Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have misconceptions about Darwin.
If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random either. There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within those laws some randomness plays a part. Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing about God or Consciousness. --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@...> wrote: > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an essay. The > only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it Like to be a > Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers disagree, so whenever > they write something, especially a major work, you can be sure someone among > their peers is going to disagree. For example, If you recommend something and > extol the author, you can be sure someone will think something is rotten in > the state of Denmark. > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, quantum > electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable explanation for > certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot explain anything beyond > that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour observed when protons are > smashed together at high velocity, and so another theory, QCD, quantum > chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking wrote recently that we may never > be able to make a theory of everything, but rather we will have a patchwork > of effective theories which, as it were, overlay each other at the edges, > each covering a certain aspect of reality to a certain depth. > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. It is > workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down when one > discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered by the flat > Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, the sun rises is a > perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the morphology > of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity in such systems. > It does not deal with consciousness at all, although some scientist tinker > with the idea of applying it to that. > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole book > > yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got the book > > from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the content of the book > > to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the necessary appearance of such > > reviews and even anticipates these reviews. The reviews are determined by a > > profound reaction to the power of Nagel's thesis. > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN you > > then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The reviews, > > to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a particular > > naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a hierarchical relation among > > the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and physics] and the completeness in > > principle of an explanation of everything in the universe through their > > unification". > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The reviews > > are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel has said (as > > contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, Xeno: to what > > extent does the standard view of evolution possess the intuitive > > explanatory power and complexity to account for our experience of what it > > means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any concerted opposition to Darwin > > and materialism came from theism--and therefore could be dismissed on those > > grounds. But I am asking you just to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I > > have selected from *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian > > Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what > > Nagel is saying which is 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. > > Familiar. > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of his > > intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of existence and the > > appearance of human beings from a strictly common sense point of view. > > Darwin's theory of evolution has never made sense to me--I mean in terms of > > explaining why I am a me, you are a you. But there has never been any way > > of contesting the evolutionary view as being a sufficient explanation for > > consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel has laid out a case (and these > > excerpts give you some idea of the boldness and justice of his thinking) > > which was guaranteed to provoke the reviews cited by A.C. Lee--reviews > > which--since I have read the book--are motivated by a metaphysical fear > > inside the first person ontology of these philosophers (although that of > > course is a Robin inference). I find the reviews entirely unconvincing and > > beside the point. They do not suggest to me these philosophers have taken > > on the essential idea of Nagel's book. The reviews are the defensive and > > distracting reviews I predicted once I heard about the book. > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, to > > analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my post--and tell me > > where they fail to challenge you right where you do not wish to be > > challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the orthodoxy that Nagel is > > confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: read > > the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > Robin > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his career > > > defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, "Mind and > > > Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary scientific > > > inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a new scientific > > > revolution based on teleological principles. It's a proposal that has, > > > unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most philosophers and > > > practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" as Nagel formulates it, > > > and thus see this line of attack as "quixtotic." Nagel questions the > > > current scientific picture because it defies "common sense;" they counter > > > by simply pointing out that much of what has been proven by science, from > > > Copernicus on, in fact does. Leiter and Weisberg do see a more > > > substantial challenge in Nagel's skepticism about evolutionary > > > explanations for our ability to discern truth in ethics, logic and math. > > > But they counter that moral realism is not the only philosophical > > > plausible ethical position, and, in the case of the self-evident truths > > > of logic and math, that even if evolutionary arguments for the validity > > > of reason risk circularity, we can at least point to the successes of the > > > empirical sciences as a sign that we are on the right track. Finally, > > > they think Nagel's insistence "that explanation and prediction are > > > symmetrical" is an outdated one, and that his description of what a new, > > > teleologically-oriented science would look like is insufficiently clear. > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same criticisms, > > > but drills down further on a few in particular. He also thinks there is > > > no reason to require symmetry between explanation and prediction. For > > > Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and improbable." As for > > > teleology, Sober has no problem understanding certain phenomena this way, > > > as long as there are "causal underpinnings" for a given teleological > > > statement. But Nagel's position, as Sober understands it, entails > > > "teleological explanations that are both true and