________________________________
Tukka said: Dan and I were just arguing whether truth is equivalent with good.
Seems
like I was right. The word "mainly" implies there's also something else
to good than truth.
dmb says: Pirsig identifies the MOQ with Pragmatism (a theory of truth) and
approvingly quotes William James saying, "Truth is a species of the Good". More
specifically, the MOQ divides the Good into four levels of static values so
that health is a biological species of the Good, wealth and fame are a social
species of the Good, and truth is an intellectual level kind of Good. So truth
isn't equivalent to the Good simply because it's not the only kind of Good.
"[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I
think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I
just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of
all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes."
Tukka said:
Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also
impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an
article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal
rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious".
However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of
static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's
just the general notion of static value that's undefinable.
dmb says:
This is very confusing. (A) You say Pirsig fails to mention a point that he
just mentioned, (B) you contradict that point for no apparent reason, and (C)
you say the theory can be defined but the general notion can't be defined for
no apparent reason. I'd be surprised if anyone can make sense of that.
Tukka said: ...we here are obviously incapable of innovation if it
involves criticism of Pirsig. Even if the need for innovation could be
deductively proven we just wouldn't do it because, instead of
understanding that the MOQ requires us to replace worse ideas with
better ones, we'd be socially loyal to Pirsig and that's it.
dmb says:
While I agree that social level values shouldn't get in the way of seeking
truth, I also think any fair and neutral observing would say that you're
letting pride stand in the way of getting questions to your answers. You're
letting ego stand in the way of even entertaining the possibility that somebody
might teach you something, aren't you? Please consider the obvious hostility
with which you responded to my answers: "You've pretended you're my mentor and
then posted me a pep talk," you said. "Because, if someone reads that really
carelessly, he or she might actually believe you're my mentor. That I'm a
novice, struggling to understand the MOQ, but you already do and you're so
generous you give me a pep talk," you added. I think that sort of reaction is
intellectually immature and irresponsible and that no fruitful conversation can
occur under such conditions.
Tukka said: I'd like a more precise definition of "objective scientific
instrument". Are questionnaires and social sciences objective? If not, why not?
[...] Generally speaking, social sciences are considered empirical sciences as
opposed to normative sciences. And don't we subscribe to empiricism? Well, a
social scientist could distinguish a king from a commoner.
dmb says:
There's a long discussion in Lila concerning the problem with "objectivity" in
the social sciences. That section would supply some answers. But it's also an
issue with which social science still grapples constantly. Since the subject
matter is not purely physical, the standard scientific methods used in the
physical sciences have to be adapted. The methods and procedures used by social
scientists are usually explained in great detail so that each paper or Journal
article will include a fairly substantial section devoted to those methods.
Ideally, anyone working at the graduate level of any field will be able to
explain what counts as valid evidence and truth within that field so that they
are, in effect, philosophers of that discipline. Basically, the methods and
standards need to be appropriate to the nature of the subject matter and,
obviously, physics and anthropology have very different objects of study.
"[50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. [To say SOM is identical to the
intellectual level of the MOQ] It seems to exclude non-subject-object
constructions such as symbolic logic, higher mathematics, and computer
languages from the intellectual level and gives them no home. Also the term
'quality' as used in the MOQ would be excluded from the intellectual level. In
fact, the MOQ, which gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also
have to be excluded from the intellectual level."
Tukka said: Important point for my case. I've been accused of trying to impose
SOM
on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM.
Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore.
dmb says:
Pirsig is explaining why it's "too restrictive" to say that SOM is identical to
the intellectual level, right? And so he's pointing out some intellectual
things that are not SOM. This has no bearing on whether or not you've
understood the relation between SOM and the MOQ. I have already offered some
criticism of exactly that - But that was done without making any references to
symbolic logic or regular logic.
What Pirsig's point tells us is that SOM is an intellectual pattern among other
intellectual patterns, not the whole level. But please notice that this is a
major demotion, a huge reduction in rank for SOM. Within SOM, subjects and
objects are metaphysical, the very structure of reality, the real substance of
the universe. But in the MOQ, SOM is just a concept, an abstraction invented by
the human mind for human purposes. And we have to take the same attitude toward
the static levels of the MOQ, as an idea invented for human purposes and not
reality itself. In the MOQ, words and concepts take you away from reality, not
toward it. But we can talk about words and think about ideas because those are
knowable and definable, by definition. (And that's why it would be a mistake to
"have a theory that accounts for symbolic logic, higher mathematics and
programming languages by placing them into a metaphysical category".) This
error of treating abstractions as if they were actual existiential realities is
called "reification" or, as Whitehead put it, "the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness".
