> > > > --- "Jason" <jedi_spock@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > > > misconceptions about Darwin. > > > > > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > > > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > > > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > > > either. > > > > > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > > > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > > > > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > > > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > > > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > > > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > > > about God or Consciousness. > > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@> wrote: > > > > You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. Consciousness > > evolved like everything else. All life on this planet is descended > > from one cell, a hybrid between two types of bacteria - which is all > > there was for billions of years - there would be no complexity or > > consciousness without that one chance event. That is as hard a fact as > > you'll find, religious types can sit around dreaming otherwise till the > > cows come home. > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@...> wrote: > > "What has to be explained is not just the lacing of organic life with a > tincture of qualia but the coming into existence of subjective individual > points of view--a type of existence logically distinct from anything > describable by the physical sciences alone." Nagel p.44. >
All subjective views are phenomenon primarily neurological and a lot of research is being done on this. This dosen't affect the objective methodology of Science. > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an > > > > essay. The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it > > > > Like to be a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers > > > > disagree, so whenever they write something, especially a major work, > > > > you can be sure someone among their peers is going to disagree. For > > > > example, If you recommend something and extol the author, you can be > > > > sure someone will think something is rotten in the state of Denmark. > > > > > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > > > > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, > > > > quantum electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable > > > > explanation for certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot > > > > explain anything beyond that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour > > > > observed when protons are smashed together at high velocity, and so > > > > another theory, QCD, quantum chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking > > > > wrote recently that we may never be able to make a theory of > > > > everything, but rather we will have a patchwork of effective theories > > > > which, as it were, overlay each other at the edges, each covering a > > > > certain aspect of reality to a certain depth. > > > > > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. > > > > It is workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down > > > > when one discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered > > > > by the flat Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, > > > > the sun rises is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity > > > > in such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at all, although > > > > some scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to that. > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole > > > > > book yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got > > > > > the book from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the > > > > > content of the book to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the > > > > > necessary appearance of such reviews and even anticipates these > > > > > reviews. The reviews are determined by a profound reaction to the > > > > > power of Nagel's thesis. > > > > > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN > > > > > you then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The > > > > > reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a > > > > > particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a > > > > > hierarchical relation among the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and > > > > > physics] and the completeness in principle of an explanation of > > > > > everything in the universe through their unification". > > > > > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The > > > > > reviews are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel > > > > > has said (as contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, > > > > > Xeno: to what extent does the standard view of evolution possess the > > > > > intuitive explanatory power and complexity to account for our > > > > > experience of what it means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any > > > > > concerted opposition to Darwin and materialism came from theism--and > > > > > therefore could be dismissed on those grounds. But I am asking you > > > > > just to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I have selected from *Mind > > > > > and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is > > > > > Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what Nagel is saying which > > > > > is 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. Familiar. > > > > > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of > > > > > his intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of > > > > > existence and the appearance of human beings from a strictly common > > > > > sense point of view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made > > > > > sense to me--I mean in terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a > > > > > you. But there has never been any way of contesting the evolutionary > > > > > view as being a sufficient explanation for consciousness, cognition, > > > > > and value. Nagel has laid out a case (and these excerpts give you > > > > > some idea of the boldness and justice of his thinking) which was > > > > > guaranteed to provoke the reviews cited by A.C. Lee--reviews > > > > > which--since I have read the book--are motivated by a metaphysical > > > > > fear inside the first person ontology of these philosophers (although > > > > > that of course is a Robin inference). I find the reviews entirely > > > > > unconvincing and beside the point. They do not suggest to me these > > > > > philosophers have taken on the essential idea of Nagel's book. The > > > > > reviews are the defensive and distracting reviews I predicted once I > > > > > heard about the book. > > > > > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, > > > > > to analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my > > > > > post--and tell me where they fail to challenge you right where you do > > > > > not wish to be challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the > > > > > orthodoxy that Nagel is confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: > > > > > read the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his > > > > > > career defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, > > > > > > "Mind and Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary > > > > > > scientific inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a > > > > > > new scientific revolution based on teleological principles. It's a > > > > > > proposal that has, unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most > > > > > > philosophers and practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" > > > > > > as Nagel formulates it, and thus see this line of attack as > > > > > > "quixtotic." Nagel questions the current scientific picture because > > > > > > it defies "common sense;" they counter by simply pointing out that > > > > > > much of what has been proven by science, from Copernicus on, in > > > > > > fact does. Leiter and Weisberg do see a more substantial challenge > > > > > > in Nagel's skepticism about evolutionary explanations for our > > > > > > ability to discern truth in ethics, logic and math. But they > > > > > > counter that moral realism is not the only philosophical plausible > > > > > > ethical position, and, in the case of the self-evident truths of > > > > > > logic and math, that even if evolutionary arguments for the > > > > > > validity of reason risk circularity, we can at least point to the > > > > > > successes of the empirical sciences as a sign that we are on the > > > > > > right track. Finally, they think Nagel's insistence "that > > > > > > explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is an outdated one, and > > > > > > that his description of what a new, teleologically-oriented science > > > > > > would look like is insufficiently