> > > > --- "Jason" <jedi_spock@> wrote: > > > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > > > misconceptions about Darwin. > > > > > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > > > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > > > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > > > either. > > > > > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > > > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > > > > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > > > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > > > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > > > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > > > about God or Consciousness. > > > > > > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@> wrote: > > > You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. > > Consciousness evolved like everything else. All life on > > this planet is descended from one cell, a hybrid between > > two types of bacteria - which is all there was for > > billions of years - there would be no complexity or > > consciousness without that one chance event. That is > > as hard a fact as you'll find, religious types can sit > > around dreaming otherwise till the cows come home. > > > > --- turquoiseb <no_reply@...> wrote: > > When it comes to theories -- either about the "correctness" > of one's cherished ideas or concepts or the degree to > which one "holds the high ground" or "owns" one's opponents > in a discussion about such things, I can think of no better > metaphor than the one I just witnessed on my morning > walk with my dogs. > > Every so often they'll feel the need to stop, lift a leg, > and deposit their version of "Here I make my stand...this > is MY territory, and MY version of The Theory Of Everything" > on a bush or lamppost or bicycle or auto tire. They have > such a pleased expression on their faces as they do this, > similar to the expressions one imagines on the faces of > FFLers as they deposit *their* cherished theories on the > rest of us. One also senses a feeling of "completion," as > if by peeing on that spot they've established their > dominance FOREVER. > > But then I sit on a park bench and watch as other dogs > come by, walking their owners. Each successive dog sniffs > the air, senses a challenge to *their* view of Reality > And How It Works, and then walks over and sniffs the > actual pee-theory, "reading doggie email" as it were. > Nine times out of ten the new dogs *disagree* with the > first pee-theory, or with its claim of dominance, and > insist on presenting their own. So they lift their legs or > squat and present a counter-theory. The looks on their > faces as they do this indicate that they *also* feel as > if the discussion is now OVER, since they have presented > the Ultimate Counter-Argument, and that nothing any other > dog could...uh...express on the subject could possibly > override their deposit of eternal wisdom. > > And so it goes. Each successive presentation of Unified > Pee Theory is presented as if it's the Last Possible > Word On The Subject, and "proves" the canine theory- > holder supreme and unchallengeable. And each proves just > as ephemeral as the last one. Sometimes dogs with Really > Big Egos see other dogs daring to dispute their pee- > theories with an "overspray," and feel compelled to go > back to the same bush to reiterate their points, > literally lifting their legs on those who dare to > challenge them, and trying once more to establish > dominance. > > And none of it lasts any longer than the next rainstorm. > > :-) >
Heh Heh, for a guy who often claims that "there is no truth but only opinions and all opinons are equally valid", this is a new revelation. I suppose this is *your* version of binary poop that you unloaded on us right now. Too bad Porpoise. You confuse Science which is an objective methodology as another "ism" or "philosophy" It's kinda funny you didn't say any of these things when Bob Price was around and your refusal to deal with Robin directly is puzzling. > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an > > > > essay. The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it > > > > Like to be a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers > > > > disagree, so whenever they write something, especially a major work, > > > > you can be sure someone among their peers is going to disagree. For > > > > example, If you recommend something and extol the author, you can be > > > > sure someone will think something is rotten in the state of Denmark. > > > > > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > > > > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, > > > > quantum electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable > > > > explanation for certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot > > > > explain anything beyond that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour > > > > observed when protons are smashed together at high velocity, and so > > > > another theory, QCD, quantum chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking > > > > wrote recently that we may never be able to make a theory of > > > > everything, but rather we will have a patchwork of effective theories > > > > which, as it were, overlay each other at the edges, each covering a > > > > certain aspect of reality to a certain depth. > > > > > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. > > > > It is workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down > > > > when one discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered > > > > by the flat Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, > > > > the sun rises is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity > > > > in such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at all, although > > > > some scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to that. > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole > > > > > book yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got > > > > > the book from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the > > > > > content of the book to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the > > > > > necessary appearance of such reviews and even anticipates these > > > > > reviews. The reviews are determined by a profound reaction to the > > > > > power of Nagel's thesis. > > > > > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN > > > > > you then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The > > > > > reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a > > > > > particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a > > > > > hierarchical relation among the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and > > > > > physics] and the completeness in principle of an explanation of > > > > > everything in the universe through their unification". > > > > > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The > > > > > reviews are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel > > > > > has said (as contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, > > > > > Xeno: to what extent does the standard view of evolution possess the > > > > > intuitive explanatory power and complexity to account for our > > > > > experience of what it means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any > > > > > concerted opposition to Darwin and materialism came from theism--and > > > > > therefore could be dismissed on those grounds. But I am asking you > > > > > just to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I have selected from *Mind > > > > > and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is > > > > > Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what Nagel is saying which > > > > > is 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. Familiar. > > > > > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of > > > > > his intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of > > > > > existence and the appearance of human beings from a strictly common > > > > > sense point of view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made > > > > > sense to me--I mean in terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a > > > > > you. But there has never been any way of contesting the evolutionary > > > > > view as being a sufficient explanation for consciousness, cognition, > > > > > and value. Nagel has laid out a case (and these excerpts give you > > > > > some idea of the boldness and justice of his thinking) which was > > > > > guaranteed to provoke the reviews cited by A.C. Lee--reviews > > > > > which--since I have read the book--are motivated by a metaphysical > > > > > fear inside the first person ontology of these philosophers (although > > > > > that of course is a Robin inference). I find the reviews entirely > > > > > unconvincing and beside the point. They do not suggest to me these > > > > > philosophers have taken on the essential idea of Nagel's book. The > > > > > reviews are the defensive and distracting reviews I predicted once I > > > > > heard about the book. > > > > > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, > > > > > to analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my > > > > > post--and tell me where they fail to challenge you right where you do > > > > > not wish to be challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the > > > > > orthodoxy that Nagel is confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: > > > > > read the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his > > > > > > career defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, > > > > > > "Mind and Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary > > > > > > scientific inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a > > > > > > new scientific revolution based on teleological principles. It's a > > > > > > proposal that has, unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most > > > > > > philosophers and practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" > > > > > > as Nagel formulates it, and thus see this line of attack as > > > > > > "quixtotic." Nagel questions the current scientific picture because > > > > > > it defies "common sense;" they counter by simply pointing out that > > > > > > much of what has been proven by science, from Copernicus on, in > > > > > > fact does. Leiter and Weisberg do see a more substantial challenge > > > > > > in Nagel's skepticism about evolutionary explanations for our > > > > > > ability to discern truth in ethics, logic and math. But they > > > > > > counter that moral realism is not the only philosophical plausible > > > > > > ethical position, and, in the case of the self-evident truths of > > > > > > logic and math, that even if evolutionary arguments for the > > > > > > validity of reason risk circularity, we can at least point to the > > > > > > successes of the empirical sciences as a sign that we are on the > > > > > > right track. Finally, they think Nagel's insistence "that > > > > > > explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is an outdated one, and > > > > > > that his description of what a new, teleologically-oriented science > > > > > > would look like is insufficiently clear. > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same > > > > > > criticisms, but drills down further on a few in particular. He also > > > > > > thinks there is no reason to require symmetry between explanation > > > > > > and prediction. For Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and > > > > > > improbable." As for teleology, Sober has no problem understanding > > > > > > certain phenomena this way, as long as there are "causal > > > > > > underpinnings" for a given teleological statement. But Nagel's > > > > > > position, as Sober understands it, entails "teleological > > > > > > explanations that are both true and causally inexplicable," a class > > > > > > for which neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, can offer any > > > > > > examples. (In a strangely concessive coda, Sober does admit that > > > > > > his "reactions may be mired in presuppositions," and that history > > > > > > may prove Nagel to be "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were > > > > > > unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally > > > > > > agrees with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new > > > > > > conception of fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 > > > > > > Cosmos and Culture that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust > > > > > > response. Noë points to one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or > > > > > > his critics give enough credence to, namely, that to dispel the > > > > > > "cognitive illusion" that we can't adequately explain life and > > > > > > consciousness, we only need to abandon the idea that these > > > > > > phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet this would be merely to > > > > > > dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes Nagel's book as a > > > > > > challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of > > > > > > gravity as not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made > > > > > > "physicalist" a more common description. The Brigham Young > > > > > > University philosophy professor James Faulconer, in a short primer > > > > > > on Mormon metaphysics at Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, > > > > > > remain