Tukka said: The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to imply it
does,
though. I feel this way. Am I wrong?
dmb says:
I don't know who implied such a thing but logical contradictions are invalid in
the MOQ, just as they are in any other philosophy. But there is plenty of room
for criticizing Rationalistic philosophies like Hegel's, wherein reality
reality itself is supposed to be logically structured. Logic is about the
quality of thought, not the structure of reality.
Pirsig explains his motives for attempting to solve the
mind-matter-problem this way: "Hugo: I don't agree on much of what
Merriam has to say. For one, his way of handling the Schrödinger Cat
paradox [59] RMP: I think this paradox exists as a result of the
materialist history of scientific thinking. Scientists often forget that
all scientific knowledge is subjective knowledge based on experience,
although science does not deny that this is true."
"does not deny that this is true" doesn't mean "asserts that this is
true". This is because science is objective, not subjective, and has
little to say about subjectivity.
Continued to a description of MOQ idealism: "All objects are in fact
mental constructs based on experience. If we do not forget this and
start with experience as the beginning point of the experiment, rather
than objective quantum particles as the beginning point of the
experiment, the paradox seems to vanish."
This is one of the things of which people sometimes assume I don't
understand them. I don't know what reason I give them to suppose so. The
intention of this statement isn't to suggest that logical analysis may
not be performed within the MOQ.
"The existence of collective masses of electrons can be inferred from
experience and there is every reason to think they exist independently
of the mind. But in the case of the spin of an *individual* electron,
there is *no* experience. In addition, the nature of the Heisenberg
Theory of Indeterminacy prevents any inference from general collective
experience of electrons to certify the spin of any individual electron.
If you can't experience something and you can't infer it either, then
you have no scientific basis for saying that it exists."
I have inferred the Heinous Quadrilemma. Therefore it exists.
"Maggie: The MOQ also says that every Quality event results in one
object and one subject. [60] RMP: It says subjects and objects are
deduced from quality events, but many quality events occur without a
resultant subject and object."
I agree.
"Maggie: The initial connection between leader and follower may be
formed by a Quality event at any level, but must be maintained by the
social level. [62] RMP: In the case of the military, where deserters are
executed by firing squad, you can say that leadership is maintained by
the biological and inorganic levels; that is, handcuffs and bullets."
What does this make of military rank? That it is just a biological
pattern? That a lieutenant is not obeyed by his subordinates because of
his rank but because he seems like tough guy?
I think Pirsig's definition is offensive towards soldiers. The French
Foreign Legion has some kind of a oath the soldiers have to swear. A
soldier obeying commands is operating at the social level.
>From the SODV (Subjects, Objects, Data and Values) paper:
"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things:
mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object
does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be
independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived
from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs
at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing.
It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of
the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality
is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made
possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject
and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is
deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of
the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the
cause of the Quality!
And:
[65] RMP: ...In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all
subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the
observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In
the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation
creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.'
Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where
there are no observations?''
Tukka said:
Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If
it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared
as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a
deduction has an undefined concept as a premise?
dmb says:
Yes, deduced. This is what I've been trying to tell you about the relations
between SOM and the MOQ, about the place of subjects and objects in the MOQ.
The real deal with subjects and objects, I answered in response to your
question, is that they are not really real. They're just ideas derived from
experience. And that's what Pirsig is saying here. In all subject-object
metaphysics, he says, both the object and the subject are assumed to exist
prior to the observation but in the MOQ, the intellectual patterns called
'observed' and 'observer' are derived from experience. This is not idealism, by
the way, because it puts experience first, not mind or subjectivity. This point
is also made at the end of chapter 29 of Lila and there you'll see that he and
William James call this radical empiricism, not idealism.
Tukka said: ...but complementarity doesn't allow multiple contradictory views to
coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And
the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the
only context provided for idealism is "true ideas".
dmb says:
The MOQ is the context, which means Pragmatic truth, which means that truth is
plural - among other things. In Pragmatism truth is not what corresponds to the
one and only objective reality but it has to agree with the experience when
it's put into practice for a particular purpose. Idealism doesn't make much
sense when you're doing empirical science but materialism will work even if
it's not true in any ultimate sense or in any metaphysical sense. Physics isn't
necessarily any truer than philosophy or poetry and each domain is allowed to
have its own standards of excellence.
And just one more. I'm out of time and steam.
[73] RMP: In the MOQ, the
static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object
and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual
patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to
help prevent confusion later on."
Tukka said: It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now.
dmb says:
I think you've hereby admitted that you're confused about the relation between
SOM and the MOQ, about how to map subjects and objects onto the four levels of
value. If I try to help with that confusion, you might want to consider
thanking me instead of scolding me. It hardly seems fair to pose the question
and then attack those who presume to answer, you know?
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Robert M. Pirsig's MoQ deals with the fundamentals of existence and provides a
more coherent system for understanding reality than our current paradigms allow
Tuukka said:
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