> On 5 Mar 2020, at 11:54, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 9:39 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 5 Mar 2020, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an entity >> is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation of >> finding itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious >> that there should be no such expectation. > > It is not just obvious. It is derivable from the simplest definition of > “first person” and “third person”. > > This is simply false. It cannot be derived from anything. The truth is that > testing any such notion about the probability by repeating the trial shows > that no single value of the probability is appropriate. Alternatively, for > most 1p observers, any particular theory about the probability will be > disconfirmed.
The P(W or M) = 1 is confirmed by all copies. P(W and M) = 1 is refuted by all copies. > The first person data is the particular bit string recorded by an individual. Yes, but seen from that individual’s point of view. > From the 3p perspective, Note that the question is about the 1p perspective …. > there are 2^N different 1p bit strings after N trials. In Helsinki you know in advance that you will get only one of the result among the 2^N different bit strings. Bruno > > Bruce > > > All arguments presented against the 1p-indeterminacy have always been > refuted, and almost all time by pointing on a confusion between first person > and third person. The first person id defined by the owner of the personal > memory taken with them in the box, and the third person is described by the > personal memory of those outside the box. > > > > >> This seems to be an immediate judgement on considering the question, with >> attempts at rational justification perhaps following but not being the >> primary determinant of belief. A parallel is Newcomb’s paradox: on learning >> of it some people immediately feel it is obvious you should choose one box >> and others immediately feel you should choose both boxes. > > > I think that the Newcomb situation is far more complex, or that the > self-duplication is far more easy, at least for anyone who admits even weak > form of Mechanism. To believe that there is no indeterminacy is like > believing that all amoebas have telepathic power. > > The only reason I can see to refuse the first person indeterminacy is the > comprehension that it leads to the end of physicalism, that is a long lasting > comfortable habit of thought. People tend to hate change of paradigm. > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ_9TuO2n8ggPP4UggctLLtQJKHpvJqkD7vUnPrg-%2B6hA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ_9TuO2n8ggPP4UggctLLtQJKHpvJqkD7vUnPrg-%2B6hA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F2A36980-F0B6-44B3-867A-D607B6C84351%40ulb.ac.be.
