Ron, all,
You are dealing with the self reference paradox. It generates contradictions.
There was so much unessential stuff in your first message that
although I read this I completely missed the point. But, in fact, this
is a very good point I think. Don't worry about spelling mistakes if
you present a point this good. Just keep it short. That's my advice,
anyway. And my explanation for not taking your logical ability
seriously at first.
What you're pointing at is dialetheism: the view that there is true
contradictions. And, mind you, you really saved my day today when I
realized you're knowledgeable about this stuff. I loathe feeling like
the only one! But on with the point...
If this were a point scoring exercise then, most respectfully, I would
like to award you 100 (one hundred) points should you decide points
awarded by me would benefit you in any way. Please do not apologize
for posting. There's really no need to. <3
Okay, now I really have to get on with the point or else I start
seeming sarcastic, which I'm not at all.
As a response to the Heinous Quadrilemma, the self-reference paradox
points towards paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logics are
inconsistent, which means they include contradictions, but they're not
trivial. In other words, one cannot deduce any statement from a
contradiction. The principle of explosion does not apply.
So I find you to suggest that the first horn of the Quadrilemma - to
accept that the MOQ is inconsistent - isn't a problem!
This is what I thought at first. I thought it ruins this part of my argument:
"The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that
the MOQ cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is
either inconsistent or not a single metaphysics."
This part of my argument relies on the so-called disjunctive
syllogism, which goes:
Either A or B
Not B
---
Consequently, A
There are paraconsistent logics which don't include the disjunctive
syllogism. I thought it's quite probable that some of these logics
could be used to formalize the MOQ so that the Heinous Quardilemma
wouldn't work. Furthermore, well, I wrote this:
"If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem."
This probably isn't literally true. It's very likely that a
paraconsistent MOQ would solve at least some if not all philosophical
problems it's supposed to. I don't know if it'd solve them well but it
would be some kind of a framework in which it'd be possible to argue
that even if it doesn't solve the problems very well it still solves
them.
So, yeah, I think a paraconsistent interpretation of the MOQ could
have been one way of dealing with the Heinous Quadrilemma if it
weren't for one thing. In LILA, Pirsig writes:
"The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with
experience, and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality
satisfies these."
So, unfortunately, according to Robert Pirsig the MOQ is consistent.
If so, it cannot be paraconsistent.
Thank you for trying. Better luck next time. Just throw the points
away if you don't want them for any reason. You can see not everyone
likes me. So if I give you points, maybe you can't show off with them.
How could you if someone breaks a rule he himself set, to express a
dislike for me? But I gave them to you with sincerity and wish you
good luck in the future.
Good luck, in my opinion, is not in winning but in meaningful
participation. When I posted my formalization about the theory of
static value patterns people just said that's a good idea. I
appreciate that. I'm grateful. But how to continue discussion from
that? Hmm, hard.
If you keep up making observations like these, you can just throw me
one-liners and forget about upper case letters and punctuation!
Kind regards,
Tuk
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