> On 20 Aug 2018, at 19:55, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 8/20/2018 2:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum >>>>>>>>>>> structure, >>>>>>>>>> I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the >>>>>>>>>> quantum logic. It is richer than the quantum logic of the >>>>>>>>>> physicians, so this predicts new things. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What are they? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum logical >>>>>>>> terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond the reach of my >>>>>>>> (old) theorem prover. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So they are not testable. >>>>>> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> >>>>>> Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived, and thus >>>>>> not tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure how you arrive at >>>>>> your conclusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the >>>>>>>>>>> UD. >>>>>>>>>> Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to >>>>>>>>>> progress. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if you >>>>>>>>> cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as quantum >>>>>>>> logic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That's a far cry from quantum mechanics. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has to be >>>>>> false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we can test this. >>>>>> >>>>>> The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist frame. >>>>>> Physicalism is *already* refuted. >>>>> >>>>> No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The >>>>> assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is mental >>>>> because the mental is substrate independent and therefore is independent >>>>> of all substrate. The last doesn't follow. >>>> >>>> >>>> What is a substrate? >>> >>> Supporting material. >> >> That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here you seem >> to say that a substrate would support some primary matter. The physical >> accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories too. It is just that >> the “material” appears to be a mode of the observable, definable from >> self-reference. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> How you test its primary existence? >>> >>> Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant. >> >> But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism? > > Because your argument was that matter cannot account for the mental.
When we assume compationalism. Yes. In that case consciousness is associated with a digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality (or you have to tell me how that matter intervenes and if that is not computing emulable, you can’t say no more yes to the doctor). A computation is realised in a semantical structure (a model in the sense of the logicians, when the relative truth making up the relevant computations are satisfied (like the neurons acts due to this or that conditions, etc.). The machine cannot feel that distinction, but what I show is that it can verify it by observation, by comparing the arithmetical physical modes and the physical inferred from observation. > That question is independent of whether matter or thought or arithmetic or > whatever is fundamental. ? > > Your argument seems to be that computationalism implies that thoughts can be > instantiated by many different material events (e.g. cosmic rays striking > neurons, a record) No. The cosmic way is used to criticize that idea. The movie graph show that invoking matter to solve the computationalist mind-body problem is as much absurd than invoking holy water or god in a metaphysical argument. It does not work, even if locally, the *human* consciousness is implemented in the physical realm. That physical realm cannot be invoked, but must be explained by the measure on all sigma_1 sentences/computations. > therefore a thought is characterized by something independent of matter Yes, a relatively self-referentially correct computation(s). But for the first person, (plural or singular) there are many of them, which leads to the mathematical problems of justifying the discourse on quanta and qualia. > and it can be instantiated in the immaterial relations of languages, e.g. > arithmetic, combinatorics,… Yes, as we know since long. Any sigma_1 complete structure is enough to assume, but the observer (which provably exist there) believes also in the induction axioms (making them Löbian, and aware of the mind-body problems and its solutions, when not too much lazy). > But that is a cheat because "characterized" =/="instantiated". Anything can > be characterized in language. The language is only the messenger. Consciousness is related to computations, which, like geometry, admits a lot of theorem which are independent of the choice of any language. Indeed, all machines have a theology (in the greek sense), which prove that most truth to which the machine is confronted are not definable in any language. The language we talk about are understandable by universal machine, but the truth of the propositions on the machines will not depend on any language. The language is only in the choice of an initial language, to talk about all universal machine and universal languages. > That fits very well with this list which was started by people who liked the > idea of everything and anything from a philosophical perspective because it > excused them from explaining why this rather than that. Not at all. It formulates the problem, and gives the unique solution, that we can compare with nature, so that we might be able to evaluate a possible departure of mechanism, but up to now, Nature seems to looks like needed (for the mechanist) solution of the mind-body problem when stated in *any* Turing universal theory or extensions. You confuse mechanism with digital physics, which would assume the physical universe is given by a particular universal machine or program. > But explaining why this rather than that is exactly what is science's job. Arithmetic + mechanism explained why the universal machine is confronted with the observable mode, and why it obeys a quantum logic, and why it separates into quanta and qualia. And the explanation is testable. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
