David, all, Wow. This is good stuff. Thank you for taking your time to answer these questions. Tuk, I will attempt to get to your email as soon as possible but I don't see that I can do better than Dave. Pretty much spot on. Study it well. You can learn something here. Hell. I can learn something too.
Thanks again, Dan On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:46 PM, david <dmbucha...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > ________________________________ > Tukka said: Dan and I were just arguing whether truth is equivalent with > good. Seems > like I was right. The word "mainly" implies there's also something else > to good than truth. > > dmb says: Pirsig identifies the MOQ with Pragmatism (a theory of truth) and > approvingly quotes William James saying, "Truth is a species of the Good". > More specifically, the MOQ divides the Good into four levels of static values > so that health is a biological species of the Good, wealth and fame are a > social species of the Good, and truth is an intellectual level kind of Good. > So truth isn't equivalent to the Good simply because it's not the only kind > of Good. > > "[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I > think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I > just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of > all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes." > > Tukka said: > > Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also > impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an > article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal > rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious". > However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of > static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's > just the general notion of static value that's undefinable. > > dmb says: > > This is very confusing. (A) You say Pirsig fails to mention a point that he > just mentioned, (B) you contradict that point for no apparent reason, and (C) > you say the theory can be defined but the general notion can't be defined for > no apparent reason. I'd be surprised if anyone can make sense of that. > > > Tukka said: ...we here are obviously incapable of innovation if it > involves criticism of Pirsig. Even if the need for innovation could be > deductively proven we just wouldn't do it because, instead of > understanding that the MOQ requires us to replace worse ideas with > better ones, we'd be socially loyal to Pirsig and that's it. > > > dmb says: > > While I agree that social level values shouldn't get in the way of seeking > truth, I also think any fair and neutral observing would say that you're > letting pride stand in the way of getting questions to your answers. You're > letting ego stand in the way of even entertaining the possibility that > somebody might teach you something, aren't you? Please consider the obvious > hostility with which you responded to my answers: "You've pretended you're my > mentor and then posted me a pep talk," you said. "Because, if someone reads > that really carelessly, he or she might actually believe you're my mentor. > That I'm a novice, struggling to understand the MOQ, but you already do and > you're so generous you give me a pep talk," you added. I think that sort of > reaction is intellectually immature and irresponsible and that no fruitful > conversation can occur under such conditions. > > > Tukka said: I'd like a more precise definition of "objective scientific > instrument". Are questionnaires and social sciences objective? If not, why > not? [...] Generally speaking, social sciences are considered empirical > sciences as opposed to normative sciences. And don't we subscribe to > empiricism? Well, a social scientist could distinguish a king from a commoner. > > > dmb says: > > There's a long discussion in Lila concerning the problem with "objectivity" > in the social sciences. That section would supply some answers. But it's also > an issue with which social science still grapples constantly. Since the > subject matter is not purely physical, the standard scientific methods used > in the physical sciences have to be adapted. The methods and procedures used > by social scientists are usually explained in great detail so that each paper > or Journal article will include a fairly substantial section devoted to those > methods. Ideally, anyone working at the graduate level of any field will be > able to explain what counts as valid evidence and truth within that field so > that they are, in effect, philosophers of that discipline. Basically, the > methods and standards need to be appropriate to the nature of the subject > matter and, obviously, physics and anthropology have very different objects > of study. > > "[50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. [To say SOM is identical to the > intellectual level of the MOQ] It seems to exclude non-subject-object > constructions such as symbolic logic, higher mathematics, and computer > languages from the intellectual level and gives them no home. Also the term > 'quality' as used in the MOQ would be excluded from the intellectual level. > In fact, the MOQ, which gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, would > also have to be excluded from the intellectual level." > > Tukka said: Important point for my case. I've been accused of trying to > impose SOM > on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM. > Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore. > > dmb says: > > Pirsig is explaining why it's "too restrictive" to say that SOM is identical > to the intellectual level, right? And so he's pointing out some intellectual > things that are not SOM. This has no bearing on whether or not you've > understood the relation between SOM and the MOQ. I have already offered some > criticism of exactly that - But that was done without making any references > to symbolic logic or regular logic. > > What Pirsig's point tells us is that SOM is an intellectual pattern among > other intellectual patterns, not the whole level. But please notice that this > is a major demotion, a huge reduction in rank for SOM. Within SOM, subjects > and objects are metaphysical, the very structure of reality, the real > substance of the universe. But in the MOQ, SOM is just a concept, an > abstraction invented by the human mind for human purposes. And we have to > take the same attitude toward the static levels of the MOQ, as an idea > invented for human purposes and not reality itself. In the MOQ, words and > concepts take you away from reality, not toward it. But we can talk about > words and think about ideas because those are knowable and definable, by > definition. (And that's why it would be a mistake to "have a theory that > accounts for symbolic logic, higher mathematics and programming languages by > placing them into a metaphysical category".) This error of treating > abstractions as if they were actual existiential realities is called > "reification" or, as Whitehead put it, "the fallacy of misplaced > concreteness". > > > Tukka said: The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to imply it > does, > though. I feel this way. Am I wrong? > > dmb says: > > I don't know who implied such a thing but logical contradictions are invalid > in the MOQ, just as they are in any other philosophy. But there is plenty of > room for criticizing Rationalistic philosophies like Hegel's, wherein reality > reality itself is supposed to be logically structured. Logic is about the > quality of thought, not the structure of reality. > > Pirsig explains his motives for