--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@...> wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Jason" <jedi_spock@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > > misconceptions about Darwin. > > > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > > either. > > > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > > about God or Consciousness. > > You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. Consciousness > evolved like everything else. All life on this planet is descended > from one cell, a hybrid between two types of bacteria - which is all > there was for billions of years - there would be no complexity or > consciousness without that one chance event. That is as hard a fact as you'll > find, religious types can sit around dreaming otherwise till the cows come > home. "What has to be explained is not just the lacing of organic life with a tincture of qualia but the coming into existence of subjective individual points of view--a type of existence logically distinct from anything describable by the physical sciences alone." Nagel p.44.
> > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an essay. > > > The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it Like to > > > be a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers disagree, so > > > whenever they write something, especially a major work, you can be sure > > > someone among their peers is going to disagree. For example, If you > > > recommend something and extol the author, you can be sure someone will > > > think something is rotten in the state of Denmark. > > > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > > > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, > > > quantum electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable > > > explanation for certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot > > > explain anything beyond that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour > > > observed when protons are smashed together at high velocity, and so > > > another theory, QCD, quantum chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking > > > wrote recently that we may never be able to make a theory of everything, > > > but rather we will have a patchwork of effective theories which, as it > > > were, overlay each other at the edges, each covering a certain aspect of > > > reality to a certain depth. > > > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. It > > > is workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down when > > > one discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered by the > > > flat Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, the sun > > > rises is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity > > > in such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at all, although > > > some scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to that. > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole > > > > book yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got > > > > the book from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the content > > > > of the book to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the necessary > > > > appearance of such reviews and even anticipates these reviews. The > > > > reviews are determined by a profound reaction to the power of Nagel's > > > > thesis. > > > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN > > > > you then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The > > > > reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a > > > > particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a hierarchical > > > > relation among the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and physics] and > > > > the completeness in principle of an explanation of everything in the > > > > universe through their unification". > > > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The > > > > reviews are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel > > > > has said (as contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, > > > > Xeno: to what extent does the standard view of evolution possess the > > > > intuitive explanatory power and complexity to account for our > > > > experience of what it means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any > > > > concerted opposition to Darwin and materialism came from theism--and > > > > therefore could be dismissed on those grounds. But I am asking you just > > > > to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I have selected from *Mind and > > > > Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is > > > > Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what Nagel is saying which is > > > > 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. Familiar. > > > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of > > > > his intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of existence > > > > and the appearance of human beings from a strictly common sense point > > > > of view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made sense to me--I > > > > mean in terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a you. But there has > > > > never been any way of contesting the evolutionary view as being a > > > > sufficient explanation for consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel > > > > has laid out a case (and these excerpts give you some idea of the > > > > boldness and justice of his thinking) which was guaranteed to provoke > > > > the reviews cited by A.C. Lee--reviews which--since I have read the > > > > book--are motivated by a metaphysical fear inside the first person > > > > ontology of these philosophers (although that of course is a Robin > > > > inference). I find the reviews entirely unconvincing and beside the > > > > point. They do not suggest to me these philosophers have taken on the > > > > essential idea of Nagel's book. The reviews are the defensive and > > > > distracting reviews I predicted once I heard about the book. > > > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, to > > > > analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my post--and > > > > tell me where they fail to challenge you right where you do not wish to > > > > be challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the orthodoxy that > > > > Nagel is confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: > > > > read the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his > > > > > career defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, > > > > > "Mind and Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary > > > > > scientific inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a > > > > > new scientific revolution based on teleological principles. It's a > > > > > proposal that has, unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most philosophers > > > > > and practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" as Nagel > > > > > formulates it, and thus see this line of attack as "quixtotic." Nagel > > > > > questions the current scientific picture because it defies "common > > > > > sense;" they counter by simply pointing out that much of what has > > > > > been proven by science, from Copernicus on, in fact does. Leiter and > > > > > Weisberg do see a more substantial challenge in Nagel's skepticism > > > > > about evolutionary explanations for our ability to discern truth in > > > > > ethics, logic and math. But they counter that moral realism is not > > > > > the only philosophical plausible ethical position, and, in the case > > > > > of the self-evident truths of logic and math, that even if > > > > > evolutionary arguments for the validity of reason risk circularity, > > > > > we can at least point to the successes of the empirical sciences as a > > > > > sign that we are on the right track. Finally, they think Nagel's > > > > > insistence "that explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is an > > > > > outdated one, and that his description of what a new, > > > > > teleologically-oriented science would look like is insufficiently > > > > > clear. > > > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same > > > > > criticisms, but drills down further on a few in particular. He also > > > > > thinks there is no reason to require symmetry between explanation and > > > > > prediction. For Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and > > > > > improbable." As for teleology, Sober has no problem understanding > > > > > certain phenomena this way, as long as there are "causal > > > > > underpinnings" for a given teleological statement. But Nagel's > > > > > position, as Sober understands it, entails "teleological explanations > > > > > that are both true and causally inexplicable," a class for which > > > > > neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, can offer any examples. (In a > > > > > strangely concessive coda, Sober does admit that his "reactions may > > > > > be mired in presuppositions," and that history may prove Nagel to be > > > > > "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally agrees > > > > > with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new conception > > > > > of fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 Cosmos and > > > > > Culture that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust response. Noë > > > > > points to one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or his critics give > > > > > enough credence to, namely, that to dispel the "cognitive illusion" > > > > > that we can't adequately explain life and consciousness, we only need > > > > > to abandon the idea that these phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet > > > > > this would be merely to dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes > > > > > Nagel's book as a challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of gravity > > > > > as not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made > > > > > "physicalist" a more common description. The Brigham Young University > > > > > philosophy professor James Faulconer, in a short primer on Mormon > > > > > metaphysics at Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, remain > > > > > materialists. Joseph Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, that > > > > > "everything is material even if there is material that we presently > > > > > cannot see or understand." That "everything" includes God the Father, > > > > > even if he is morally perfect, immortal, and otherwise so different > > > > > from humans in degree as to be practically inscrutable. Faulconer > > > > > thinks this materialism cashes out in at least two ways. First, he > > > > > sees it as explaining why Utah "produces a disproportionate number of > > > > > scientists," and why his own university supports scientific inquiry > > > > > so enthusiastically. Second he thinks it might account for the Mormon > > > > > interest in and enthusiasm for business. Without a belief in another > > > > > "spiritual" world, Mormons can view practicing business in this world > > > > > as another way of faithfully practicing their religion. Indeed, > > > > > Faulconer hopes that precisely because Mormons are materialists, that > > > > > they inhabit the only world that exists, they may be more responsible > > > > > stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > > > > > > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in biology. > > > > > > Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox view, and > > > > > > any resistance to it is regarded as not only scientifically but > > > > > > politically incorrect. But for a long time I have found the > > > > > > materialist account of how we and our fellow organisms came to > > > > > > exist hard to believe, including the standard version of how the > > > > > > evolutionary process works. The more details we learn about the > > > > > > chemical basis of life and the intricacy of the genetic code, the > > > > > > more unbelievable the standard historical account becomes . . . it > > > > > > seems to me that, as it is usually presented, the current orthodoxy > > > > > > about the cosmic order is the product of governing assumptions that > > > > > > are unsupported, and that it flies in the face of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the > > > > > > reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of > > > > > > life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it > > > > > > is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the > > > > > > mechanism of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this > > > > > > naive response, not in favor of a fully worked out > > > > > > physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative that > > > > > > is really a schema for explanation, supported by some examples. > > > > > > What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible argument that the > > > > > > story has a nonnegligible probability of being true. There are two > > > > > > questions. First, given what is known about the chemical basis of > > > > > > biology and genetics, what is the likelihood that self-reproducing > > > > > > life forms should have come into existence spontaneously on the > > > > > > earth, solely through the operation of the laws of physics and > > > > > > chemistry? The second question is about the sources of variation in > > > > > > the evolutionary process that was set into motion once life began: > > > > > > In the available geological time since the first life forms > > > > > > appeared on the earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of > > > > > > physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should > > > > > > have occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to > > > > > > produce the organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is > > > > > > very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important > > > > > > part. My skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a > > > > > > belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief that the > > > > > > available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of > > > > > > scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us > > > > > > to subordinate the incredulity of common sense. This is especially > > > > > > true with regard to the origin of life. > > > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our > > > > > > possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more > > > > > > credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced > > > > > > you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing about > > > > > > it. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many people as > > > > > > outrageous, but that is because almost everyone in our secular > > > > > > culture has been browbeaten into regarding the reductive research > > > > > > program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else would not > > > > > > be science. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be > > > > > > explained as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real > > > > > > understanding of the world . . . > > > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus faces > > > > > > problems of probability that I believe are not taken seriously > > > > > > enough, both with respect to the evolution of life forms through > > > > > > accidental mutation and natural selection and with respect to the > > > > > > formation from dead matter of physical systems capable of such > > > > > > evolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through > > > > > > mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does > > > > > > for the evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, > > > > > > the problem is much harder, since the option of natural selection > > > > > > as an explanation is not available, And the coming into existence > > > > > > of the genetic code--an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences > > > > > > into amino acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code > > > > > > and carry out its instructions--seems particularly resistant to > > > > > > being revealed as probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, > > > > > > the prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead > > > > > > matter and its evolution through accidental and natural selection > > > > > > to its present forms has involved nothing but the operation of > > > > > > physical law--cannot be regarded as unassailable. It is an > > > > > > assumption governing the scientific project rather than a > > > > > > well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
