On 26 May 2017, at 03:16, David Nyman wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>
Date: 26 May 2017 at 01:53
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
On 26 May 2017 at 01:24, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/25/2017 4:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot
call it simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in
mechanism, he should tell us what is his explanation for
consciousness. But here, he clearly dismiss the problem when
saying that once machine will be intelligent, the "hard" problem
will dissolve. But he never explained why and how.
Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing,
but something that can be implemented in different ways having
different relations to memory and emotions.
Sure, but you betray your implicit conclusion. Consciousness is
just a 'thing' in this view - a neurological thing supervening on a
physical thing. Parse it how you will, the 'explanation' will
always be in terms one thing or another.
Exactly my point - leading to a virtuous circle of explanation.
That's your point? Well I guess that works if things are your
(only) thing. That, in case you missed it, was *my* point. By the
way, you're still PM-ing me.
Which explain why I did not get the message.
Brent, an explanation can be circular only if you can embed the circle
in some clean ontology. Adding "virtuous" will not help. I can
appreciate you virtous circles, but this is because arithmetic
implements many (virtuous) circles.
Bruno
I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism,
which is that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain
the appearance of the physical universe.
I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an
inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
Vocabulary.
?? Your point is that you should be allowed a pejorative
characterization of what Newton, Einstein, et al have done?
Hardly. Of course I meant only *your* quibble about vocabulary. I
don't see anything pejorative in invoke. Invoke and infer are
doing the same work here, AFAICS.
Would it have been better to invoke arithmetic? What would that
explain?
The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if you're
reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
particular *selection* of computations from the computational
plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances.
But do they really? Are those computations - in and of themselves -
really capable of 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come
to be uniquely selected for our delectation? Are they really
capable of 'explaining' why or how those selfsame appearances come
to be present to us?
Good questions.
Thanks.
Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it
doesn't exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever
those computations are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit
of what we can ask in explanation.
Well, you didn't answer this. But to be fair, it was somewhat of a
rhetorical question, since you've told me time and again that this
is indeed what you think.
But if that's the way it is, I can't help being put in mind of
that old huntsman John Peel, who would assert, with a remarkable
satisfaction in the virtue of invincible ignorance, "What I don't
know ain't knowledge."
It ain't so much what you don't know that gets you into trouble, as
what you know that ain't so.
--- Josh Billings
A double-edge sword, if ever I felt one.
David
Brent
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