attempting to solve the > mind-matter-problem this way: "Hugo: I don't agree on much of what > Merriam has to say. For one, his way of handling the Schrödinger Cat > paradox [59] RMP: I think this paradox exists as a result of the > materialist history of scientific thinking. Scientists often forget that > all scientific knowledge is subjective knowledge based on experience, > although science does not deny that this is true." > > "does not deny that this is true" doesn't mean "asserts that this is > true". This is because science is objective, not subjective, and has > little to say about subjectivity. > > Continued to a description of MOQ idealism: "All objects are in fact > mental constructs based on experience. If we do not forget this and > start with experience as the beginning point of the experiment, rather > than objective quantum particles as the beginning point of the > experiment, the paradox seems to vanish." > > This is one of the things of which people sometimes assume I don't > understand them. I don't know what reason I give them to suppose so. The > intention of this statement isn't to suggest that logical analysis may > not be performed within the MOQ. > > "The existence of collective masses of electrons can be inferred from > experience and there is every reason to think they exist independently > of the mind. But in the case of the spin of an *individual* electron, > there is *no* experience. In addition, the nature of the Heisenberg > Theory of Indeterminacy prevents any inference from general collective > experience of electrons to certify the spin of any individual electron. > If you can't experience something and you can't infer it either, then > you have no scientific basis for saying that it exists." > > I have inferred the Heinous Quadrilemma. Therefore it exists. > > "Maggie: The MOQ also says that every Quality event results in one > object and one subject. [60] RMP: It says subjects and objects are > deduced from quality events, but many quality events occur without a > resultant subject and object." > > I agree. > > "Maggie: The initial connection between leader and follower may be > formed by a Quality event at any level, but must be maintained by the > social level. [62] RMP: In the case of the military, where deserters are > executed by firing squad, you can say that leadership is maintained by > the biological and inorganic levels; that is, handcuffs and bullets." > > What does this make of military rank? That it is just a biological > pattern? That a lieutenant is not obeyed by his subordinates because of > his rank but because he seems like tough guy? > > I think Pirsig's definition is offensive towards soldiers. The French > Foreign Legion has some kind of a oath the soldiers have to swear. A > soldier obeying commands is operating at the social level. > > From the SODV (Subjects, Objects, Data and Values) paper: > "In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: > mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object > does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be > independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived > from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs > at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing. > It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of > the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality > is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made > possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject > and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is > deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of > the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the > cause of the Quality! > And: > [65] RMP: ...In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all > subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the > observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In > the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation > creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.' > Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where > there are no observations?'' > > Tukka said: > Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If > it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared > as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a > deduction has an undefined concept as a premise? > > > dmb says: > > Yes, deduced. This is what I've been trying to tell you about the relations > between SOM and the MOQ, about the place of subjects and objects in the MOQ. > The real deal with subjects and objects, I answered in response to your > question, is that they are not really real. They're just ideas derived from > experience. And that's what Pirsig is saying here. In all subject-object > metaphysics, he says, both the object and the subject are assumed to exist > prior to the observation but in the MOQ, the intellectual patterns called > 'observed' and 'observer' are derived from experience. This is not idealism, > by the way, because it puts experience first, not mind or subjectivity. This > point is also made at the end of chapter 29 of Lila and there you'll see that > he and William James call this radical empiricism, not idealism. > > > Tukka said: ...but complementarity doesn't allow multiple contradictory views > to > coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And > the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the > only context provided for idealism is "true ideas". > > dmb says: > > The MOQ is the context, which means Pragmatic truth, which means that truth > is plural - among other things. In Pragmatism truth is not what corresponds > to the one and only objective reality but it has to agree with the experience > when it's put into practice for a particular purpose. Idealism doesn't make > much sense when you're doing empirical science but materialism will work even > if it's not true in any ultimate sense or in any metaphysical sense. Physics > isn't necessarily any truer than philosophy or poetry and each domain is > allowed to have its own standards of excellence. > > > And just one more. I'm out of time and steam. > > > [73] RMP: In the MOQ, the > static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object > and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual > patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to > help prevent confusion later on." > > > Tukka said: It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now. > > > dmb says: > > I think you've hereby admitted that you're confused about the relation > between SOM and the MOQ, about how to map subjects and objects onto the four > levels of value. If I try to help with that confusion, you might want to > consider thanking me instead of scolding me. It hardly seems fair to pose the > question and then attack those who presume to answer, you know? > > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > Avast | Download Free Antivirus for PC, Mac & > Android<https://www.avast.com/antivirus> > www.avast.com > Protect your devices with the best free antivirus on the market. Download > Avast antivirus and anti-spyware protection for your PC, Mac and Android. > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > MOQ Online - MOQ_Discuss<http://moq.org/md/archives.html> > moq.org > Robert M. Pirsig's MoQ deals with the fundamentals of existence and provides > a more coherent system for understanding reality than our current paradigms > allow > > > Tuukka said: > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html -- http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