causally inexplicable," > > > a class for which neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, can offer any > > > examples. (In a strangely concessive coda, Sober does admit that his > > > "reactions may be mired in presuppositions," and that history may prove > > > Nagel to be "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were unable to > > > recognize.") > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally agrees > > > with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new conception of > > > fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 Cosmos and Culture > > > that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust response. Noë points to > > > one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or his critics give enough > > > credence to, namely, that to dispel the "cognitive illusion" that we > > > can't adequately explain life and consciousness, we only need to abandon > > > the idea that these phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet this would be > > > merely to dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes Nagel's book as a > > > challenge to go further. > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of gravity as > > > not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made "physicalist" a > > > more common description. The Brigham Young University philosophy > > > professor James Faulconer, in a short primer on Mormon metaphysics at > > > Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, remain materialists. Joseph > > > Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, that "everything is material even > > > if there is material that we presently cannot see or understand." That > > > "everything" includes God the Father, even if he is morally perfect, > > > immortal, and otherwise so different from humans in degree as to be > > > practically inscrutable. Faulconer thinks this materialism cashes out in > > > at least two ways. First, he sees it as explaining why Utah "produces a > > > disproportionate number of scientists," and why his own university > > > supports scientific inquiry so enthusiastically. Second he thinks it > > > might account for the Mormon interest in and enthusiasm for business. > > > Without a belief in another "spiritual" world, Mormons can view > > > practicing business in this world as another way of faithfully practicing > > > their religion. Indeed, Faulconer hopes that precisely because Mormons > > > are materialists, that they inhabit the only world that exists, they may > > > be more responsible stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE > > > > IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in biology. > > > > Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox view, and any > > > > resistance to it is regarded as not only scientifically but politically > > > > incorrect. But for a long time I have found the materialist account of > > > > how we and our fellow organisms came to exist hard to believe, > > > > including the standard version of how the evolutionary process works. > > > > The more details we learn about the chemical basis of life and the > > > > intricacy of the genetic code, the more unbelievable the standard > > > > historical account becomes . . . it seems to me that, as it is usually > > > > presented, the current orthodoxy about the cosmic order is the product > > > > of governing assumptions that are unsupported, and that it flies in the > > > > face of common sense. > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the > > > > reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of life. > > > > It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is the > > > > result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the mechanism > > > > of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this naive response, > > > > not in favor of a fully worked out physical/chemical explanation but in > > > > favor of an alternative that is really a schema for explanation, > > > > supported by some examples. What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a > > > > credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible probability of > > > > being true. There are two questions. First, given what is known about > > > > the chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is the likelihood that > > > > self-reproducing life forms should have come into existence > > > > spontaneously on the earth, solely through the operation of the laws of > > > > physics and chemistry? The second question is about the sources of > > > > variation in the evolutionary process that was set into motion once > > > > life began: In the available geological time since the first life forms > > > > appeared on the earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of > > > > physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have > > > > occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to produce the > > > > organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is very > > > > indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important part. My > > > > skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a belief in any > > > > definite alternative. It is just a belief that the available scientific > > > > evidence, in spite of the consensus of scientific opinion, does not in > > > > this matter rationally require us to subordinate the incredulity of > > > > common sense. This is especially true with regard to the origin of life. > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our > > > > possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible > > > > now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced you, and me, > > > > and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing about it. . . . I > > > > realize that such doubts will strike many people as outrageous, but > > > > that is because almost everyone in our secular culture has been > > > > browbeaten into regarding the reductive research program as sacrosanct, > > > > on the ground that anything else would not be science. > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be explained > > > > as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real understanding of the > > > > world . . . > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus faces > > > > problems of probability that I believe are not taken seriously enough, > > > > both with respect to the evolution of life forms through accidental > > > > mutation and natural selection and with respect to the formation from > > > > dead matter of physical systems capable of such evolution. > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through mutations > > > > in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does for the > > > > evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, the problem is > > > > much harder, since the option of natural selection as an explanation is > > > > not available, And the coming into existence of the genetic code--an > > > > arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences into amino acids, together > > > > with mechanisms that can read the code and carry out its > > > > instructions--seems particularly resistant to being revealed as > > > > probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, the > > > > prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead matter and > > > > its evolution through accidental and natural selection to its present > > > > forms has involved nothing but the operation of physical law--cannot be > > > > regarded as unassailable. It is an assumption governing the scientific > > > > project rather than a well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > >
