Marcus -
I'll concede (welcome it!) your point about a composite channel...
I think the more apt description is a (not necessarily orthogonal)
basis set? In your example, the "product feature description" component
would *ideally* be maxed while the "technical details required to
reverse-engineer/compete" would be minimized. These happen to seem to
have discrete values (1 and 0) but in fact, due to implementation (and
maybe strategic?) issues, they may take on a continuum of values.
I still maintain that within one component (to whatever degree one can
actually identify a single component that isn't subdivided into yet more
refined components) the quality is somewhat continuous and often
relative rather than absolute?
In the Snowden/NSA example, there are questions such as "does the NSA
charter include monitoring digital communications" and "is it
appropriate/legal for the NSA to collect *all* electronic/digital
communications" and "what are the implications of an individual
obfuscating the nature of their communications through encryption,
steganography, proxy servers, anonymous relays, etc."
I think it is pretty much accepted that the NSA *exists* to monitor
communications which in this era implies quite heavily,
digital/electronic communications, but they are specifically excluded
from applying this to US Citizens on domestic soil. I'm not up on how
it applies to US Citizens on foreign soil (without a warrant), but the
grey starts when someone on US soil (ISP on US soil?) communicates with
someone *not* on US Soil (ISP outside US soil?).
I think there are clear imperatives in the Fourth Amendment, expanded or
illuminated in the 1967 Katz V US
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katz_v._United_States> ruling which
establish that any Gov't agency collecting *all* communications is
totally out of line. There is, however, a grey continuum it seems in
practice. Since the nationality of any given user of Google or Yahoo
is quite vague (associated primarily with an IP address and maybe
secondarily with a registered user identity) it can (and apparently has
been) argued that *any* communication possibly includes a non-US-Citizen
and possibly someone residing outside the borders of the US and it's
territories.
Most/All states have rules about how dark-tinted one's windows in one's
vehicle can be. In the real, physical world, a LEO may, for example,
see something appearing illegal (a clear plastic bag containing a white,
powdery substance!!!!) through a vehicle window during a routine
traffic stop which gives him the "probable cause" to go further, search
the vehicle, seize the contents, etc... but it is much more grey as to
whether the application of high-opacity film to one's windows of one's
vehicle, making it very difficult for such casual observations to be
made is legal or not... obviously panel-vans obscure vision more
effectively than vans with dark windows... however... the same
arguments banning darkened windows in a vehicle might apply to
encrypting one's e-mail. but perhaps the same argument of a panel-van
vs a darkened-window van may apply in turn?
The basis of window-tint legislation implies that drivers need to be
able to see clearly out the front and sides (plus rear via window and/or
mirrors). This does NOT explain why most laws include "one-way"
glass... where the driver can see *out* fine, but someone outside (to
wit, LEO) can't see inside.
There is no similar basis for encrypted data... the only reason to
insist on the ability to read the data is the presumed *right* to do so.
- Steve
On 9/24/13 3:44 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
I very much agree with Glen's point here that it isn't open v closed,
it is more/less open/closed relative to some ideal or some existing
system. I don't fully appreciate Marcus response invoking A/D and
D/A converters... I think the question of discrete v continuous is
always an interesting one but I don't think that was Glen's point?
I claim that the degree of openness of a composite channel is set that
way for a reason. Examples:
Half open, to hide corporate IP, while still disclosing that the
product is cool.
The closed bits being the details of the technology, and the
concept/idea bits being open.
All closed, to keep a secret.
Almost open, e.g. anonymizing names to protect the parties
involved, but disclosing their case files.
Open, to have all available eyes on a problem, i.e. open source.
Marcus
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