Wil, you raise a lot of issues here, we could end up with a long (and interesting debate). A few reactions, following your numbering.
1. we did know that it was highly likely that we¹d only get a political agreement, although it is worth noting there was always an (outside) chance that enough KP parties might say it was worth inserting new numbers into a second KP commitment period, alongside this political declartation including non-KP countries, notably the US. But this declaration is a hell of a lot weaker than many observers expected, and I¹d say was absolutely possible before the start of the Copenhagen talks. The numbers in terms of emissions reductions already on the table were (while obviously inadequate to deal with Tuvalu¹s problems or to get to a 2C overall goal) were broadly consistent enough that you could imagine a deal aroudn them even those weren¹t in the final version, although they say they¹re going to put numbers in by Feb. The US-China monitoring spat seems incomprehensible from the outside, since the US itself wants a relatively light multilateral monitoring of emissions reporting (consequently it¹s not certain that your point 4a is correct). And so on on every issue a deal seemed possible, they¹ve come up with the weakest version. 2. on legally binding. You¹re right of course that international law is weak in terms of enforcement. But you¹re wrong that many¹ Annex B countries will fail to meet their Kyoto targets the EU will get there easily enough, as will (for hot air reasons) most ex-soviet countries. NZ still has some to do but has set up a system which will mean it will buy hot air in effect. Australia and Japan aren¹t too far off. Only really Canada is way off, and I despair at the idiots in charge of the country I moved to. So the q to my mind is not about enforcement, but rather about (a) the set of expectations that the term legally binding¹ sets up amongst states that they tend to behave differently in the context of such a status to an agreement here I¹d claim that if Kyoto had just been a political declaration¹ then I can¹t see the EU having set about achieving its targets so thoroughly without the legal status (although that¹s a judgement call of course), and (b) you can¹t set up any sort of institutional arrangements such as the CDM without the legal¹ status of an agreement. And Kyoto compliance overall for the Annex B countries (they will get there collectively, canadian rubbishness being outweighed by russian hot air) has been driven by the Kyoto-CDM-EU ETS relationship, which couldn¹t have existed without a legal agreement. 3. I tend to agree on this realist¹ point, although one thing this misses is that the multilateral process has become much more focused on adapation in recent years, and there those countries (not venezuela, but the AOSIS and african states) are crucial. 4. I¹ll just raise two points here one is that the money is totally unclear on details whether it¹s additional money from states, whether its expectations of flows from offset markets (CDM or otherwise), wheher its additional to existing aid, etc. And while forest people love REDD, if it¹s included in an offset mechanism like the CDM, which it looks like it will be, this could be a disaster, taking away incentives for actual emissions reductions in the Annex I/B countries. An interesting aside here is that while in the negotiations much was being heralded for REDD, in the carbon market meetings IETA was running, there were workshops on how the hell you might make money out of a REDD project they are of the view it¹s probalby not a very cheap option. That might save us in fact. Enough for now. Mat -- Matthew Paterson École d'études politiques, Université d'Ottawa Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5 tel: +1 613 562-5800 x1716 Web site: http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/pol/eng/profdetails.asp?ID=123 And http://matpaterson.wordpress.com/ Co-editor, Global Environmental Politics: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/glep Latest books "Climate capitalism: global warming and the transformation of the global economy" (with Peter Newell) http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521194857 And "Cultural Political Economy" (edited, with Jacqueline Best) http://www.routledgepolitics.com/books/Cultural-Political-Economy-isbn978041 5489324 From: Wil Burns <williamcgbu...@comcast.net> Reply-To: <williamcgbu...@comcast.net> Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2009 07:42:53 -0800 To: 'Radoslav Dimitrov' <radoslav.dimit...@uwo.ca>, 'Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe' <gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu> Subject: RE: Copenhagen result I think amidst all of the (legitimate) gloom about the results at Copenhagen, we should emphasize a couple of things: 1. It was known well before the meeting that we were likely to only get a political declaration from Copenhagen; in many ways, I think the media hyped the final stages of the meeting as some kind of unraveling of consensus, when most folks expected no more than a broad-brushed agreement that wasn¹t legally binding; 2. I know this may sound like heresy from someone from the international law side of the equation, but I think the emphasis on securing a legally binding decision from the Parties to the UNFCCC or KP is a bit of a chimera. What does it mean for an agreement to be ³legally binding² when one looks at both the architecture of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (and any likely successor agreement, either as an amendment to the KP