On 7/21/2019 11:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 3:22 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
<mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <danialso...@gmail.com
<mailto:danialso...@gmail.com>> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the
indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at
both city at once, but that will need some telepathy
hardly compatible with the idea that the level of
substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great
math and let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original
is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after
a delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the
original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more
sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more
the just memories of previous states, but depending also on
bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies
or not depends on the details of your theory of personal
identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if
the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a
single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and
can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument
is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie
in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a
new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than
your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical
question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not.
So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the
relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the
experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will
not happen.
Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain
that the continuer will not be identical. But I'm not identical
with Brent Meeker of yesterday or last year or of 1939. I have a
continuous causal connection with those Brent Meekers and I have
some similarities (DNA for example). So it hardly makes sense to
demand a sharp answer to "What will you experience." in a
duplication experiment when we don't even have a sharp definition
of "you". And it doesn't even take something as scifi as a
duplicator to raise the question. I might have a stroke tonight
and lose my ability to recognize names. Will I be the same person
tomorrow? I will have some of the same memories, but not all.
Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not?
These are good questions. That is why the 'closest continuer' theory
has some merit. It gives a reasonable account of how you remain the
same person under the continual changing of the atoms/molecules that
make up your body and brain. In the case of stroke or other head
injury, memories may be seriously disrupted or lost, but your family
will still recognise 'you' as the same Brent as yesterday, showing
that bodily continuity is a significant component in the concepts of
personal identity over changes in body and mind. It is not all down to
clear memories of the earlier self.
Nozick's closest continuer theory was developed in the light of data
from, and experience of, split brain individuals, which are the
closest we can currently come to the idea of personal duplication. The
philosophy of personal identity is complex, and there are not
necessarily any clear winners in the debate. In my opinion, that is a
cogent reason for being sceptical about Bruno's simplistic models.
Bruce
I haven't read Nozick's closest continuer theory. How would it apply to
MWI? Is the branch in which you change the least the only one that's
the "real you"? That would account for a lot of mental
intransigence...but it doesn't seem plausible.
Brent
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