Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
I've read LC RMP annotations and have some comments. And, from now on,
I'm going to call Lila's Child LC because otherwise Adrie might confuse
it with LILA. These comments pertain to the Heinous Quadrilemma but also
other issues.
"Jason: What distinguishes a high quality intellectual idea from a lower
quality one? [8] RMP: It's truth, mainly. Also the magnitude of the
questions it answers or problems it solves. Other things being equal,
its rhetorical 'elegance' is also important in the mathematical sense of
that term."
Dan and I were just arguing whether truth is equivalent with good. Seems
like I was right. The word "mainly" implies there's also something else
to good than truth.
Definition of the mind: "Magnus: The languages our individual intellects
are built upon are the language provided by our social patterns of value
called our bodies. [25] RMP: This is okay. In LILA, I never defined the
intellectual level of the MOQ, since everyone who is up to reading LILA
already knows what 'intellectual' means. For purposes of MOQ precision,
let's say that the intellectual level is the same as mind. It is the
collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the brain, that stand
for patterns of experience."
This annotation is well written by Pirsig. "Jason: My initial reaction
regards your suggestion that self-consciousness or self-awareness [29]
RMP: The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a 'self' that
is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual
patterns. There is no 'self' that contains these patterns. These
patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious
mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to 'big
self' and 'small self.' Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic
Quality"
"[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I
think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I
just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of
all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes."
Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also
impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an
article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal
rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious".
However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of
static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's
just the general notion of static value that's undefinable.
"Doug: I stated the paradox to Pirsig a little differently:
A: Statement B is true.
B: Statement A is false.
If you place both of these sentences in one context (which is what SOM
does with everything) you get, guess what, paradox (es). You feel this
kind of brain locked looping stupor. It makes you dizzy. My point to
Pirsig and to my fellow TLS mates (this paradox is not new, I did not
originate it, countless others have used this example; except I have not
seen anyone else solve it the way I am about to show you. If you know of
another person who has alredy done this, please share) is that MOQ and
QM and the concept of many truths eliminates the paradox.
They do so by implying that if there are many truths there must be many
contexts. All we have to do to eliminate the paradox is create a
separate context for the two statements, say a local 'true' context and
a local 'false' context. Then place the two sentences in each context.
When you get a contradiction, switch to the other context to make the
sentence, which is contradictory true. Caveat: we now have added
responsibility of keeping track of multiple contexts for ourselves and
those with whom we are communicating. This is *not* easy. It is easier
to be SOM-like, assume a single context, and allow the paradoxes to spew
forth abundantly."
This has nothing to do whether the Heinous Quadrilemma works or not. The
point is that Pirsig doesn't specify other contexts for idealism and
materialism except truth for the former, extremely high moral value for
the latter and logical consistency (not paraconsistency - NO true
contradictions) for both. Which is what makes the Heinous Quadrilemma
possible.
Should there have been additional relevant contexts, Pirsig should have
presented them as we here are obviously incapable of innovation if it
involves criticism of Pirsig. Even if the need for innovation could be
deductively proven we just wouldn't do it because, instead of
understanding that the MOQ requires us to replace worse ideas with
better ones, we'd be socially loyal to Pirsig and that's it.
"Citation of Magnus [49] RMP: 'Societies' is used figuratively here as a
more colorful word meaning 'groups.' If I had known it would be taken
literally as evidence that cells belong in the social level I would not
have used it. Maybe in a future edition it can be struck out.
One can also call ants and bees 'social' insects, but for purposes of
precision in the MOQ, social patterns should be defined as human and
subjective. Unlike cells and bees and ants, they cannot be detected with
an objective scientific instrument. For example, there is no objective
scientific instrument that can distinguish between a king and commoner,
because the difference is social."
I'd like a more precise definition of "objective scientific instrument".
Are questionnaires and social sciences objective? If not, why not?
Because we want to "cut it off somewhere" and that's the point where we
draw the line, just like how Africa was split into nation states with
disregard towards which local tribe actually lived where. If you draw
lines that way you get problems later. That's an empirical fact.
Generally speaking, social sciences are considered empirical sciences as
opposed to normative sciences. And don't we subscribe to empiricism?
Well, a social scientist could distinguish a king from a commoner.
"Bodvar: A while back, we spoke about the emergence of intellect and I
said that in a way SOM could be seen as identical to the intellectual
level of the MOQ! [50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. It seems to
exclude non-subject-object constructions such as symbolic logic, higher
mathematics, and computer languages from the intellectual level and
gives them no home. Also the term 'quality' as used in the MOQ would be
excluded from the intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ, which gives
intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also have to be excluded
from the intellectual level."
Important point for my case. I've been accused of trying to impose SOM
on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM.
Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore.
I have a theory that accounts for symbolic logic, higher mathematics and
programming languages by placing them into a metaphysical category
comparable to subjectivity and objectivity. But that's AMOQ, not MOQ.
Given how bad social skills I reportedly have, you might never accept a
good modification if it were made by me. However, according to the MOQ
that'd be an immoral choice. Intellectuality should prevail over sociality.
"Hugo: First, I think we have to distinguish between the objectivity of
methodology and 'objective knowledge,' [53] RMP: Even in a
subject-object metaphysics this is an oxymoron. It leads to endless
conversation."
Intuitively I agree.
"[56] RMP: The word 'produced' implies that Dynamic Quality is a part of
a cause and effect system of the kind generated by scientific thinking.
But Dynamic Quality cannot be part of any cause and effect system since
all cause and effect systems are static patterns. (...)"
This annotation supports my argument that, when formalizing the MOQ, it
is appropriate to omit undefinable concepts, such as Quality and Dynamic
Quality, from the formalism and all connectives pointing to and from them.
"[57] RMP: In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of
matter. Matter is a deduction from experience."
One might want to think Pirsig should've written "induction" instead of
"deduction". But he did write "deduction". Why?
A definition of SOM: "Hugo: Well, I find the source of SOM in
Aristotle's work, but I find more. And we are off course in our
discussions of the MOQ (including Pirsig, especially Pirsig because he
is so good at it) using the logic that Aristotle worked out. Logic is a
valuable tool, but out rationalistic culture has taken logic to be the
very structure of the world. Anyway, I just thought it fair and humbling
to mention that the ideas behind the MOQ are just as ancient as the
ideas behind SOM, and that Aristotle worked out some key concepts of
both. [58] RMP: Yes, the MOQ only contradicts the SOM denial that value
exists in the real world. The MOQ says it does. Thus the MOQ is an
expansion of existing knowledge, not a denial of existing knowledge."
The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to imply it does,
though. I feel this way. Am I wrong?
Pirsig explains his motives for attempting to solve the
mind-matter-problem this way: "Hugo: I don't agree on much of what
Merriam has to say. For one, his way of handling the Schrödinger Cat
paradox [59] RMP: I think this paradox exists as a result of the
materialist history of scientific thinking. Scientists often forget that
all scientific knowledge is subjective knowledge based on experience,
although science does not deny that this is true."
"does not deny that this is true" doesn't mean "asserts that this is
true". This is because science is objective, not subjective, and has
little to say about subjectivity.
Continued to a description of MOQ idealism: "All objects are in fact
mental constructs based on experience. If we do not forget this and
start with experience as the beginning point of the experiment, rather
than objective quantum particles as the beginning point of the
experiment, the paradox seems to vanish."
This is one of the things of which people sometimes assume I don't
understand them. I don't know what reason I give them to suppose so. The
intention of this statement isn't to suggest that logical analysis may
not be performed within the MOQ.
"The existence of collective masses of electrons can be inferred from
experience and there is every reason to think they exist independently
of the mind. But in the case of the spin of an *individual* electron,
there is *no* experience. In addition, the nature of the Heisenberg
Theory of Indeterminacy prevents any inference from general collective
experience of electrons to certify the spin of any individual electron.
If you can't experience something and you can't infer it either, then
you have no scientific basis for saying that it exists."
I have inferred the Heinous Quadrilemma. Therefore it exists.
"Maggie: The MOQ also says that every Quality event results in one
object and one subject. [60] RMP: It says subjects and objects are
deduced from quality events, but many quality events occur without a
resultant subject and object."
I agree.
"Maggie: The initial connection between leader and follower may be
formed by a Quality event at any level, but must be maintained by the
social level. [62] RMP: In the case of the military, where deserters are
executed by firing squad, you can say that leadership is maintained by
the biological and inorganic levels; that is, handcuffs and bullets."
What does this make of military rank? That it is just a biological
pattern? That a lieutenant is not obeyed by his subordinates because of
his rank but because he seems like tough guy?
I think Pirsig's definition is offensive towards soldiers. The French
Foreign Legion has some kind of a oath the soldiers have to swear. A
soldier obeying commands is operating at the social level.
''Doug: I found the following on the Quality event in SODV (Subjects,
Objects, Data and Values paper):
"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things:
mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object
does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be
independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived
from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs
at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing.
It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of
the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality
is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made
possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject
and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is
deduced''
Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If
it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared
as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a
deduction has an undefined concept as a premise?
Continued: ''from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of
the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the
cause of the Quality!
And:
The most striking similarity between the Metaphysics of Quality and
Complementarity is that this Quality event corresponds to what Bohr
means by 'observation' When the Copenhagen Interpretation 'holds that
the unmeasured atom is not real, then it's attributes are created or
realized in the act of measurement,' (Herbert xiii) it is saying
something very close to the Metaphysics of Quality. The observation
creates the reality" [65] RMP: It seems close but I think it is really
very far apart. In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all
subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the
observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In
the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation
creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.'
Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where
there are no observations?''
