> On 22 Jul 2019, at 08:09, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 3:22 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> > wrote: > On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <danialso...@gmail.com >> <mailto:danialso...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >> <snip> >>> >>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need >>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>> >>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>> >>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's >>> find out -- you go first. >> >> Let me rephrase the question: >> >> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >> >> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. >> The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in >> several different places. >> >> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or >> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >> (dies). >> >> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on >> what will or will not happen. > > Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain that the > continuer will not be identical. But I'm not identical with Brent Meeker of > yesterday or last year or of 1939. I have a continuous causal connection > with those Brent Meekers and I have some similarities (DNA for example). So > it hardly makes sense to demand a sharp answer to "What will you experience." > in a duplication experiment when we don't even have a sharp definition of > "you". And it doesn't even take something as scifi as a duplicator to raise > the question. I might have a stroke tonight and lose my ability to recognize > names. Will I be the same person tomorrow? I will have some of the same > memories, but not all. Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not? > > These are good questions. That is why the 'closest continuer' theory has some > merit. It gives a reasonable account of how you remain the same person under > the continual changing of the atoms/molecules that make up your body and > brain. In the case of stroke or other head injury, memories may be seriously > disrupted or lost, but your family will still recognise 'you' as the same > Brent as yesterday, showing that bodily continuity is a significant component > in the concepts of personal identity over changes in body and mind. It is not > all down to clear memories of the earlier self.
As you point out, it requires a continuum, or some topologies on the set of accessible consistent extension, and it *that* sense, we recover some” closer continuation” from the topology imposed by incompleteness (related to the S4Grz1 logics, and its variants). But in the case of numerical identical preparation/reconsitition, which exists in infinitely many occurrences in the arithmetical reality/model, we do get the first person indeterminacy and the quantum logic associated to them. > > Nozick's closest continuer theory was developed in the light of data from, > and experience of, split brain individuals, which are the closest we can > currently come to the idea of personal duplication. The philosophy of > personal identity is complex, and there are not necessarily any clear winners > in the debate. In my opinion, that is a cogent reason for being sceptical > about Bruno's simplistic models. Ad hominem insult. The version of mechanism I present is both on the informal and formal level, more precise and more subtle than most version in the literature, which avoid the existential quantification on the substitution level, and then the thought experiments are just an explanation of how I found all this, how to explain to non mathematician, but the “real” work is in the mathematics which follows, and which is everything but “simplistic”, and you just seem to be negative for the pleasure of being negative, and that shows your prejudices. Then your metaphysics is implicit, but it s-does seem that you are a dogmatic believer, which does not help. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQBaRPDOG9CB4O1J8Ttb9wsvuQKBNkV-K0p8UYZe6ZZeA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQBaRPDOG9CB4O1J8Ttb9wsvuQKBNkV-K0p8UYZe6ZZeA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F5A6E0DD-079C-424F-A145-991202A46C8D%40ulb.ac.be.
