On Sun, Dec 24, 2000 at 06:32:18PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> >>>>> "E" == Eric <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> E> One problem I see is that having a trust list might cluster
> E> nodes too much. It would become a popularity contest. One
> E> node has a reputation for being trustworthy so it has many
> E> references, but some new node that is just as secure can't get
> E> any because it is unknown.
>
> I don't think we're on the same page on this. In my mind, VERY FEW
> PEOPLE would know about my node's existence at all -- only folks that
> I'd made out-of-band agreements with.
How anonymous is that? I thought the point is that you have no idea who you are
getting the data from or who requested the data. By putting those sorts of measures
into effect, we make each cluster a target. People will try to gain trust, become
accepted into the cluster, than take advantage of the vulnerabilities. I would much
rather have anonymity.
>
> I don't think it would be a popularity contest at all. Even if I was
> very trustworthy, I wouldn't set up an agreement with YOU if you were
> untrustworthy.
How would you know that I was untrustworthy. It seems pretty elitist to deny requests
to a computer because they aren't on your list. Freenet, to me, seems to be built
around the principles of free speech and free access to information to anyone. Trust
lists seem to impede the flow of information.
One last qualm before I shut up: Suppose an FBI agent outside of your trust list
requests data from the gateway to your private network. The agent now knows for sure
that it comes from someone inside of that network (although finding out who is in that
network might be tough). That seems kind of scary. I would rather that the agent who
gets data from a computer not know how deep the search had to go.
eric
PGP Key 0x3AFA955A.
