On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 10:59:13PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > It would seem that the scheme proposed (limiting connections to
> > a few other nodes) doesn't really help in a totalitarian country.
> > The government can set up a tap (or one could be already active, a la
> > Carnivore) and discover that an "unauthorized" protocol is being run.
> > Even the fact that you are sending out more than HTTP GET requests could
> > be grounds for an in-depth investigation.
>
> You would of course need to have a stealth node masquerading as something
> other than a node. However, this is *not* enough because eventually you
> have to act like a Freenet node and return some responses for some keys
> otherwise you're not a Freenet node. So what you need to stay hidden is
> the ability to not act like a Freenet node except with trusted
> connections.
But the point is that the only thing your are claiming to solve that isnt
solved by existing or near-existing solutions is the paranoid-dissident
mode. And there just *arent* trusted links. Any of them can be
monitored. This just doesnt fix that. In that sort of operation, there
are no trusted links.
>
> Not at all. I could have a stealth node with trusted connection
> authentication by the end of the month if I made it masquerade as an HTTP
> server.
Which is stego. 99% of the people dont have stego and dont need it, and
the 1% who do probably don't need Freenet for their communication...
Which brings me to another point. The kind of communication Freenet
allows is uncensored *publication*. Not email type coordination between
people. What good is publication amongst a private network when your real
goal is worldwide distribution? A cluster is completely unnecessary. One
trusted node linked to the worldwide Freenet and a secure inter-person
communcation system is what you want.
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