> On 8 Sep 2020, at 01:05, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com > <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a > >> possible subjectivity”. > > > I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 > > different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room > > differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay > > in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the > > room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the > > probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime. > > In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John > Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is > only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk out, > look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% chance he > will not see a prime number. And the question "What is the probability I will > see a prime number?" has no answer because in this hypothetical the personal > pronoun "I" is ambiguous. > > However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of those > rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a prime > number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a legitimate > unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there are 25 prime > numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a subjective > probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he is not, So > that probability figure must just be a measure of that John Clark's ignorance. > > The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a > prime number, > > > How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that > singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
We are interested in all copies, and what is common for the majority of them (to get the prediction right). Nothing pick up one of them, except each does that itself from the first person perspective. There is no ontological dualism, only a phenomenological dualism, the same we need to understand the difference between seeing someone tortured and being tortured. To negate that phenomenological dualism is like eliminating person or consciousness, which will indeed be mandatory to keep Materialism + Mechanism coherent. But as this negates consciousness, eventually the monism will have to be idealistic or neutral. Your position either negate Mechanism (and we are then out of the scope of the thread), or to eliminate the first person experience, which is obviously random from the points of view of the majority of duplicated people when we iterate the duplication. Bruno > > Bruce > > not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler who buys a > lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one particular gambler > will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that some gambler will buy > the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the tickets are sold. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS-%2BTCeuZub8rzgyDfQ0vQbaU%3Da_xxC9e0p%3DwP6COWCfg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS-%2BTCeuZub8rzgyDfQ0vQbaU%3Da_xxC9e0p%3DwP6COWCfg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D0FB40A9-A337-4DF8-B57C-EA322367F891%40ulb.ac.be.
