> From Mr.Bad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> IC> Do you think that it at-least partially addresses the "Media
> IC> Enforcer" problem?
>
>I think it does, partially.
>
>~Mr. Bad
The only shortcoming (with regards to the "media enforcer" pseudo-attack) with
"shadow nodes" is that it the 'shield' node is still exposed, correct? The
'shadowed' node's address is no longer distributed, and it no longer responds
to unsolicited contact, right?
I guess the only other issue is whether people worried about being punished
for using a node might not be better off with a transient node? That would
not contribute to the network, but Oskar apparently thinks that a shielded
node would not contribute to the network, either.
Would it hurt the network to allow transient nodes to refuse incoming
connections from non-localhost addresses? If I understand the network
correctly, this shouldn't be happening, anyway, so it shouldn't be a problem,
right?
Would a shielded node's operator manually select a shield node? How would he
find one? Would shield nodes allow anyone to "hide behind" them, or only
selected other nodes, or what? Would a node 'advertise' that it was willing
to act as a shield node?
--
Benjamin Coates
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