I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using as an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during the day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from a flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped by outside forces.
BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*! -- Russ On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your flashlight > example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto tomahto) > because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and effector to the > flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets dark and off when > it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we merely kicked the > can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about decoupling and > hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such thing as a (pure) > agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But for practical > purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a day. > > On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote: > > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between > things that are agents and things that aren't. > > > > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would > also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most > obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. > > > > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do > anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and > destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of > destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have > multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in > negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. > > > > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and > it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have some > internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This final > condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. > > > > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an > agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that an > agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its > interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal > level of complexity might be. > > > > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of > agents I looked at the article on Agency < > https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the > /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a parody > of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the > article overview. > > > > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, > and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The > philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard > theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, > the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by > the agent’s mental states and events. > > > > _ > > _ > > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same > time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have > intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider the > possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those > discussions seem relatively tangential.) > > > > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of > worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far. > > > > __-- Russ Abbott > > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science > > California State University, Los Angeles > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com > <mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in <http://job.in> the Philosophy > Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook: > > > > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited > defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. > His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins > theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes > nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves > are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often > ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct > interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about > reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is > the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of > neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real? > Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists > raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions > about them. But *philosophers* try to answer > > them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At least > the smart ones do. > > > > -- > ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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