Alain,

Do you think it is better to let the RIRs develop a policy for
allocating PA space for local use, i.e. create a swamp like IPv4?

In detail...

Alain Durand wrote:
> 
> I think that this effort is not ready for prime time.
> 
> This document is creating a explosive cocktail made of:
> 
>         - policy: creation of a new authority to perform address assignment
> outside of the regular channels

That is a matter for IANA. I don't see why it is intrinsically dangerous,
but IANA could perfectly well designate one of the existing RIRs, if that
looked like a good idea.

>         - economy: imposition of a fixed one time fee model, preventing
> competition

Yes, that's a *good* thing. It also prevents commercial exploitation of this 
address space as a rental asset. That's a good thing too.

>                                and creating a swamp of untraceable
> registrations

That is the reason for the escrow proposal.

>         - politics: dangerous instructions to IANA, see Geofff Houston comments

I don't see where "dangerous" comes from, and I think the current draft responds
to Geoff adequately.

>         - technology: half baked ideas that do not analyze seriously their
> impact:
>                 - what about reverse DNS?

Suggestions? Is reverse DNS needed for these addresses? You're correct that
this needs analysis.

>                 - what about address selection rules?

These addresses behave like global scope for that purpose.

>                 - what about address leakage?

These addresses are unique, so leakage is nothing like as harmful
as with RFC 1918. They are also known to be unrouteable globally, so
can be blackholed at domain boundaries. I thought that was discussed in
the draft.

>                 - how to debug those networks when they will leak?

You don't need to. If you see one of these addresses out of its intended
domain, you only need to drop it. I'm not saying this lightly - I really
think this is not an issue. There is nothing to debug. You just don't care.

>                   and it is impossible to map those prefixes back to their owner?

Doesn't matter. You just drop them.

> 
> All this is designed to address what is mostly a perception/social
> problem which justification only resides in
> a self serving companion document that fails to demonstrate that such
> local addresses
> are actually needed/required.

I'm sorry, that is just wrong. It is far from a social problem and the Hain/Templin
draft is far from self-serving. 

> In a rush to create something to replace the Site Local addresses,

It isn't replacing site-local. It's filling a widely perceived need that
has emerged (with our better understanding of the needs of enterprise and
inter-enterprise networking) since site-local was invented. The rush, as I
said at the top, is to prevent widespread misuse of PA prefixes and to give
us a chance of preventing NAT6.

If this doesn't get done soon, I think the emphasis will rapidly change to
working with the RIRs to get a rough and ready policy in place for
private use of PA space.

> I'm afraid this document is playing the apprentice sorcerer and will
> create more
> long term damage than its author think.

On the contrary, IMHO, *not* doing this will create long term damage.

   Brian

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