> On 5 Sep 2020, at 14:26, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 5, 2020 at 5:28 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>
> > Hugh Everett would say pretty much the same thing because he also believes
> > we live in a deterministic world. Originally he may have only a vague idea
> > of which branch of the multiverse is being observed and so he thinks
> > there's a 50% chance, but as time goes on and he gains more information he
> > still can't narrow it down to one particular branch but there are a great
> > many branches that he can rule out and so by using the exact same Bayesian
> > statistical rules that Albert used he now says the Yankees have a 75%
> > chance of winning the World Series this year. But again If the world is
> > deterministic then that number says nothing intrinsically true about the
> > Yankees, it just says something about the state of mind of the speaker who
> > made the utterance.
>
> > The analogy does not work, in Everett, like in the WM-self-duplication, we
> > are in different histories at the same time, as long as we cannot
> > distinguish them.
>
> If the multiple copies of John K Clark in different worlds can not
> distinguish the tiny historical differences between those worlds then it
> would be meaningless to insist that they are different people. If later one
> of them notices something about his environment that the other does not then
> they would no longer be identical and then and only then would it make sense
> to say there are two different John K Clark’s.
OK
>
> > If two identical brain/computer are run in two different rooms,
>
> If the two rooms are different and the brain/computer has sense organs then
> the brain/computer will detect those differences and so the brain/computers
> will no longer be identical.
OK
>
> > there is an objective probability on the possible subjective future
> > self-locating outcome.
>
> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a possible
> subjectivity”.
I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 different,
but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room differs, like in
some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay in the room, there is
only one person. But the copies are asked to open the room, and the person was
asked, before the experience what is the probability that when going out of the
room, its number is prime.
I use the usual first person non transitive identity notion, where the identity
if preserve in experience without amnesia.
So the HM and HW person are both the H-person, despite the HM and HW person
have become different.
(H, M, and W refers to Helsinki, Moscow, and Washington in the Helsinki——>
{Washington, Moscow} self-duplication experience.
> And if things are deterministic, as they are in Everett's Multiverse, then
> nothing is objectively probabilistic, thus probability must just be a measure
> of an observer's ignorance. What else could it be?
The objective ignorance of a subject about which branch of the universal wave
he belongs, in Everett.
Or the objective ignorance of all universal Turing machines about which
computations emulate them in arithmetic.
>
> > Here the 3p [...]
>
> Bruno, can you write a post about anything without getting into Peepee?
The 3p/1p distinction need it to get the theory of both quanta and qualia, and
to understand why they are different, and how they are related.
It is also imposed by incompleteness once you define the first person by the
definition of Theatetus (the true justified-opinion) using Gödel’s beweisbar
predicate for true opinion. That works well, quantum and intutionistoc logic
appears where predicted, and verified by the actual observation until now.
With Mechanism, the burden of the proof is given to the believer in some
irreducible physical universe. He has to explain what it is, and how it select
the computation in arithmetic (or to abandon the digital mechanist hypothesis
in the cognitive science).
Bruno
>
> John K Clark
>
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