Someone could try to argue this to mean complementarity renders the MOQ
immune to the first horn of the Heinous Quadrilemma, inconsistency. But
complementarity isn't a defined property of a logical system. Is there a
way to formalize that?
"Lots of discussion [67] RMP: This is difficult to untangle. Bohr's
'observation' and the MOQ's 'quality event' are the same, but the
contexts are different. The difference is rooted in the historic
chicken-egg controversy over whether matter came first and produces
ideas, which produce what we know as matter. The MOQ says that Quality
comes first, which produces ideas, which produce what we know as matter.
The scientific community almost invariably presumes that matter comes
first and produces ideas. However, as to further the confusion, the MOQ
says that the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea! I
think Bohr would say that philosophic idealism (i.e. ideas come before
matter) is a viable philosophy since complementarity allows multiple
contradictory views to coexist"
Yeah, but complementarity doesn't allow multiple contradictory views to
coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And
the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the
only context provided for idealism is "true ideas".
"Mark: Sorry to appear tangential to your original thread, but you are
using the terms 'subject' and 'object' in an unusual way for me. Could
you please help me understand? Do you agree that 'subject' implies the
self and 'objects' are all that is not self? [73] RMP: In the MOQ, the
static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object
and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual
patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to
help prevent confusion later on."
It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now.
"Mark: If you are saying that logic deals with things that are not
subjects or objets, then, according to Pirsig, you have defined Quality.
[74] RMP: Here comes the confusion. To prevent it, it is better to say
that logic is a set of rules (i.e. an intellectual pattern) that helps
produce high quality in other intellectual patterns."
Doesn't Pirsig say that the MOQ is an intellectual pattern? I think he
says that in the end of the letter to Paul Turner. If logic helps
produce high quality in other intellectual patterns then I'm doing what
I'm supposed to be doing right now.
"Dave: For example, 'this tree.' In SOM, we define it by its scientific
characteristics (i.e., size, shape, color, species, board feet of
lumber, structural properties, cell structure etc.) and then we
generally stop. But in the MOQ--at least when we talk about man's static
pattern, "this tree"--we at minimum have to move on up into the social
level [79] RMP: A tree is purely biological. The MOQ doesn't require a
social description a social description any more than the SOM does.
Remember the SOM includes the field of social science."
Are social patterns subjective? If so, they are invisible to scientific
instruments. So are social sciences subjective? That is to say, instead
of being a social scientist one could just play a drum in a cocoa
ceremony and have no different epistemological predisposition than a
social scientist? We'd need romantic and classical quality here to make
sense of stuff.
Or perhaps we'd need the objective and subjective quality of ZAMM. But
it would be really awkward if we found it meaningful to state: "Social
science and drumming are LILA subjective but social science is ZAMM
objective and drumming is ZAMM subjective."
"Dave: Under quantum mechanics if all men die then the [sic] does [sic]
phenomena we observe and call 'quanta' cease to be? Would the then
remaining universe, other than man being gone, markedly change? Would
the sun, earth, stars disappear or change in any way? [80] RMP: This is
the usual argument against the philosophic idealism that is part of the
MOQ so it had better be answer here. It is similar to the question, 'If
a tree falls in the forest and nobody hears it, does it make a sound?'
The historic answer of the idealists it, 'What tree?'
In order to ask this question you have to presuppose the existence of
the falling tree and then ask whether this presupposed tree would vanish
if nobody was there. Of course, it wouldn't vanish! It has already been
presupposed.
This presupposition is a standard logical fallacy known as a hypothesis
contrary to fact. It is the 'hypothetical question' that is always
thrown out of court as inadmissible. If pigs could fly, how high would
they go? The answer is the same as the answer to Dave's question"
Here Pirsig asserts that idealism is part of the MOQ. As a part of the
MOQ, idealism seems to function exactly like it would without the MOQ,
which reinforces my assertion that MOQ idealism (in which Quality comes
first) is logically equivalent to ordinary idealism.
In [84] Pirsig compliments Platt's "Principles of the Metaphysics of
Quality". I have some comments on these principles.
"5. The Awareness Hierarchy Principle: Each higher level evolved from
and included the lower but expanded awareness. For example, the
intellectual can apprehend mathematical patterns that the lower levels
cannot. Also, all levels possess, in addition to environmental
awareness, an awareness of values. Even a lowly virus knows what's good
for it."
Here, to "include" probably means to "be a subset of".
"11. The Truth Principle: Truth, an intellectual value pattern, is a
species of Good. There's no single, exclusive truth, but those of high
quality are empirical, logical, elegant and brief. In any case, it's
immoral for truth to be subordinated to social values."
The last sentence is something everyone on MD should remember. Pirsig
deems it immoral that an annoying person be resisted if he's making a
relevant point. Of course it's up to me not to disturb social processes
too much while I'm at this but, well... I've been diagnosed with
Asperger's syndrome. And sometimes this condition makes me behave in
ways that other people experience as needlessly unpleasant, cold or
inconsiderate.
