> On 7 Sep 2020, at 16:33, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> >> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> >> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> >> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk 
> >> out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% 
> >> chance he will not see a prime number.
> 
> > You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the 
> > alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them.
> 
> And you make the exact same error over and over and over and over again!  If 
> I made a mistake in the above it certainly wasn't that one because I said 
> absolutely nothing about what Mr.You would or would not do or say or think, 
> and could not even if I wanted to because due to the circumstances of the 
> thought experiment the personal pronoun "you" has no referent,


It has a perfectly clear referent, if you make precise if you talk about he 
first person “you” or about some third person view.

You mock the 1p/3p distinction (the “peepee”), but the absence of reference 
comes from not taking that difference into account. It is an informal confusion 
similar to Penrose and Lucas, who confused the []p (3p), and the []p & p (1p).

The confusion is natural as G* proves them equivalent, but the whole point 
comes from the fact hat the machine cannot prove that equivalence. 

The machine cannot even define “[]p & p”, which explains the difficulty here, 
but it is both resolved intuitively and formally with the mechanist assumption 
made precise, and the understanding of the 1p/3p difference (that you have, as 
you told us many times).

Bruno



> so any "question" using that word has no answer because it is not a question, 
> it's just some words and a question mark.
> 
> >> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of 
> >> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a 
> >> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a 
> >> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there 
> >> are 25 prime numbers less than 100.
> 
> > In this case, there were no explicit duplication,
> 
> Exactly, and therefore the personal pronoun "you" would not be ambiguous.so a 
> question that started as "what would you" would not automatically be an 
> ambiguous question.
> 
> > Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty that 
> > I will be [...]
> 
> I don't need to read another word. No I do not agree, and I don't disagree 
> either because gibberish is not the sort of thing one can agree or disagree 
> with, it's just gibberish. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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