On 8/20/2018 5:53 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 12:20:19PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/20/2018 11:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When we assume compationalism. Yes. In that case consciousness is
associated with a digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish
a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality
But you didn't show that.
This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is pretty much
required for the Church Turing thesis to hold. Of course, step 7 relies on
robustness of the *-verse, for which step 8 is the remedy.
You mean this?
/7) Although your surviving does not depend on the faraway events,//
//from the first person perspective the event "I survive at the//
//left edge (let us say) of the galaxy" could depend on the faraway//
//other reconstitution. The duplicability entails first person//
//indeterminisme, although everything is determinate for a third//
//person. (It is really the computationalist 3-determinateness //
//which entails the computationalist 1-indeterminateness)./
I don't understand the first sentence. And I don't understand what
"robustness" refers to?
But already, I believe the *-verse must be robust, as otherwise quantum
computing supremacy will never work. Empirical support of this contention is
due real soon now™. So I suspect step 8 could well be consigned to the dustbin
of history...
You only showed that it would be true if the digital
entity were immersed in an environment. You argued that the environment could
also be digital...but the doctor couldn't provide that. But then your argument
fails. You've only shown that the digital entity can exist in a digital
environment consisting of digital matter (including the entities digital
brain). So you've just replicated the world except you've appended "digital"
in front of every noun and relation. If everything is digital, then digital
matter may be primary in this digital world. The adjective "digital" has lost
it's metaphysical significance...unless you can derive some observable
consequence of "digital".
This is a critique of step 8 (the MGA), which curryfies the environment into
the computation. My money's on robustness being empirically confirmed in the
next few decades...
We must be looking at some different enumeration of the argument. I have:
/8) You are 'read' and annihilated in Brussels and the information//
//is send to Washington and Moscow. You are reconstituted at Washington//
//and the information is keep intact at Moscow during one year. Then//
//you are reconstituted at Moscow. (Duplication with assymmetric//
//delay). The point is the following: whatever the way you choose for//
//quantifying the 1-indeterminisme in the symmetric duplication, you//
//must quantifify in the same manner the assymmetric duplication.//
//This follows from COMP and 3. The first person cannot be aware of//
//the delays.//
/
Brent
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