--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@...> wrote: > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <authfriend@> wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@> > > wrote: > > > (snip) > > > > > I'm much more interested in whether the materialists are > > > > > content that they have successfully seen off the incursion. > > > > > Maybe - like we were with the so called "intelligent design" > > > > > BS - they react strongly to the ignorance of the argument > > > > > to slap it down straight away lest tubthumpers use it as an > > > > > excuse. > > > > > > > > Doubt it, at least with regard to the "ignorance of the > > > > argument." Nagel is a *very* highly respected senior > > > > philosopher, not some dork from the Discovery Institute. > > > > (He's the author of the celebrated essay "What Is It > > > > Like to Be a Bat?" of which I'm sure you've heard.) > > > > > > I hope that's not an argument from authority, probably > > > the least convincing way of winning an argument. All > > > of the ID crowd were "highly respected" PHDs, just not > > > any more, chortle. > > > > Of COURSE it's not an "argument from authority." Jeez, > > it's hard to keep you on track. > > Just testing.
Well, Barry sure failed! > > My point is that while Nagel's argument may be *wrong*, > > it's unlikely to be *ignorant*, as you had just got done > > speculating. You obviously didn't know of Nagel's stature, > > so I was telling you. He's a superstar in the field of > > philosophy, not just a "highly respected PhD." It's one > > of the reasons the big guns of materialist philosophy > > have come out in force against his book. > > > > (snip) > > > > > But it isn't all explained by any means, I get sceptical because > > > > > the method of explanation used so far (materialist science) has > > > > > done a pretty damn good job so far. > > > > > > > > Well, if you don't analyze the explanation philosophically > > > > to see whether it's logically coherent, it may seem like it > > > > does a good job. > > > > > > Why the use of the term philosophically? > > > > Because the analysis is philosophical. (duh) > > I think that seperating the two terms is a mistake as they > have to be compatible logically, you can't have a good > philosophical argument that is a crap scientific one as > both disciplines are trying to achieve the same thing. No, they really are different types of analysis. There's no reason a scientist can't do philosophical analysis; it's just that most of them aren't trained in it. And a philosopher's analysis can't ignore or contradict scientific (e.g., empirical) analysis. Ideally, the scientist and the philosopher would come up with the same answers each using his/her own type of analysis. In this case, though, it would seem more appropriate for the philosopher to do the analysis first so the scientist doesn't waste time chasing incoherent premises. > > > Scientifically does the job just as well as it also stands > > > and falls on how coherent - and more importantly - testable > > > it is. > > > > Not currently testable. And to the extent that scientific > > explanations in the areas of mind and consciousness are > > coherent, it's because they're logically sound. To say > > that mind and brain are identical, for example, is just > > not coherent, but the reasons it isn't are of a > > philosophical nature. Scientists don't tend to be schooled > > in scientific philosophy. In most areas that doesn't > > matter, but it very much does in this case. > > I'd never say mind and brain are identical Well, some do, very insistently. I think it was you who posted an article by a neuroscientist that made that very claim: mind and brain are the same thing, just from different viewpoints. just that you > can't have one without the other. In fact one gives rise to > the other as should be obvious. The first is obvious, the second isn't. > Exactly how one translates > the measurable data into how we perceive it is the tricky bit, Well, *that* we perceive at all is really the tricky bit. > my money is on a neurological solution. But will be thrilled > if it turns out to be some sort of quantum thing like the > godhead. But I'm really not holding my breath. I wouldn't hold my breath for either. > Plenty of other options too. What we have to remember is > that science hasn't been looking at consciousness for very > long, only a few decades really. Early days. Yes, but is there a reason *in principle* why they aren't going to be able to locate the mind/consciousness in the brain? Is it even coherent to think there could be a neurological solution? We can continue this once you've got hold of the book from the library, if you like. > > (snip) > > > > And as I said, Nagel's suggestion as to an alternative > > > > mechanism is tentative and incompletely developed. It's > > > > just one possible way to approach the problem. The much > > > > more important aspect of the book has to do with the > > > > explanatory gap. There's no point talking about > > > > alternative mechanisms until you see why neo-Darwinism > > > > doesn't--can't--fill the gap; otherwise you can't tell > > > > what might be successful in filling it. > > > > > > Well, as I say most of these "gaps" turn out to be the result > > > of inadequate research. > > > > Right. But not this one. It may turn out to be bridgeable, > > but not on the basis of more research. > > > > > I suppose I can manage 128 pages to satisfy > > > my curiosity. If it's in the library... > > > > I'm not expecting you to be impressed, BTW. ;-) > > Well in that case I won't spend another £15 in Amazon this > week and shall definitely wait until the library gets it in stock. >
