If you have not read it — I highly recommend The Tree of Knowledge by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Self organization from simple to complex via a single mechanism.
On Fri, Jul 14, 2023, at 7:30 PM, David Eric Smith wrote: > I have had a version of this problem for several years, because I want to > start with small-molecule chemistry on early planets, and eventually talk > about biospheres full of evolving actors. I have wanted to have a rough > category system for how many qualitative kinds of transitions I should need > to account for, and to explain within ordinary materials by the action of > random processes. Just because I am not a(n analytical) philosopher, I have > no ambition to shoehorn the universe into a system or suppose that my > categories subsume all questions even I might someday care about, or that > they are sure to have unambiguous boundaries. I just want a kind of sketch > that seems like it will carry some weight. For now. > > Autonomy: One early division to me would be between matter that responds > “passively” to its environment moment-by-moment, and as a result takes on an > internal state that is an effectively given function of the surroundings at > the time, versus one that has some protection for some internal variables > from the constant outside harassment, and a source of autonomous dynamics for > those internal variables. One could bring in words like “energy”, but I > would rather not for a variety of reasons. Often, though, when others do, I > will understand why and be willing to go along with the choice. > > Control: The category of things with autonomous internal degrees of freedom > that have some immunity from the slings and arrows of the immediate > surroundings is extremely broad. Within it there could be very many > different kinds of organizations that, if we lack a better word, we might > call “architectures”. One family of architectures that I recognize is that > of control systems. Major components include whatever is controlled (in > chem-eng used to be called “the plant”), a “model” in the sense of Conant and > Ashby, “sensors” to respond to the plant and signal the model, and > “effectors” to get an output from the model and somehow influence the plant. > One could ask when the organization of some material system is well described > by this control-loop architecture. I think the control-loop architecture > entails some degree of autonomy, else the whole system is adequately > described by passive response to the environment. But probably a sophist > could find counterexamples. > > One could ask whether having the control-loop architecture counts as having > agency. By discriminating among states of the world according to their > relation to states indexed in the model, and then acting on the world (even > by so little as acting on one’s own position in the world), one could be said > to express some sort of “goal”, and in that sense to have “had” such a goal. > > Is that enough for agency? Maybe. Or maybe not. > > Reflection: The controller’s model could, in the previous level, be anything. > So again very broad. Presumably a subset of control systems have models > that incorporate some notion of a a “self”, so they could not only > specifically model the conditions of the world, but also the condition of the > self and of the self relative to the world, and then all of these variables > become eligible targets for control actions. > > Conterfactuals and simulation: autonomy need not be limited to the receiving > of signals and responding to them with control commands. It could include > producing values for counterfactual states within the controller’s model, of > playing out representations of the consequences of control signals (another > level of reflection, this time on the dynamics of the command loop), and then > choosing according to a meta-criterion. Here I have in mind something like > the simulation that goes on in the tactical look-ahead in combinatorial > games. We now have a couple levels of representation between wherever the > criteria are hard-coded and wherever the control signal (the “choice”) acts. > They are all still control loops, but it seems likely that control loops can > have different enough major categories of design that there is a place for > names for such intermediate layers of abstraction to distinguish some kinds > as having them, from others that don’t. > > How much internal reflective representation does one want to require to > satisfy one or another concept of agency? None of them, in particular? A > particular subset? > > For different purposes I can see arguing for different answers, and I am not > sure how many categories it will be broadly useful to recognize. > > Eric > > >> On Jul 15, 2023, at 8:28 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using as >> an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during the >> day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from a >> flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it >> really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying >> on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have >> on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden >> light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped by >> outside forces. >> >> BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*! >> __ >> __-- Russ >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your flashlight >>> example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto tomahto) >>> because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and effector to the >>> flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets dark and off when >>> it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we merely kicked the >>> can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about decoupling and >>> hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such thing as a (pure) >>> agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But for practical >>> purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a