or a standalone treaty)? Kyoto is a legally binding agreement, and many of the Annex I Parties will fail, in some cases abjectly, to meet their emissions reductions obligations under the treaty. What is the penalty for this? Well, there¹s an enforcement mechanism, but subject to acceptance through the amendment process, and even then, any individual party can opt out. At the end of the day, it¹s diplomacy and self-interest, broadly defined, that will probably ultimately determine the success of any agreement that the Parties arrive at in Mexico City and beyond. I think the presence of the regimes helps to develop and strengthen norms, but the reality is that no one is going to be hauled in front of the ICJ or any other body for failing to meet their ³legally binding² obligations under the climate agreements (in fact, if you look at the UNFCCC, your only recourse is to conciliation unless the other party to any given dispute expressly consents to a legally binding dispute resolution mechanism); 3. Let me get even more realist here. While it would be nice to have the likes of Vanuatu and Venezuela on board with this document, in the long term, the planet will be saved, or doomed, by the top ten major GHG emitters, especially the U.S. and China, responsible for about 50% of the world¹s emissions (with China not slated to have emissions 60% higher than the U.S. by 2020). 4. Let¹s also not forget the positive outgrowths of Copenhagen: a. The call for Bali for developing countries to engage in ³nationally appropriate mitigation actions² has been translated into a pledge to do so by the major emitting developing countries, and there will be some kind of national and international protocols developed for verification; b. A commitment by developed countries to mobilize more than $30 billion for funding mitigation programs for developing countries in three years, and a serious effort to mobilize $100 billion by 2020. One needs to be extremely skeptical about this pledge, given the fact that a similar commitment after Marrakesh for a mere $400 million never transpired, but a number of countries, including Japan and Germany, have in recent months put some real money on the table, and so we may be turning the corner on this issue. I don¹t foresee reaching the point where mitigation or adaptation funding is recognized on the grounds of liability under the polluter pays principle, as developing countries would wish, so developing countries will still have to rely on the kindness of strangers, but the train at least appears on the track at this point; c. The establishment of a High Level panel to explore potential sources of revenue for the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, which could provide serious funding for both mitigation and adaptation programs. d. A broad framework has been formulated for Reductions from Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, a source of emissions greater than all transportation sources combined. If a REDD agreement can be reached at Mexico City, it might both eventually lead to substantial reductions in emission, as well as help to institutionalize cooperation between developed and developing countries, the latter of which will account for the lion¹s share of emission by the middle of this century. So, while I would have hoped for infinitely more from Copenhagen, it¹s important to remember that we may have kicked the can forward a bit! wil Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org <mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org> http://www.jiwlp.com <http://www.jiwlp.com/> SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348 <http://ssrn.com/author=240348> Skype ID: Wil.Burns From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Radoslav Dimitrov Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 7:10 AM To: Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe Subject: Copenhagen result The political declaration by heads of states names the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted. To the horror of most delegations, seven countries opposed the Accord: Tuvalu, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They stressed there is no consensus and the Accord cannot be officially adopted. The meeting was suspended and after several hours of frantic efforts, a compromise was reached. A COP decision was made to not adopt but ³Take note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009,² attach the Accord in an Appendix and list the countries who support the accord. The mandate for negotiations was extended but the reference to ³legally binding² outcome of 2010 negotiations was taken out. AOSIS, Japan, Russia, the EU, and Norway supported ³legally binding.² India, China, Brazil, Saudi and the US opposed. However, the US was soft and merely said it is better not to prejudge legal nature of outcome. Similar exchange on KP AWG mandate. South Africa wanted to ensure AWG KP leads to Kyoto 2 and proposed "adoption of KP amendment at COP16." Japan and Russia opposed. End result: the mandate of the two AWGs is extended for one year but no mention of what negotiations are supposed to lead to (what kind of agreement the end product is supposed to be). There will be two 2010 sessions: Bonn in May/June, and COP16 in Mexico November/December. Merry Chritmas to all! Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Ph.D. Associate Professor Department of Political Science University of Western Ontario Social Science Centre London, Ontario Canada N6A 5C2 Tel. +1(519) 661-2111 ext. 85023 Fax +1(519) 661-3904 Email: rdimi...@uwo.ca
