On 14/11/22 08:41, Scott Kitterman wrote:

On November 12, 2022 6:46:13 PM UTC, Wei Chuang 
<weihaw=40google....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

>
>Received headers are generally not DKIM signed and spammers have
>stripped/probably modified them.  Another problem is that while a human can
>interpret the domain names, IP and other information present there in the
>headers, the non-standard naming and format variations means that it's not
>suitable as a machine readable signal in my opinion.

I don't think there's any point in pursuing solutions that require a human to 
read/understand anything about header fields.

Having reviewed the proposals again, it seems like anything that actively makes 
replays harder without adding additional indirect mail flow failures amounts to 
a plan to document the flow of the email to provide additional signal for 
receivers to understand what's been replayed versus what's a normal indirect 
flow.

Side thought: it occurs to me that any solution that relates to understanding the path is already addressed by a trivial extension to ARC, in particular that its headers are sufficiently uniform to be machine-readable, contain the information required to understand important information about the path (although not the Received: headers), and are cryptographically attestable. The required extension would simply be for forwarders performing non-DKIM-damaging forwarding to also perform ARC-sealing in order to present reliable information about the path to receivers. Putting forwarders in the position of benefiting from implementing ARC (or suffering more from not doing so) is not ideal but (a) the number who do so at scale is small and getting smaller, and (b) it doesn't create any dilemmas (vs. e.g. deciding whether to modify messages in a way which breaks DKIM). This doesn't need a WG; forwarders are free to do it and receivers are free to rely on it today.


I'm inclined to think that instead of specifying specific drafts to consider, 
the charter should point to the problem statement draft instead.

+1


I get the desire to limit the scope, but limiting the outcomes is the wrong way to do it.


- Roland


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