Simply pointing out that I have bad social skills has no effect on my
behavior. This is because that behavior isn't caused by choice, attitude
or lack of motivation or respect but by a genuine lack of empathy.
Information, that would be useful for me in improving my behavior, would
include written practical examples about situations in which I did
something wrong, and a description of what I should've done. They should
be quite accurate.
In any case, the point of the above citation is this: truth is
subordinate to moral value. So they're probably not equivalent.
"12. The Freedom Principle: To create ever higher levels of awareness,
Dynamic Quality strives for freedom from all static patterns. Freedom is
the core value and highest Good in the Metaphysics of Quality. Thus, the
best social and intellectual patterns are those that promote freedom
consistent with maintaining the static patterns necessary for survival."
I have something to say about this, but those things are more about what
I think than about what Pirsig thinks.
"Platt: The way I interpret this is that the front edge of experience,
i.e., Dynamic Quality, includes a sense of value (a dim perception) that
operates simultaneously with the front edge and makes an instantaneous
judgment along the high/low Quality spectrum, causing a Dynamic response
prior to static thought. [86] RMP: Since in the MOQ all divisions of
Quality are static it follows that high and low are subdivisions of
static quality, since the MOQ is itself a static intellectual pattern of
Quality."
As a static intellectual pattern of Quality the MOQ can be approached
dialectically. This supports the view that the Heinous Quadrilemma
applies to the MOQ.
"Platt: So I see Quality divided two ways in the MOQ: along a fuzzy
logic sort of positive/negative spectrum, and a hard logic
Dynamic/static split with both occurring simultaneously, not in a
separate either/or relationship but a complimentary [sic] relationship.
[87] RMP: This seems very good as long as it is understood that the
structure of the MOQ puts static and Dynamic above high and low in its
hierarchy."
Platt writes about "fuzzy logic sort of positive/negative spectrum"
which is feasible at least in the MOQ-related computer programs I've
made and, particularly, those I intend to make. Indeed in these programs
there can be a method for determining the exact moral value of a pattern
in fuzzy logic.
"Bodvar: Society in the MOQ sense is a very wide term. [93] RMP: This
strikes me as so general it destroys the meaning of society for MOQ
purposes. I think it is better just to keep it as the subjective customs
of a group of people."
Are these customs invisible to objective scientific instruments? If yes,
are social sciences subjective? If yes, does the MOQ put them into the
same category with poetry?
"Ant: I am unhappy with the replacement of 'intellect' with
'rationality.' Firstly, 'rationalism' is the philosophical theory of /a
priori/ ideas, that truth and knowledge are attainable primarily through
reason rather than through knowledge. Unfortunately, I think its usage
within the MOQ could become confusing especially as the MOQ is an
/empirical/ theory opposed to /rationality/. Maybe the term 'reasoning'
could be put in its place but even with this term, there are problems.
[94] RMP: Good point."
In annotation [50] Pirsig states symbolic logic not to be a
subject-object construction. Then what is it? We know this of it:
* It should be a static pattern.
* It should be intellectual but it can't, because then it wouldn't be
ZAMM subjective and we haven't agreed that ZAMM subjectivity isn't the
same thing as LILA subjectivity.
* It should be psychic, in the mind, but it can't because then it
wouldn't be ZAMM objective and we haven't agreed that ZAMM objectivity
isn't the same thing as LILA objectivity.
Not much room for such a thing in Pirsig's MOQ! But hey, we can't
improve the MOQ because none of us is Pirsig! Pirsig says the MOQ is
just MOQ and Pirsig is just Pirsig, but that's just what he thinks. Here
on MD we only care about what Pirsig has said. The MOQ is just a sidekick.
Furthermore, given that the MOQ opposes SOM and that symbolic logic
isn't a subject-object construction, why would the MOQ anyhow be opposed
to rationality? Symbolic logic is rational.
Does the MOQ consider symbolic logic empirical?
"Bodvar: I long stuck to 'Symbolic Language' (and still think it's a
good definition), but someone else caught the idea that intellect can be
seen as rational thinking. Long before the Lila Squad days, it had
puzzled me greatly that Subject/Object metaphysics /may/ be viewed as
the intellectual level of MOQ! I even raised the question in a letter to
Pirsig, but he did not respond. [95] RMP: I don't remember not
responding, so it must have been an oversight. I don't think the
subject-object level is identical with intellect. Intellect is simply
thinking, and one can think without involving the subject-object
relationship. Computer language is not primarily structured into subject
and objects. Algebra has no subjects and objects."
I agree about the subject-object "level" not being identical with
empiricistic intellect. It goes in line with annotation [50] which
states that symbolic logic is not a subject-object construction. But if
symbolic logic isn't a subject-object construction, is it still
subjective or objective?