clear. > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same > > > > > > criticisms, but drills down further on a few in particular. He also > > > > > > thinks there is no reason to require symmetry between explanation > > > > > > and prediction. For Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and > > > > > > improbable." As for teleology, Sober has no problem understanding > > > > > > certain phenomena this way, as long as there are "causal > > > > > > underpinnings" for a given teleological statement. But Nagel's > > > > > > position, as Sober understands it, entails "teleological > > > > > > explanations that are both true and causally inexplicable," a class > > > > > > for which neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, can offer any > > > > > > examples. (In a strangely concessive coda, Sober does admit that > > > > > > his "reactions may be mired in presuppositions," and that history > > > > > > may prove Nagel to be "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were > > > > > > unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally > > > > > > agrees with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new > > > > > > conception of fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 > > > > > > Cosmos and Culture that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust > > > > > > response. Noë points to one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or > > > > > > his critics give enough credence to, namely, that to dispel the > > > > > > "cognitive illusion" that we can't adequately explain life and > > > > > > consciousness, we only need to abandon the idea that these > > > > > > phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet this would be merely to > > > > > > dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes Nagel's book as a > > > > > > challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of > > > > > > gravity as not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made > > > > > > "physicalist" a more common description. The Brigham Young > > > > > > University philosophy professor James Faulconer, in a short primer > > > > > > on Mormon metaphysics at Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, > > > > > > remain materialists. Joseph Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, > > > > > > that "everything is material even if there is material that we > > > > > > presently cannot see or understand." That "everything" includes God > > > > > > the Father, even if he is morally perfect, immortal, and otherwise > > > > > > so different from humans in degree as to be practically > > > > > > inscrutable. Faulconer thinks this materialism cashes out in at > > > > > > least two ways. First, he sees it as explaining why Utah "produces > > > > > > a disproportionate number of scientists," and why his own > > > > > > university supports scientific inquiry so enthusiastically. Second > > > > > > he thinks it might account for the Mormon interest in and > > > > > > enthusiasm for business. Without a belief in another "spiritual" > > > > > > world, Mormons can view practicing business in this world as > > > > > > another way of faithfully practicing their religion. Indeed, > > > > > > Faulconer hopes that precisely because Mormons are materialists, > > > > > > that they inhabit the only world that exists, they may be more > > > > > > responsible stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > > > > > > > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in > > > > > > > biology. Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox > > > > > > > view, and any resistance to it is regarded as not only > > > > > > > scientifically but politically incorrect. But for a long time I > > > > > > > have found the materialist account of how we and our fellow > > > > > > > organisms came to exist hard to believe, including the standard > > > > > > > version of how the evolutionary process works. The more details > > > > > > > we learn about the chemical basis of life and the intricacy of > > > > > > > the genetic code, the more unbelievable the standard historical > > > > > > > account becomes . . . it seems to me that, as it is usually > > > > > > > presented, the current orthodoxy about the cosmic order is the > > > > > > > product of governing assumptions that are unsupported, and that > > > > > > > it flies in the face of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to > > > > > > > the reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and > > > > > > > evolution of life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life > > > > > > > as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents > > > > > > > together with the mechanism of natural selection. We are expected > > > > > > > to abandon this naive response, not in favor of a fully worked > > > > > > > out physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative > > > > > > > that is really a schema for explanation, supported by some > > > > > > > examples. What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible > > > > > > > argument that the story has a nonnegligible probability of being > > > > > > > true. There are two questions. First, given what is known about > > > > > > > the chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is the > > > > > > > likelihood that self-reproducing life forms should have come into > > > > > > > existence spontaneously on the earth, solely through the > > > > > > > operation of the laws of physics and chemistry? The second > > > > > > > question is about the sources of variation in the evolutionary > > > > > > > process that was set into motion once life began: In the > > > > > > > available geological time since the first life forms appeared on > > > > > > > the earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of physical > > > > > > > accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have > > > > > > > occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to > > > > > > > produce the organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is > > > > > > > very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important > > > > > > > part. My skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a > > > > > > > belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief that the > > > > > > > available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of > > > > > > > scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us > > > > > > > to subordinate the incredulity of common sense. This is > > > > > > > especially true with regard to the origin of life. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in > > > > > > > our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more > > > > > > > credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced > > > > > > > you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing > > > > > > > about it. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many > > > > > > > people as outrageous, but that is because almost everyone in our > > > > > > > secular culture has been browbeaten into regarding the reductive > > > > > > > research program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else > > > > > > > would not be science. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be > > > > > > > explained as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real > > > > > > > understanding of the world . . . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus > > > > > > > faces problems of probability that I believe are not taken > > > > > > > seriously enough, both with respect to the evolution of life > > > > > > > forms through accidental mutation and natural selection and with > > > > > > > respect to the formation from dead matter of physical systems > > > > > > > capable of such evolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through > > > > > > > mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does > > > > > > > for the evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, > > > > > > > the problem is much harder, since the option of natural selection > > > > > > > as an explanation is not available, And the coming into existence > > > > > > > of the genetic code--an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences > > > > > > > into amino acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code > > > > > > > and carry out its instructions--seems particularly resistant to > > > > > > > being revealed as probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, > > > > > > > the prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead > > > > > > > matter and its evolution through accidental and natural selection > > > > > > > to its present forms has involved nothing but the operation of > > > > > > > physical law--cannot be regarded as unassailable. It is an > > > > > > > assumption governing the scientific project rather than a > > > > > > > well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
