By the way, not all designers are individuals. Foxes design the behavior of rabbits and rabbits design the behavior of foxes, but I wouldn't be quick to call foxes an individual or rabbits an individual. Natural selection designs but it is not itself designed to do so.
On Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 2:05 PM Nicholas Thompson <thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, Russ, > > I have a non-scientist friend to whom I sometimes show my posts here for > guidance. I showed him some recent posts and he wrote back, "Wow, Nick! > You are really swinging for the fences, here!" He and I know that one who > swings for the fences, rarely hits the ball, let alone the fences. > > So please can we precede in little tiny steps. > > You raise the question, _ *what makes an agent?*. > > This expression is ambiguous in just the way I was trying to highlight in > my response: > > It could mean, *(1) What are the conditions that bring an agent into > being? * > > Or it could mean, *(2) What are the conditions that require us to > identify something an agent?.* > > The first (I think) is the explanatory question; the second, the > descriptive question. Wittgenstein was said to have said that something > cannot be its own explanation, and I believed him. Whatever else might be > said about the relation between explanations and descriptions is that > descriptions are states of affairs taken for granted by explanations. If > you ask me why the chicken crossed the road, my answering your quest > commits me to the premise that the chicken did indeed cross the road. > > A definition is *explanatory *when it describes a process which explains > something else and which, itself, is in need of explanation. > > So: Can I come back to you with a question? Which of the two meanings > did you intend. And if you were looking to define agents in terms of the > internal mechanism that makes agency possible, what precisely is the state > of affairs, behavior, what-have-you, that such agents are called upon to > explain.! > > For me agency is design in behavior, and an agent is an individual whose > behavior is designed. All of this has to be worked out before your > explanatory question becomes relevant, What is the neural mechanism by > which such designs come about? > > nick > > > > On Sun, Jul 16, 2023 at 3:18 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Nick, >> >> I just asked Eric for examples. Your examples confuse me because I don't >> see how you relate them to agenthood. Are you really suggesting that you >> think of waves and puddles as agents? My suggestion was that you need some >> sort of internal decision-making mechanism to qualify as an agent. >> >> I don't know anything about the carotid sinus. >> >> Your thermostat example strikes me as similar to my flashlight example. I >> might put as: a thermostat senses the temperature and twiddles the controls >> of the heating/AC units in response. >> >> I'm not sure where you are going by labeling my discussion explanatory. I >> wasn't thinking that I was explaining anything, other, perhaps, than my >> intuition of what makes an agent. >> >> -- Russ >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:06 PM Nicholas Thompson < >> thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Some examples I like to think about: >>> >>> Waves arrange pebbles on a beach from small to large >>> >>> A puddle maintains its temperature at 32 degrees as long as it has ice >>> in it. >>> >>> The carotid sinus maintains the acidity of the blood by causing us to >>> breath more oxygen when it gets to acid. (I hope I have that right. >>> >>> An old-fashioned thermostat maintains the temperature of a house by >>> maintaining the level of a vial of mercury attached to a bi-metallic coil. >>> >>> Russ, the objection would have with your definition is that it is >>> explanatory. An explanatory definition identifies a phenomenon with its >>> causes, bypassing the phenomenon that raises the need for an explanation >>> in the first place? What is the relation between agents and their >>> surroundings that makes them seem agentish? Having answered that question, >>> your explanation now comes into play. >>> >>> The thing about the above examples that makes them all seem agenty is >>> that they keep bringing the system back to the same place. The thing about >>> them that makes them seem less agenty is that they have only one means to >>> do so. Give that thermostat a solar panel, and a heat pump, and an oil >>> furnace and have it switch from one to the other as circumstances vary, now >>> the thermostat becomes much more agenty. >>> >>> Does that make any sense? I think the nastiest problems here are (1) >>> keeping the levels of organization straight and (2) teasing out the >>> individual that is the agent. >>> >>> Nick >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 7:29 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered >>>> using as an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) >>>> during the day and goes on at night. In what important way is that >>>> different from a flashlight? They both have energy storage systems >>>> (batteries). Does it really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" >>>> rather than relying on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? >>>> And they both have on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional >>>> whereas the garden light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They >>>> are both tripped by outside forces. >>>> >>>> BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*! >>>> >>>> -- Russ >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your >>>>> flashlight example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto >>>>> tomahto) because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and >>>>> effector to the flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets >>>>> dark and off when it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe >>>>> we >>>>> merely kicked the can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about >>>>> decoupling and hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such >>>>> thing as a (pure) agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But >>>>> for practical purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a >>>>> day. >>>>> >>>>> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote: >>>>> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make >>>>> between things that are agents and things that aren't. >>>>> > >>>>> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I >>>>> would also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. >>>>> The >>>>> most obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. >>>>> > >>>>> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do >>>>> anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and >>>>> destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of >>>>> destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have >>>>> multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in >>>>> negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. >>>>> > >>>>> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, >>>>> and it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have >>>>> some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This >>>>> final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. >>>>> > >>>>> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) >>>>> an agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that >>>>> an >>>>> agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its >>>>> interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal >>>>> level of complexity might be. >>>>> > >>>>> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of >>>>> agents I looked at the article on Agency < >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the >>>>> /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a >>>>> parody >>>>> of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the >>>>> article overview. >>>>> > >>>>> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to >>>>> act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. >>>>> The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a >>>>> standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of >>>>> intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms >>>>> of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. >>>>> > >>>>> > _ >>>>> > _ >>>>> > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the >>>>> same time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have >>>>> intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider the >>>>> possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those >>>>> discussions seem relatively tangential.) >>>>> > >>>>> > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can >>>>> of worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far. >>>>> > >>>>> > __-- Russ Abbott >>>>> > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science >>>>> > California State University, Los Angeles >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in <http://job.in> the >>>>> Philosophy Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on >>>>> Facebook: >>>>> > >>>>> > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited >>>>> defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at >>>>> all. >>>>> His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins >>>>> theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes >>>>> nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves >>>>> are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often >>>>> ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct >>>>> interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about >>>>> reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What >>>>> is >>>>> the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of >>>>> neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be >>>>> real? >>>>> Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists >>>>> raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions >>>>> about them. But *philosophers* try to answer >>>>> > them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At >>>>> least the smart ones do. >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ >>>>> >>>>> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>>>> >>>> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>>> >>>
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