I agree that both drafts have their flaws, but very definitely view the Paris
draft as the lesser of the two evils. In fact, I am not sure that it has any
evil in it at all.
The dnso.org application's recognition of a "Trademark and anti-counterfeiting"
constituency is an unfair and discriminatory approach to the definition of
constituencies. As has been pointed out many times, its only purpose is to gain
the political support of the trademark constituency. While we all recognize
trademark interests as players in this process, it is logically wrong and
politically unfair to take one side of a policy issue and give its adherents
special representation, while denying it to the other side. The dnso.org group
was asked to compromise by balancing this constituency with one devoted to free
expression or public interest groups, but it refused. It was also pointed out
that no TM constituency was needed, as TM owners are businesses and have had no
difficulty making themselves heard throughout the process.
The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this same criticism.
I commend them for this.
I also support the focus on research and policy development that is contained in
the Paris draft. That is something that ICANN and the process will actually
need. It is, for a change, actually a forward-looking and constructive approach
instead of a defensive and paranoid one. It is clear that the developers of the
dnso.org draft were more interested in controlling policy than in understanding,
formulating, and constructively developing it.
A few rejoiners below:
John B. Reynolds wrote:
> There are number of problems with the Paris draft. Section 2.1 leaves the
> issue of who is eligible for DNSO membership up to ICANN by making it
> coextensive with ICANN's membership. It is not yet clear what the makeup of
> this membership will be or whether it would be appropriate for the DNSO.
I see this as a great strength of the Paris draft.
> Section 3.2 requires the General Assembly to "self-organize into diverse
> constituencies" without providing any mechanism for doing so. If
> discussions on these mailing lists are any indication, this is likely to
> generate endless squabbles about the proper number and type of
> constituencies that would likely not be resolved until ICANN stepped in to
> impose a solution.
Seems like the IETF has worked well this way for years.
> The real show-stoppers are in Article V, specifically Sections 5.8 through
> 5.11. The "Fair Hearing" provisions of Sections 5.8, 5.10, and 5.11 make it
> possible for any special interest or special interest group to delay almost
> indefinitely any policy that they disagree with. Section 5.9 goes even
> further. It elevates the particular special interest group of registries
> above all others by giving it veto power and by requiring an essentially
> unachievable 3/4 supermajority of registries for approval. These
> provisions, taken individually and in toto, would make it nearly impossible
> for the DNSO to produce any substantive policy recommendations whatsoever.
> That is unacceptable to me. It is my hope and expectation that it will
> prove to be unacceptable to ICANN as well.
I share some of these concerns but do not see them as a show stopper, just as a
reflection of the paranoia that pervades this process.
> The flaws in the Washington draft are relatively minor by comparison.
> Business interests are overrepresented, and there is no mechanism for
> individual users or domain holders to participate directly (Section I.B).
That's minor, eh?
> It also fails to make clear whether Names Council members are elected by the
> constituencies they represent or by the entire membership (Section I.E). I
> regard the former approach as necessary to prevent the Names Council from
> being captured by a special interest group or groups constituting a majority
> of the membership.
I'm quite sure that the business interests who put the dnso,org proposal
together have the latter in mind.
> The Washington draft, however, would create a DNSO that is capable of taking
> action. For that reason, I support it, albeit as the lesser of two evils.
The Washington draft is designed to create a DNSO that is safely under the
control of established business interests. I am not sanguine about the kind of
"action" such an organization would take.
