> On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum >>>>>>>>> structure, >>>>>>>> I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the quantum >>>>>>>> logic. It is richer than the quantum logic of the physicians, so this >>>>>>>> predicts new things. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What are they? >>>>>> >>>>>> The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum logical >>>>>> terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond the reach of my >>>>>> (old) theorem prover. >>>>> >>>>> So they are not testable. >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived, and thus not >>>> tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure how you arrive at your >>>> conclusion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the UD. >>>>>>>> Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to >>>>>>>> progress. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if you >>>>>>> cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as quantum >>>>>> logic. >>>>> >>>>> That's a far cry from quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has to be >>>> false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we can test this. >>>> >>>> The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist frame. >>>> Physicalism is *already* refuted. >>> >>> No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The >>> assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is mental because >>> the mental is substrate independent and therefore is independent of all >>> substrate. The last doesn't follow. >> >> >> What is a substrate? > > Supporting material.
That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here you seem to say that a substrate would support some primary matter. The physical accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories too. It is just that the “material” appears to be a mode of the observable, definable from self-reference. > >> How you test its primary existence? > > Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant. But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism? > Concrete can be the substrate of a building whether it is primary or has a > substrate of atoms. Then I am not sure we have disagreed. > >> How does a substrate select a computation, given the mechanist first person >> indeterminacy ? > > Concrete doesn't necessarily select the building, it supports it. In our > particular case it seems that evolution of carbon chemistry has selected a > computation as reproductively advantageous. Same here. Bruno > > Brent > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
