovered by humans. I recall, anecdotally, that in my old system design days it was customary to write, with studied irony, "and then magic happens" inside a rough sketch of a cloud - who knows, perhaps a link to the modern use of the term - to represent something nobody had yet managed to figure out any way of delivering. ISTM that statements like 'reality is what it is' are written inside clouds somewhat like that, but perhaps missing the accompanying sense of irony. IOW magic just happens, and then, poof! - WYSIWYG. 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