--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Jason" <jedi_spock@...> wrote: > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > misconceptions about Darwin. > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > either. > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > about God or Consciousness.
You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. Consciousness evolved like everything else. All life on this planet is descended from one cell, a hybrid between two types of bacteria - which is all there was for billions of years - there would be no complexity or consciousness without that one chance event. That is as hard a fact as you'll find, religious types can sit around dreaming otherwise till the cows come home. > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an essay. > > The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it Like to be > > a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers disagree, so > > whenever they write something, especially a major work, you can be sure > > someone among their peers is going to disagree. For example, If you > > recommend something and extol the author, you can be sure someone will > > think something is rotten in the state of Denmark. > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, quantum > > electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable explanation for > > certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot explain anything > > beyond that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour observed when protons > > are smashed together at high velocity, and so another theory, QCD, quantum > > chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking wrote recently that we may never > > be able to make a theory of everything, but rather we will have a patchwork > > of effective theories which, as it were, overlay each other at the edges, > > each covering a certain aspect of reality to a certain depth. > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. It > > is workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down when one > > discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered by the flat > > Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, the sun rises is > > a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity in > > such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at all, although some > > scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to that. > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole book > > > yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got the book > > > from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the content of the book > > > to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the necessary appearance of > > > such reviews and even anticipates these reviews. The reviews are > > > determined by a profound reaction to the power of Nagel's thesis. > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN you > > > then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The > > > reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a > > > particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a hierarchical > > > relation among the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and physics] and the > > > completeness in principle of an explanation of everything in the universe > > > through their unification". > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The reviews > > > are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel has said (as > > > contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, Xeno: to what > > > extent does the standard view of evolution possess the intuitive > > > explanatory power and complexity to account for our experience of what it > > > means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any concerted opposition to > > > Darwin and materialism came from theism--and therefore could be dismissed > > > on those grounds. But I am asking you just to do this, Xeno: Read the > > > passages I have selected from *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist > > > Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*, and then > > > tell me what Nagel is saying which is 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. > > > insignificant 4. Familiar. > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of his > > > intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of existence and > > > the appearance of human beings from a strictly common sense point of > > > view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made sense to me--I mean in > > > terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a you. But there has never > > > been any way of contesting the evolutionary view as being a sufficient > > > explanation for consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel has laid out a > > > case (and these excerpts give you some idea of the boldness and justice > > > of his thinking) which was guaranteed to provoke the reviews cited by > > > A.C. Lee--reviews which--since I have read the book--are motivated by a > > > metaphysical fear inside the first person ontology of these philosophers > > > (although that of course is a Robin inference). I find the reviews > > > entirely unconvincing and beside the point. They do not suggest to me > > > these philosophers have taken on the essential idea of Nagel's book. The > > > reviews are the defensive and distracting reviews I predicted once I > > > heard about the book. > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, to > > > analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my post--and tell > > > me where they fail to challenge you right where you do not wish to be > > > challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the orthodoxy that Nagel is > > > confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: read > > > the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his career > > > > defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, "Mind and > > > > Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary scientific > > > > inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a new scientific > > > > revolution based on teleological principles. It's a proposal that has, > > > > unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most philosophers > > > > and practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" as Nagel > > > > formulates it, and thus see this line of attack as "quixtotic." Nagel > > > > questions the current scientific picture because it defies "common > > > > sense;" they counter by simply pointing out that much of what has been > > > > proven by science, from Copernicus on, in fact does. Leiter and > > > > Weisberg do see a more substantial challenge in Nagel's skepticism > > > > about evolutionary explanations for our ability to discern truth in > > > > ethics, logic and math. But they counter that moral realism is not the > > > > only philosophical plausible ethical position, and, in the case of the > > > > self-evident truths of logic and math, that even if evolutionary > > > > arguments for the validity of reason risk circularity, we can at least > > > > point to the successes of the empirical sciences as a sign that we are > > > > on the right track. Finally, they think Nagel's insistence "that > > > > explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is an outdated one, and > > > > that his description of what a new, teleologically-oriented science > > > > would look like is insufficiently clear. > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same criticisms, > > > > but drills down further on a few in particular. He also thinks there is > > > > no reason to require symmetry between explanation and prediction. For > > > > Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and improbable." As for > > > > teleology, Sober has no problem understanding certain phenomena this > > > > way, as long as there are "causal underpinnings" for