"Ken: We and most everybody in the Lila Squad discuss the MOQ solely in
relation to the human race. In this context, all of this makes sense. It
makes sense until we begin to talk about the operation of Dynamic
Quality before sentience. The static patterns of value start with the
inorganic level. This implies that the MOQ existed before sentience.
[97] RMP: Within the MOQ, the /idea/ that static patterns of value start
with the inorganic level is considered to be a good /idea/. But the MOQ
itself, like science, starts with human experience. Remember the early
talk in ZMM about Newton's Law of Gravity? Scientific laws without
people to write them are a scientific impossibility."
Materialism is a good idea.
"Magnus: But in the MOQ , both parts of the QE are subjects from its
point of view. [100] RMP: Both are patterns of value. But as the diagram
in SODV shows, subjective knowledge (social and intellectual patterns)
is different from objects (biological and inorganic patterns). Their
unity occurs only in the Dynamic Quality that precedes all patterns.
Confusion is generated on this matter when it is forgotten that /all/
scientific knowledge, including knowledge of objects, is subjective
knowledge. This knowledge is confirmed by experience in such a way as to
allow the scientist to generate a supremely high quality intellectual
belief that external objects exist. But that belief itself is still
subjective."
My dictionary describes "subjective" as:
1. "Taking place within the mind and modified by individual bias"
2. "(philosophy) of a mental act performed entirely within the mind"
3. "(grammar) pertaining to subjects as opposed to objects"
Science is supposed to eliminate the individual bias to some extent and
it is in this sense that science is sometimes thought of as objective. I
would like to focus on a notion of subjectivity in which this individual
bias is a focal point. In other words, a subjectivity that isn't
logical. But LILA terminology is inconvenient for having such a
discussion. In ZAMM the terminology is better suited.
"Maggie: There are many 'things' that we are unconscious of, that people
have never noticed. Any of them would have aspects in other levels but
not intellectual. They are not objects. They have not been observed.
But, there is no intellectual pattern that is independent of lower
levels. Any high level pattern has mediated and reordered lower patterns
or it doesn't exist. And, if it mediates even one level of patterns,
that automatically mediates sets of lower level patterns, with the chain
effect going all the way to the inorganic. So, there's no pattern that
exists in only the upper levels but there are patterns that exist only
in lower. [101] RMP: A materialist would say yes. And idealist would say
no."
And what about the patterns that exist only in the upper levels but not
in the lower levels? Do they have a moral hierarchy? Or do all of them
exist on the intellectual level? Pirsig writes in [25] that the
intellectual level is the mind, so maybe they do. That's not a very
ambitious solution.
As if anything were intellectual just because it's in the mind. How are
religious visions intellectual? Hallucinations? Dreams?
What sense is there in stating the mind to be the intellectual level?
This is the most anti-mystical, pro-science stance I can think of. This
is hardly something I'd expect from someone who ever appreciated
anything about American Indian mysticism.
''Dave: I'm out of my element here in seeing the consequences. I
understand the relatively [sic] analogue and agree that Quality is the
mother of all relativity, but don't see why Pirsig would bring up Bohr
and try to relate his work to Bohr's if he was uncomfortable with where
that comparison could or would lead. I also don't see the threat to the
MOQ. [102] RMP: I see today more clearly than when I wrote the SODV
paper that the key to integrating the MOQ with science is through
philosophic idealism, which says that objects grow out of ideas, not the
other way around. Since at the most primary level the observed and the
observer are both intellectual assumptions, the paradoxes of quantum
theory have to be conflicts of intellectual assumption, not just
conflicts of what is observed. Except in the case of Dynamic Quality,
what is observed always involves an interaction with ideas that have
been previously assumed. So the problem is not, "How can observed nature
be so screwy?" but can also be, "What is wrong with our most primitive
assumptions that our set of ideas called 'nature' are turning out so
screwy?" Getting back to physics, this question becomes, "Why should we
assume that the slit experiment should perform differently than it
does?" I think that if researched it would be found that buried in the
data of the slit experiment is an assumption that light exists and
follows consistent laws independently of any human experience. If so,
the MOQ would say that although in the past this seems to have been the
highest quality assumption one can make about light, there may be a
higher quality one that contradicts it. This is pretty much what the
physicists are saying but the MOQ provides a sound metaphysical
structure within which they can say it.''
Pirsig implies that idealism is true. And among other things, Pirsig
affirms the obvious: that intellectual patterns can contradict each other.
"Donny: Marting suggests that Kant 'practically defined SOM'. I'm no
Kant scholar, but my understanding is that beyond us and the /thing for
us/ (object, by the way, literally means 'that which stands over
against') he posited a /thing in itself/ which was unknowable but
presumably a transcendent unity that could be called God or Tao or
Quality [103] RMP: Quality in the MOQ is monistic and thus is not the
same as Kant's 'thing in itself' which is the object of a dualism."
Okay, good. Stating that the MOQ is monistic won't cause problems.
