I think amidst all of the (legitimate) gloom about the results at
Copenhagen, we should emphasize a couple of things:

 

1.          It was known well before the meeting that we were likely to only
get a political declaration from Copenhagen; in many ways, I think the media
hyped the final stages of the meeting as some kind of unraveling of
consensus, when most folks expected no more than a broad-brushed agreement
that wasn't legally binding;

2.          I know this may sound like heresy from someone from the
international law side of the equation, but I think the emphasis on securing
a legally binding decision from the Parties to the UNFCCC or KP is a bit of
a chimera. What does it mean for an agreement to be "legally binding" when
one looks at both the architecture of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (and
any likely successor agreement, either as an amendment to the KP or a
standalone treaty)? Kyoto is a legally binding agreement, and many of the
Annex I Parties will fail, in some cases abjectly, to meet their emissions
reductions obligations under the treaty. What is the penalty for this? Well,
there's an enforcement mechanism, but subject to acceptance through the
amendment process, and even then, any individual party can opt out. At the
end of the day, it's diplomacy and self-interest, broadly defined, that will
probably ultimately determine the success of any agreement that the Parties
arrive at in Mexico City and beyond. I think the presence of the regimes
helps to develop and strengthen norms, but the reality is that no one is
going to be hauled in front of the ICJ or any other body for failing to meet
their "legally binding" obligations under the climate agreements (in fact,
if you look at the UNFCCC, your only recourse is to conciliation unless the
other party to any given dispute expressly consents to a legally binding
dispute resolution mechanism);

3.          Let me get even more realist here. While it would be nice to
have the likes of Vanuatu and Venezuela on board with this document, in the
long term, the planet will be saved, or doomed, by the top ten major GHG
emitters, especially the U.S. and China, responsible for about 50% of the
world's emissions (with China not slated to have emissions 60% higher than
the U.S. by 2020). 

4.          Let's also not forget the positive outgrowths of Copenhagen:

a.                    The call for Bali for developing countries to engage
in "nationally appropriate mitigation actions" has been translated into a
pledge to do so by the major emitting developing countries, and there will
be some kind of national and international protocols developed for
verification;

b.                   A commitment by developed countries to mobilize more
than $30 billion for funding mitigation programs for developing countries in
three years, and a serious effort to mobilize $100 billion by 2020. One
needs to be extremely skeptical about this pledge, given the fact that a
similar commitment after Marrakesh for a mere $400 million never transpired,
but a number of countries, including Japan and Germany, have in recent
months put some real money on the table, and so we may be turning the corner
on this issue. I don't foresee reaching the point where mitigation or
adaptation funding is recognized on the grounds of liability under the
polluter pays principle, as developing countries would wish, so developing
countries will still have to rely on the kindness of strangers, but the
train at least appears on the track at this point;

c.                    The establishment of a High Level panel to explore
potential sources of revenue for the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, which
could provide serious funding for both mitigation and adaptation programs.

d.                   A broad framework has been formulated for Reductions
from Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, a source of emissions
greater than all transportation sources combined. If a REDD agreement can be
reached at Mexico City, it might both eventually lead to substantial
reductions in emission, as well as help to institutionalize cooperation
between developed and developing countries, the latter of which will account
for the lion's share of emission by the middle of this century.

 

So, while I would have hoped for infinitely more from Copenhagen, it's
important to remember that we may have kicked the can forward a bit! wil

 

 

Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief

Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy

1702 Arlington Blvd.

El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA

Ph:   650.281.9126

Fax: 510.779.5361

 <mailto:[email protected]>
[email protected]

 <http://www.jiwlp.com/> http://www.jiwlp.com

SSRN site (selected publications):  <http://ssrn.com/author=240348>
http://ssrn.com/author=240348

Skype ID: Wil.Burns

 

From: [email protected]
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Radoslav
Dimitrov
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 7:10 AM
To: Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe
Subject: Copenhagen result

 

The political declaration by heads of states names the Copenhagen Accord was
not formally adopted. To the horror of most delegations, seven countries
opposed the Accord: Tuvalu, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia. They stressed there is no consensus and the Accord cannot
be officially adopted. The meeting was suspended and after several hours of
frantic efforts, a compromise was reached. A COP decision was made to not
adopt but "Take note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009," attach
the Accord in an Appendix and list the countries who support the accord.

The mandate for negotiations was extended but the reference to "legally
binding" outcome of 2010 negotiations was taken out. AOSIS, Japan, Russia,
the EU, and Norway supported "legally binding." India, China, Brazil, Saudi
and the US opposed. However, the US was soft and merely said it is better
not to prejudge legal nature of outcome. Similar exchange on KP AWG mandate.
South Africa wanted to ensure AWG KP leads to Kyoto 2 and proposed "adoption
of KP amendment at COP16." Japan and Russia opposed. End result: the mandate
of the two AWGs is extended for one year but no mention of what negotiations
are supposed to lead to (what kind of agreement the end product is supposed
to be). There will be two 2010 sessions: Bonn in May/June, and COP16 in
Mexico November/December.

Merry Chritmas to all!

 

Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Western Ontario
Social Science Centre
London, Ontario
Canada N6A 5C2
Tel. +1(519) 661-2111 ext. 85023
Fax +1(519) 661-3904
Email: [email protected] 

 

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