materialists. Joseph Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, > > > > > > that "everything is material even if there is material that we > > > > > > presently cannot see or understand." That "everything" includes God > > > > > > the Father, even if he is morally perfect, immortal, and otherwise > > > > > > so different from humans in degree as to be practically > > > > > > inscrutable. Faulconer thinks this materialism cashes out in at > > > > > > least two ways. First, he sees it as explaining why Utah "produces > > > > > > a disproportionate number of scientists," and why his own > > > > > > university supports scientific inquiry so enthusiastically. Second > > > > > > he thinks it might account for the Mormon interest in and > > > > > > enthusiasm for business. Without a belief in another "spiritual" > > > > > > world, Mormons can view practicing business in this world as > > > > > > another way of faithfully practicing their religion. Indeed, > > > > > > Faulconer hopes that precisely because Mormons are materialists, > > > > > > that they inhabit the only world that exists, they may be more > > > > > > responsible stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > > > > > > > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in > > > > > > > biology. Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox > > > > > > > view, and any resistance to it is regarded as not only > > > > > > > scientifically but politically incorrect. But for a long time I > > > > > > > have found the materialist account of how we and our fellow > > > > > > > organisms came to exist hard to believe, including the standard > > > > > > > version of how the evolutionary process works. The more details > > > > > > > we learn about the chemical basis of life and the intricacy of > > > > > > > the genetic code, the more unbelievable the standard historical > > > > > > > account becomes . . . it seems to me that, as it is usually > > > > > > > presented, the current orthodoxy about the cosmic order is the > > > > > > > product of governing assumptions that are unsupported, and that > > > > > > > it flies in the face of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to > > > > > > > the reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and > > > > > > > evolution of life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life > > > > > > > as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents > > > > > > > together with the mechanism of natural selection. We are expected > > > > > > > to abandon this naive response, not in favor of a fully worked > > > > > > > out physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative > > > > > > > that is really a schema for explanation, supported by some > > > > > > > examples. What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible > > > > > > > argument that the story has a nonnegligible probability of being > > > > > > > true. There are two questions. First, given what is known about > > > > > > > the chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is the > > > > > > > likelihood that self-reproducing life forms should have come into > > > > > > > existence spontaneously on the earth, solely through the > > > > > > > operation of the laws of physics and chemistry? The second > > > > > > > question is about the sources of variation in the evolutionary > > > > > > > process that was set into motion once life began: In the > > > > > > > available geological time since the first life forms appeared on > > > > > > > the earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of physical > > > > > > > accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have > > > > > > > occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to > > > > > > > produce the organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is > > > > > > > very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important > > > > > > > part. My skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a > > > > > > > belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief that the > > > > > > > available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of > > > > > > > scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us > > > > > > > to subordinate the incredulity of common sense. This is > > > > > > > especially true with regard to the origin of life. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in > > > > > > > our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more > > > > > > > credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced > > > > > > > you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing > > > > > > > about it. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many > > > > > > > people as outrageous, but that is because almost everyone in our > > > > > > > secular culture has been browbeaten into regarding the reductive > > > > > > > research program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else > > > > > > > would not be science. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be > > > > > > > explained as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real > > > > > > > understanding of the world . . . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus > > > > > > > faces problems of probability that I believe are not taken > > > > > > > seriously enough, both with respect to the evolution of life > > > > > > > forms through accidental mutation and natural selection and with > > > > > > > respect to the formation from dead matter of physical systems > > > > > > > capable of such evolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through > > > > > > > mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does > > > > > > > for the evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, > > > > > > > the problem is much harder, since the option of natural selection > > > > > > > as an explanation is not available, And the coming into existence > > > > > > > of the genetic code--an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences > > > > > > > into amino acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code > > > > > > > and carry out its instructions--seems particularly resistant to > > > > > > > being revealed as probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, > > > > > > > the prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead > > > > > > > matter and its evolution through accidental and natural selection > > > > > > > to its present forms has involved nothing but the operation of > > > > > > > physical law--cannot be regarded as unassailable. It is an > > > > > > > assumption governing the scientific project rather than a > > > > > > > well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