"Donny: Pirsig makes the same equation you do without thinking about it
and that's what I'm trying to show (or else my discussion of Kant will
seem meaningless). Well, understanding Kant is a worthy goal in itself,
but it wouldn't seem especially connected to the MOQ. The difference is,
as I said earlier, an idea is not a body; it's not spatially extended.
But it is a /Gegenstand/ (an object). [106] RMP: Not in the MOQ."
Is it a good, bad or neutral thing that the MOQ is incompatible with Kant?
"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
that is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has
been done. The MOQ is an idea."
If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
Pirsig doesn't get it.
"So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
thought. It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element
of Mind. But what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
consciousness; it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM
is an object, a /Gegenstand/ (literally 'stands over against'
consciousness). So, I hope now that it's clear that SOM and MBd are
different. Pirsig missed that little point.
[108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
(Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
"Donny: When I decide that, 'That cloud is shaped like a rabbit,' is
subjective and 'I'm wearing a brown shirt,' is objective, is that
decision subjective, or is it a brute fact? [109] RMP: In the MOQ,
'brute facts' are also subjective."
Too bad that's not quite what other people consistently mean with "brute
facts".
"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
object.'
[111] RMP: Object: n.
Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
or touch; a material thing.
1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
substantive following and governed by a preposition.
4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
(American Heritage Dictionary)
The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
between them is meaningless."
If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
attention, feeling, thought or action?
Why is there no Definition #5?
"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel gives
a strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
deduction?
"Keith: What's to keep us from reverting to the traditional
understanding of the hot stove example where the oaths the person on the
hot stove utters come from their subjective valuation of pain, not from
primary empirical reality?
[126] RMP: When you examine pain closely you see that it is not in the
mind. Pain that is subjective, i.e. has no medical origin, is not
considered to be real pain, but a hallucination, a symptom of mental
illness. 'Subjective valuation' of pain is a form of insanity. But you
see that pain is not out of the mind either. When a medical patient is
unconscious, i.e., whose mind is absent, there are no objective traces
of the pain to be found. Once [sic] can possibly find the causes of the
pain with scientific instruments but one cannot find the pain itself. So
if pain isn't in the mind and it isn't in the external world where is
it? The answer provided by the MOQ is that pain, like hearing and vision
and smell and touch, is part of the empirical threshold that reveals to
us what the rest of the world is like. At the moment pain is first
experienced it is not even 'pain,' it is just negative quality, a third
category, outside of subjects and objects, whose definitions have not
yet come in."
Seems like pain is a form of romantic quality.
At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
to sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
shark. But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort
and the profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
"Horse: In the divisions between inorganic, biological, social and
intellect, where does one start and the other finish.
[128] RMP: I would agree that valuations can be intense or weak and that
this scale is without sharp divisions. However, I think the MOQ will be
better if the divisions between levels are sharp rather than fuzzy. (...)"
I agree.
"Platt: From the beginning of Lila Squad, Bo has maintained that the
intellectual level is SOM (rationality, language, science).
[129] RMP: I've always thought this is incorrect because many forms of
intellect do not have a subject-object construction. These include logic
itself, mathematics, computer programming languages, and, I believe some
primitive languages (although I can't remember what they are)."
Agreeing with Pirsig.
"Platt: Far from condemning SOM, the Metaphysics of Quality holds it to
be the highest level yet achieved.
[131] RMP: Within the intellectual level, mathematics, especially
quantum mechanics, seems higher to me."
According to Pirsig formalisms can be highly valuable. The Heinous
Quadrilemma is a formalism, in case someone didn't know. Not a very
formal one. But formalizable. By any chance, do you dislike the name
I've given? "The Heinous Quadrilemma"? I just thought to ask since Horse
finds me to have inadequate social skills.
"Platt: To fill the hole may require a new level above SOM. I'm not sure
about this. After all, the MOQ is an SOM document based on SOM reasoning.
[132] RMP: It employs SOM reasoning the way SOM reasoning employs social
structures such as courts and journals and learned societies to make
itself known. SOM reasoning is not subordinate to these social
structures, and the MOQ is not subordinate to the SOM structures it
employs. Remember that the central reality of the MOQ is not an object
or a subject or anything else. It is understood by direct experience
only and not by reasoning of any kind. Therefore to say that the MOQ is
based on SOM reasoning is as useful as saying that the Ten Commandments
are based on SOM reasoning. It doesn't tell us anything about the
essence of the Ten Commandments and it doesn't tell us anything about
the essence of the MOQ"
Okay, but according to the Heinous Quadrilemma the MOQ fails to employ
classical logic. This means anybody praising the MOQ is offering a
broken ladder to the general public. And instead of fixing the ladder he
just keeps going on about what a good place awaits at the end of the
ladder. If so, why not fix the ladder? Isn't it worth it?
"Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
Quality of being reality?
[135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
the SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
assertion that values are unreal."
I agree.
"Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
Mostly for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
dilemmas. It /does/ however provide a framework with which to
contextualize dilemmas. [143]
RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
cite the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so
can two opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to
his own choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the
U.S. Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger
context for understanding."
Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained
how to correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a
given situation.
"Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
arbitrary. If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still
the MOQ, even though he personally prefers four levels."
What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
potency of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
"Q&A [4]
Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
on the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
entirely to help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary
to get rid of them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its
structure--the upper two levels being subjective, and the lower two,
objective. Still later I saw that the subject-object distinction is very
useful for sharply distinguishing between biological and social levels.
If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
latter ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila
Squad has caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object
thinking at present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to
encase values and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That
was the attempt of the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this
whole MOQ.
At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
expressions of independent scientific reality."
Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
he reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other
kind of changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive
anyway.
"Q&A [4]
RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
materialist system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an
idealist system matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The
acceptance of one meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both
mind and matter are levels of value. Materialist explanations and
idealist explanations can coexist because they are descriptions of
coexisting levels of a larger reality.
The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
composed of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an
extremely high quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is
practical to do so. But the MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this
scientific view of reality is still an idea. If it were not an idea,
then that 'independent scientific material reality' would not be able to
change as new scientific discoveries come in."
Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
box that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain
the MOQ but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism".
So, why put the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
How do subjective patterns emerge? Do they emerge? Why? Why not? Are
there four levels of subjective quality?
I've answered these questions. But since it wasn't okay for me to post
non-Pirsig stuff on MD I haven't posted much about that here.
"Q&A [25]
DG: Why do we fear affirmative Dynamic Quality?"
Do not fear.
"Bodvar: Anders asks if the MOQ is valid for extraterrestrial life as
well. He believes in its main tenet, Dynamic/static quality, but has
doubts about the four static levels, they being too fuzzy and human
specific for his liking. [37]
Q&A [37]
RMP: I don't think they're fuzzy
DG: But they are human specific.
RMP: Anders is slipping into the materialist assumption that there is a
huge world out there that has nothing to do with people. The MOQ says
that is a high quality assumption, within limits. One of its limits is
that without humans to make it that assumption cannot be made. It is a
human specific assumption. Strictly speaking, Anders has never heard of
or ever will hear of anything that isn't human specific.
DG: So I take it philosophic idealism is a higher quality intellectual
idea in this situation vs. the physicalist working in the lab who would
find materialism to be of higher value?
RMP: That sounds right, although modern physics has produced laboratory
paradoxes for materialists that do not exist for idealists. I think it
is best to understand both systems, and shift from one to another as it
becomes valuable to do so."
Remember how in [151] Pirsig said he doesn't like being unnecessarily
arbitrary? Well, "That sounds right" sounds pretty arbitrary to me, so I
guess it's necessarily arbitrary. But the only way it can be necessarily
arbitrary is that Pirsig isn't sure of it. He might like to be but he
isn't.
Since Pirsig takes such a weak stance on this whereas my stance is
backed up by solid deduction, that thing that sounded right isn't really
right. It's wrong. Idealism is not a good idea and, consequently,
neither is Pirsig's MOQ.
"Q&A [86]
RMP: From an intellectual point of view, Dynamic understanding is a
logical contradiction. Logic does not control Dynamic understanding
however and within it there is no contradiction."
Does Pirsig mean that the MOQ can be formalized in paraconsistent logic
if Dynamic understanding is a logical contradiction? Probably not, since
elsewhere Pirsig says the MOQ is consistent. It's more likely that by
this he means Dynamic understanding is a nonrelativizably used
predicate. But to call that a contradiction would go too far in my opinion.
Frankly, it sounds like Pirsig isn't that familiar with the exact
meaning of these logical concepts.
"Q&A [97]
RMP: In the late 1800's the chicken-and-egg argument about whether ideas
precede inorganic nature or inorganic nature precedes ideas was
considered philosophically important. No one to my knowledge has ever
shown that the idealists who considered ideas to come first have been
wrong. The discussion has since died away.
It is important for an understanding of the MOQ to see that although
'common sense' dictates that inorganic nature came first, actually
'common sense' which is a set of ideas, has to come first. This 'common
sense' is arrived at through a huge web of socially approved evaluations
of various alternatives. The key term here is 'evaluation,' i.e.,
quality decisions. The fundamental reality is not the common sense or
the objects and laws approved of by common sense but the approval itself
and the quality that leads to it."
He goes on about it but doesn't notice the Heinous Quadrilemma. We're
almost at the end of the book. Will Pirsig ever state that idealism is
good or that materialism is true?
"Q&A [97]
In the MOQ, laws are a species of intellectual patterns that are
associated with a lot of social authority and are slow to change. I
don't think they have any objective status at all. (...)"
My dictionary defines "objective" as:
"1. Adjective: Undistorted by emotion or personal bias; based on
observable phenomena"
The problem with Pirsig's stance is this. Suppose a child named Mike.
