Eric, Thanks for your thoughtful additional thoughts. To make it easier for me to understand where you are going, would it be possible to include a prototypical example for each of your categories?
Thanks. -- Russ On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 5:30 PM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu> wrote: > I have had a version of this problem for several years, because I want to > start with small-molecule chemistry on early planets, and eventually talk > about biospheres full of evolving actors. I have wanted to have a rough > category system for how many qualitative kinds of transitions I should need > to account for, and to explain within ordinary materials by the action of > random processes. Just because I am not a(n analytical) philosopher, I > have no ambition to shoehorn the universe into a system or suppose that my > categories subsume all questions even I might someday care about, or that > they are sure to have unambiguous boundaries. I just want a kind of sketch > that seems like it will carry some weight. For now. > > Autonomy: One early division to me would be between matter that responds > “passively” to its environment moment-by-moment, and as a result takes on > an internal state that is an effectively given function of the surroundings > at the time, versus one that has some protection for some internal > variables from the constant outside harassment, and a source of autonomous > dynamics for those internal variables. One could bring in words like > “energy”, but I would rather not for a variety of reasons. Often, though, > when others do, I will understand why and be willing to go along with the > choice. > > Control: The category of things with autonomous internal degrees of > freedom that have some immunity from the slings and arrows of the immediate > surroundings is extremely broad. Within it there could be very many > different kinds of organizations that, if we lack a better word, we might > call “architectures”. One family of architectures that I recognize is that > of control systems. Major components include whatever is controlled (in > chem-eng used to be called “the plant”), a “model” in the sense of Conant > and Ashby, “sensors” to respond to the plant and signal the model, and > “effectors” to get an output from the model and somehow influence the > plant. One could ask when the organization of some material system is well > described by this control-loop architecture. I think the control-loop > architecture entails some degree of autonomy, else the whole system is > adequately described by passive response to the environment. But probably > a sophist could find counterexamples. > > One could ask whether having the control-loop architecture counts as > having agency. By discriminating among states of the world according to > their relation to states indexed in the model, and then acting on the world > (even by so little as acting on one’s own position in the world), one could > be said to express some sort of “goal”, and in that sense to have “had” > such a goal. > > Is that enough for agency? Maybe. Or maybe not. > > Reflection: The controller’s model could, in the previous level, be > anything. So again very broad. Presumably a subset of control systems > have models that incorporate some notion of a a “self”, so they could not > only specifically model the conditions of the world, but also the condition > of the self and of the self relative to the world, and then all of these > variables become eligible targets for control actions. > > Conterfactuals and simulation: autonomy need not be limited to the > receiving of signals and responding to them with control commands. It > could include producing values for counterfactual states within the > controller’s model, of playing out representations of the consequences of > control signals (another level of reflection, this time on the dynamics of > the command loop), and then choosing according to a meta-criterion. Here I > have in mind something like the simulation that goes on in the tactical > look-ahead in combinatorial games. We now have a couple levels of > representation between wherever the criteria are hard-coded and wherever > the control signal (the “choice”) acts. They are all still control loops, > but it seems likely that control loops can have different enough major > categories of design that there is a place for names for such intermediate > layers of abstraction to distinguish some kinds as having them, from others > that don’t. > > How much internal reflective representation does one want to require to > satisfy one or another concept of agency? None of them, in particular? A > particular subset? > > For different purposes I can see arguing for different answers, and I am > not sure how many categories it will be broadly useful to recognize. > > Eric > > > On Jul 15, 2023, at 8:28 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using > as an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during > the day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from > a flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it > really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying > on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have > on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden > light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped > by outside forces. > > BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*! > > -- Russ > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your >> flashlight example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto >> tomahto) because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and >> effector to the flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets >> dark and off when it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we >> merely kicked the can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about >> decoupling and hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such >> thing as a (pure) agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But >> for practical purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a >> day. >> >> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote: >> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between >> things that are agents and things that aren't. >> > >> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would >> also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most >> obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. >> > >> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do >> anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and >> destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of >> destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have >> multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in >> negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. >> > >> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, >> and it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have >> some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This >> final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. >> > >> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an >> agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that an >> agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its >> interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal >> level of complexity might be. >> > >> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of >> agents I looked at the article on Agency < >> https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the >> /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a parody >> of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the >> article overview. >> > >> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to >> act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. >> The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a >> standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of >> intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms >> of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. >> > >> > _ >> > _ >> > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same >> time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have >> intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider the >> possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those >> discussions seem relatively tangential.) >> > >> > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of >> worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far. >> > >> > __-- Russ Abbott >> > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science >> > California State University, Los Angeles >> > >> > >> > >> > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com >> <mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> > >> > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fjob.in&c=E,1,ZIav2qEBYSxLGqvQX4FG0oAWBKSkcEB9rSfJj-XKpOD9tHOyXksq2ZtBESmsULaSupUC7vk04BazrglG4D-b7AP92McmfQb5aRH7KAKg&typo=1> >> <http://job.in >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fjob.in&c=E,1,w5L6ESqFsG_k1WjqiiZd-LW-FNq3wwseGECZMZpifzAWAZM_vc-u9gIIo8UiMeTxSEok1oAHiNRRSoxGNvuXGZ1IeBm5Vevc1u6F8lxy4zQ,&typo=1>> >> the Philosophy Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on >> Facebook: >> > >> > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited >> defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. >> His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins >> theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes >> nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves >> are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often >> ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct >> interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about >> reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is >> the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of >> neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real? >> Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists >> raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions >> about them. But *philosophers* try to answer >> > them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. 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