On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 9:39 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> On 5 Mar 2020, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an
> entity is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation
> of finding itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious
> that there should be no such expectation.
>
>
> It is not just obvious. It is derivable from the simplest definition of
> “first person” and “third person”.
>

This is simply false. It cannot be derived from anything. The truth is that
testing any such notion about  the probability by repeating the trial shows
that no single value of the probability is appropriate. Alternatively, for
most 1p observers, any particular theory about the probability will be
disconfirmed. The first person data is the particular bit string recorded
by an individual. From the 3p perspective, there are 2^N different 1p bit
strings after N trials.

Bruce



> All arguments presented against the 1p-indeterminacy have always been
> refuted, and almost all time by pointing on a confusion between first
> person and third person.  The first person id defined by the owner of the
> personal memory taken with them in the box, and the third person is
> described by the personal memory of those outside the box.
>
>
>
>
> This seems to be an immediate judgement on considering the question, with
> attempts at rational justification perhaps following but not being the
> primary determinant of belief. A parallel is Newcomb’s paradox: on learning
> of it some people immediately feel it is obvious you should choose one box
> and others immediately feel you should choose both boxes.
>
>
>
> I think that the Newcomb situation is far more complex, or that the
> self-duplication is far more easy, at least for anyone who admits even weak
> form of Mechanism. To believe that there is no indeterminacy is like
> believing that all amoebas have telepathic power.
>
> The only reason I can see to refuse the first person indeterminacy is the
> comprehension that it leads to the end of physicalism, that is a long
> lasting comfortable habit of thought. People tend to hate change of
> paradigm.
>
> Bruno
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ_9TuO2n8ggPP4UggctLLtQJKHpvJqkD7vUnPrg-%2B6hA%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to