Mike has never been to the Moon, but he says the Moon is made of cheese.
How to interpret this?
* Subjectively: Mike lives in a child's fantasy world in which the Moon
is made of cheese.
* Objectively: Mike has incorrect information about the composition of
the Moon.
Laws are objective in the latter sense. Yet there still exist things
that are subjective in the former sense. So why complicate life by
stating that both laws and fantasy worlds are subjective?
You could have a subjective system of metaphysics. But you don't. And
I'll make you one if you want to. It's already been pretty much made. It
has great potential. I'm planning to use it as the basis of an AI.
"Q&A [99]
RMP: I think the mathematical definition of chaos deals exclusively with
what the MOQ would call static objective patterns. (...)"
What makes a mathematical definition "objective"? Is it matter?
Obviously not. Does Pirsig subscribe to mathematical realism? Probably
not. A mathematical definition might be ZAMM objective but not LILA
objective.
"Q&A [101]
A materialist would say yes. An idealist would say no.
DG: And the MOQ would say they are both right?
RMP: Within their limitations. They seem to fit within the Hindu parable
of the blind men and the elephant."
That doesn't solve the mind-matter problem. That rejects the mind-matter
problem rhetorically. Of course everyone has their own point of view.
That's the original cause of the mind-matter problem!
"Q&A [102]
I think idealism is of higher quality for understanding the MOQ because
most people understand materialism as 'common sense' but few understand
idealism as 'common sense,' and you need both. Although Dynamic Quality
is neither an object nor an idea, I have always felt that someone who
understands idealism will figure out the MOQ much faster than someone
who only understands materialism will."
"I think idealism is of higher quality". Well, is it or not? Why leave
this kind of ambiguity if Pirsig already knows how it is? Sounds like he
doesn't. "I have always felt that A" is not how one usually expresses
the conclusion of deduction.
Should we simply disregard Pirsig's faltering, this would be the kind of
a context designation I asked for. Idealism is better for understanding
the MOQ. Materialism is better for understanding something else.
But that still wouldn't solve the mind-matter problem in the intended
way. That problem existed before the MOQ did, and some schools (all of
which purportedly are right) saw merit in idealism anyway. Why? They
couldn't have appreciated idealism because idealism is good for
explaining the MOQ. They found idealism to have some other merit. Which
merit is that?
Apparently, Pirsig acknowledges in LC that there are forms of static
quality the subject-object split doesn't include. I have a theory about
them.
Horse,
"the list" Tuk and I are on is just Tuk and I so it can't really be
called
a list I don't think. And I'm pretty sure neither of us have much of an
agenda at all other than to expand our personal understanding of the MoQ
and how it relates to the rest of intellectual life. That's a big enough
agenda to keep anybody busy for three lifetimes so don't worry.
I think that an important part of the spirit of philosophy, is being able
to drop the preconceptions that drag you down and the value in raising up
the importance of immediate experience is letting go of past experience,
no?
So I'm trying.
very trying... lol
John
On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 10:11 AM, Horse <ho...@darkstar.uk.net> wrote:
Hi Dan and all
I thought that may have been why you went quiet Dan - also why Dave
seems
to have dropped out. It would appear that Tuuk is less interested in
having
a conversation and prefers a confrontation, foisting a particular
point of
view on everyone around him.
Tuukka:
It would appear that you dislike competitivity.
Tuuk and John also have an agenda which
includes 'revitalising' MD in order that the other list they occupy has
something to react against - which might explain the confrontational
approach they're currently adopting.
Tuukka:
I couldn't care less about making LS the place it used to be. Now it's a
place for me to conduct and publish my metaphysical research. It also
remains a place for John and me to comment MD critically but I don't
miss the times we actually did that.
The problem with Tuuk 's confrontational approach is that after a while
others (yourself, David, Ron etc.) get frustrated and then bored with
continually going over the same arguments because his heels are dug
in and
he is incapable of understanding that he may have erred in his initial
premise or premises and is incapable of backtracking.
Tuukka:
Do not slander. My exchange with Ron proves I understand I may have
erred in my initial premises. It's not automatically a faux pas to have
high standards. I'm not going to apologize for presenting a task so
difficult that only Dan and Ron have a clue of what it's about. What do
you mean by backtracking?
We've seen this a
number of times in the past and, as said, why would we wish to waste
precious time on someone who has no interest in listening. A shame
really
as Tuuk is an intelligent guy who may have had something of interest
to say
but his 'people skills' aren't up to much.
Tuukka:
In my defence, people rarely tell me what is it that I do wrong. And no,
I'm not going to figure that out on my own.
Still, I'm not going to waste any of my own time on it - especially when
nothing new or useful, with regard to Pirsig's MoQ, is likely to come
of it.
I also don't like being manipulated by others to further their childish
agendas!
Tuukka:
Which childish agenda would you particularly not like others manipulate
you into furthering?
Regards,
Tuk
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