a given > > > > teleological statement. But Nagel's position, as Sober understands it, > > > > entails "teleological explanations that are both true and causally > > > > inexplicable," a class for which neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, > > > > can offer any examples. (In a strangely concessive coda, Sober does > > > > admit that his "reactions may be mired in presuppositions," and that > > > > history may prove Nagel to be "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were > > > > unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally agrees > > > > with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new conception of > > > > fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 Cosmos and Culture > > > > that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust response. Noë points to > > > > one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or his critics give enough > > > > credence to, namely, that to dispel the "cognitive illusion" that we > > > > can't adequately explain life and consciousness, we only need to > > > > abandon the idea that these phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet this > > > > would be merely to dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes Nagel's > > > > book as a challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of gravity as > > > > not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made "physicalist" a > > > > more common description. The Brigham Young University philosophy > > > > professor James Faulconer, in a short primer on Mormon metaphysics at > > > > Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, remain materialists. Joseph > > > > Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, that "everything is material > > > > even if there is material that we presently cannot see or understand." > > > > That "everything" includes God the Father, even if he is morally > > > > perfect, immortal, and otherwise so different from humans in degree as > > > > to be practically inscrutable. Faulconer thinks this materialism cashes > > > > out in at least two ways. First, he sees it as explaining why Utah > > > > "produces a disproportionate number of scientists," and why his own > > > > university supports scientific inquiry so enthusiastically. Second he > > > > thinks it might account for the Mormon interest in and enthusiasm for > > > > business. Without a belief in another "spiritual" world, Mormons can > > > > view practicing business in this world as another way of faithfully > > > > practicing their religion. Indeed, Faulconer hopes that precisely > > > > because Mormons are materialists, that they inhabit the only world that > > > > exists, they may be more responsible stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > > > > > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in biology. > > > > > Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox view, and > > > > > any resistance to it is regarded as not only scientifically but > > > > > politically incorrect. But for a long time I have found the > > > > > materialist account of how we and our fellow organisms came to exist > > > > > hard to believe, including the standard version of how the > > > > > evolutionary process works. The more details we learn about the > > > > > chemical basis of life and the intricacy of the genetic code, the > > > > > more unbelievable the standard historical account becomes . . . it > > > > > seems to me that, as it is usually presented, the current orthodoxy > > > > > about the cosmic order is the product of governing assumptions that > > > > > are unsupported, and that it flies in the face of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the > > > > > reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of > > > > > life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is > > > > > the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the > > > > > mechanism of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this naive > > > > > response, not in favor of a fully worked out physical/chemical > > > > > explanation but in favor of an alternative that is really a schema > > > > > for explanation, supported by some examples. What is lacking, to my > > > > > knowledge, is a credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible > > > > > probability of being true. There are two questions. First, given what > > > > > is known about the chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is > > > > > the likelihood that self-reproducing life forms should have come into > > > > > existence spontaneously on the earth, solely through the operation of > > > > > the laws of physics and chemistry? The second question is about the > > > > > sources of variation in the evolutionary process that was set into > > > > > motion once life began: In the available geological time since the > > > > > first life forms appeared on the earth, what is the likelihood that, > > > > > as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic > > > > > mutations should have occurred that was sufficient to permit natural > > > > > selection to produce the organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is very > > > > > indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important part. My > > > > > skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a belief in any > > > > > definite alternative. It is just a belief that the available > > > > > scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of scientific opinion, > > > > > does not in this matter rationally require us to subordinate the > > > > > incredulity of common sense. This is especially true with regard to > > > > > the origin of life. > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our > > > > > possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more > > > > > credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced > > > > > you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing about > > > > > it. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many people as > > > > > outrageous, but that is because almost everyone in our secular > > > > > culture has been browbeaten into regarding the reductive research > > > > > program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else would not be > > > > > science. > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be explained > > > > > as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real understanding of the > > > > > world . . . > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus faces > > > > > problems of probability that I believe are not taken seriously > > > > > enough, both with respect to the evolution of life forms through > > > > > accidental mutation and natural selection and with respect to the > > > > > formation from dead matter of physical systems capable of such > > > > > evolution. > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through > > > > > mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does for > > > > > the evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, the > > > > > problem is much harder, since the option of natural selection as an > > > > > explanation is not available, And the coming into existence of the > > > > > genetic code--an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences into amino > > > > > acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code and carry out > > > > > its instructions--seems particularly resistant to being revealed as > > > > > probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, the > > > > > prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead matter and > > > > > its evolution through accidental and natural selection to its present > > > > > forms has involved nothing but the operation of physical law--cannot > > > > > be regarded as unassailable. It is an assumption governing the > > > > > scientific project rather than a well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