day. >>> >>> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote: >>> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between >>> > things that are agents and things that aren't. >>> > >>> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would >>> > also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The >>> > most obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. >>> > >>> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do >>> > anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and >>> > destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of >>> > destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have >>> > multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in >>> > negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. >>> > >>> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and >>> > it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have >>> > some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This >>> > final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. >>> > >>> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an >>> > agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that an >>> > agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its >>> > interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal >>> > level of complexity might be. >>> > >>> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of >>> > agents I looked at the article on Agency >>> > <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the >>> > /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a >>> > parody of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences >>> > from the article overview. >>> > >>> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, >>> > and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The >>> > philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a >>> > standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of >>> > intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms >>> > of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. >>> > >>> > _ >>> > _ >>> > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same >>> > time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have >>> > intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider the >>> > possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those >>> > discussions seem relatively tangential.) >>> > >>> > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of >>> > worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far. >>> > >>> > __-- Russ Abbott >>> > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science >>> > California State University, Los Angeles >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com >>> > <mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in >>> > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fjob.in&c=E,1,ZIav2qEBYSxLGqvQX4FG0oAWBKSkcEB9rSfJj-XKpOD9tHOyXksq2ZtBESmsULaSupUC7vk04BazrglG4D-b7AP92McmfQb5aRH7KAKg&typo=1> >>> > <http://job.in >>> > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fjob.in&c=E,1,w5L6ESqFsG_k1WjqiiZd-LW-FNq3wwseGECZMZpifzAWAZM_vc-u9gIIo8UiMeTxSEok1oAHiNRRSoxGNvuXGZ1IeBm5Vevc1u6F8lxy4zQ,&typo=1>> >>> > the Philosophy Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on >>> > Facebook: >>> > >>> > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited >>> > defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at >>> > all. His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who >>> > spins theories without paying attention to scientific practice and >>> > contributes nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that >>> > scientists themselves are constantly raising obviously philosophical >>> > questions and are often ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is >>> > the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to >>> > think about reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about >>> > science? What is the nature of consciousness? Can you explain >>> > consciousness in terms of neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What >>> > does it even mean to be real? Or is realism a red herring; should we be >>> > pragmatists instead? Scientists raise all kinds of philosophical >>> > questions and have ill-informed opinions about them. But *philosophers* >>> > try to answer >>> > them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At least >>> > the smart ones do. >>> > >>> >>> -- >>> ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ >>> >>> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,oRPdsVIsAzEJwa1TGZ1OL95Y9zsBgPaClmKg5JVAsKzQ9rvd-wcrBscpXC8Lw5ISO_tWbkaNHifx-7E14si15QsAX-y6DNb_E-Nj9OgQYwl8AVrPz4fGfmAYOz0,&typo=1> >>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,lGeTb87AyHyklkUdqndSBNKybCA8SWc8Me4TLd8l7NsiHGD1JLSSkrIEZ1dMf6m7B_byhpfyXLm78xDDroiBwc51ni2WVKwJVN7glpAzCU8gw7YJwRhC&typo=1> >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,2o08SICcOyMA73TR66Iz98Z29UmspyvwgPkYif75NZgWK_dkvpD6YHhHe5PB__VM4JvMJjqQH0bmz2MDex_5G7KAzLKNrpVDoJ6Vpytrdzi5_3AL3Dar9lLb9Zk3&typo=1> >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,MB9qNpv0pDGF1QQuaDuBcULTLUR4dO7AZtvb_sv9A4dd5RxdHlEwSN256UNn6YB0_1bWTxsfT_bYkK8LxQXEE8-P15TOebtv6LBB9lzQxPlJXJ6l&typo=1> >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,SyM6C7uNU8bELi-6dvt9t-FDya4gkk8rwF4W75Vg2eRgFf-lKLFESSnUGupzdnKcAs8vRYNBR_UesWflAdcrBrmhqekEIggVXtmwBzBoPRc,&typo=1 >> to (un)subscribe >> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,XB28OXASFXUrltZTIF778G_1YExwU_0pqhUjnV3tn3bGNbB-mvSFU3-WTj0ru2M8e0shb5HEfs-KkQN9nmxn9JMm5Ko52Y8hlvkpjkw6XDj2yRk,&typo=1 >> FRIAM-COMIC >> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,rd-IfRFB2cX5n5oOBPUCsqxCMzPwTfrtaDXTAQbUgN12oZSFXSXxx5ruO9b11ZMc1lH7_m7COJY2hKXnuOAuJKYkaAtLcj1UyW8xVXzgJfnfk40tiwdJoafHOA,,&typo=1 >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,IgK1VCJvM437beMjgYaTgVhjSyvfwpSXMCJuoObQA8b51nFbGXMAq2Z6eQJO5I1Vgo4i8-tTn6gbuhL4BMb29TZYLNnV6H1cJcZ1BwpupY5QdJXs&typo=1 >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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