On Wednesday, 12/08/2010 at 03:11 EST, RPN01 <nix.rob...@mayo.edu> wrote:
> But, should you have to have an external security manager for a system 
where
> the majority of users are disconnected guest operating systems?

Yes.

> Most of
> today's z/VM systems have a bare minimum of real human users. CP is the
> security manager for us, and it's sufficient to control the wild 
ramblings
> of, oh, say, the four people who need access.

Those four people know all the passwords.  There is no accountability and 
no plausible deniability.  You have de facto password sharing, something I 
have yet to see countenanced by any IT organization.

> The dollars are needed for
> other things with a much higher priority before we'd ever get an ESM to
> control our more wild moments.

That's certainly a fair decision to make.  Understand that the ESM is not 
there to protect the system from rogue sysprogs.  It is there to enforce 
policy and to demonstrate that you *have* a policy and the evidence to 
demonstrate its enforcement.

> And, plugging a cable into a switch generally does get you connectivity,
> because someone put that switch there for the express purpose of 
providing
> that connectivity in the first place. If I walk into an office on 
campus,
> and there's an Ethernet jack on the wall, I have the reasonable 
expectation
> that I should be able to plug my laptop into it and have a connection to 
the
> network.

You have a policy in place that "unused" ports are enabled.  Whether the 
port was opened on demand or in advance of use doesn't really matter.  It 
isn't by *your* choice that you are allowed to plug into the network.

> The same thing holds true if I see a wireless antenna on the
> ceiling here. I shouldn't have to call the Network Operations Center and
> give them my name and password and the jack number to get them to let me 
in;

No, but you may require a certificate.  But even if you don't, there was 
still a policy in place to open the ports.

> If that were the case, we'd have a lot of ticked off doctors running 
around
> here. (Much the same as I get ticked off every time I have to go grant a
> virtual machine into the virtual switch.) We even have jacks and 
wireless in
> the patent waiting areas so that they can get internet access, and they
> don't need to be granted in either.
>
> The vSwitch grant is not in any way mimicking a real life scenario. It
> doesn't compare to the real world in any way. Networking gets set up, 
and
> once it's set up, you plug things into it and they simply work, as long 
as
> you know the IP range and netmask, or your computer does a reasonable 
job of
> DHCPing you an address. You don't have to be granted into it.

You are making my point for me, demonstrating that it is NOT sufficient to 
just plug into a wall port.  Someone has cabled/authorized/opened those 
ports.  They have set up the DHCP servers or given you a considered IP 
address.  Those public ports very likely have different access rights than 
those in offices and exam rooms.

Alan Altmark

z/VM and Linux on System z Consultant
IBM System Lab Services and Training 
ibm.com/systems/services/labservices 
office: 607.429.3323
alan_altm...@us.ibm.com
IBM Endicott

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