ELEPHANT TO MARCO AND ALL,
Ho Hum. I think that's probably fair trade. I mean if I recklessly accuse
you of materialism, Marco, it's probably only right that you should foist
this inside/outside stuff on me. I am sorry about the materialism charge -
it was nearly what I meant, but not quite near enough, I must confess. I
think we'll find that both the materialism and the internalism charges miss
their mark, and, seeing that, maybe we'll discern the mark and shoot
straight next time - alteast we'll stand a chance if we can see the target.
So, what on earth was that mad bull elephant on about, accusing Marco of
materialism, of all things? Well, the account of it which appeals to me is
this: that elephant got himself confused between atomism and materialism.
What should I have said, I wonder?
When Plato complains about people who "cling to body", his problem with them
isn't simply their materialism, but their need to identify and cling to
*numericaly distinct* objects: bodies. *This* body, *that* body, *one*
body, *two*. I'll suggest that it isn't the attachment to the material
world that's the problem, so much as the particular ontological
interpretation which is given of that material world, viz, that it
fundamentally consists of a plurality of distinct things: countable like
this: one, two, three, four (etc). Now this veiw we might call "pluralism",
and we might call "discreteism" and we might call "numericism". But the
name which it has actually acquired in philosophical circles, perhaps
confusingly, is "materialism". That name isn't quite right - as I was just
saying - because it suggests that the essence of this veiw is the attachment
to the material world, whereas in fact, of course, the essence of the veiw
is in the *numericist analysis* that it gives of the material world: in the
thought that the world, fundamentally, consists in the sort of thing that
can be counted and so mathematised. (This veiw includes but does not stop
with Atomism, since atomism is the veiw that of the countable bits there are
some that cannot be divided *further* into smaller countable bits - you can
be a numericist but not an atomist, eg if you have an open mind about
finding and counting ever smaller particles.).
This numericism or mathematicism is really the essence of what we nowadays
call "materialism", and it is really the secret of our success: 747's,
DVD's, the Apple PowerBook Titanium, Global warming. Because of course it
is numericism that physics and technology is really founded on, more than
materialism as such. You can be a materialism of a kind, in thinking that
the physical world is all that really matters and is the fundamental
*substance* in the grammatical sense, but if you think that that physical
world is all just one big stuff and that change and movement and numerical
distinctions are all somehow illusions, then you will be a Parmenidean
Monist Materialist, which is a long way from the kind of scientific
materialism that we've somehow got into our heads as "materialism" proper.
But Parmenides can be a "materialist" for all that.
Now I certainly never meant to accuse you of being a materialist in the
sense that Parmenides is a materialist. So, when I said that you were a
materialist, Marco, it wasn't the
attention-to-matter-as-the-grammatical-substance part of materialism that I
was meaning to ascribe to you, but the assumption-that-reality-is-countable
part. True, that by itself would be a reason to use another word than
"materialism" - particularly given the fact that we are discussing this in
the context of Pirsig's thought, and it is the question of Substance which
most fixes his attention on materialism (Prisig follows convention in
attributing this substance veiw to Aristotle, but I find it nascent in
Parmenides). However, my mistake is understandable given the salient
features of modern materialism.
I think that my charge against you, properly understood and rephrased as
"numericism" rather than as "materialism", holds true and is worth
repeating. You (appear to) think that Quality, the fundamental reality of
the world, comes in these little Quantum Packets called "Quality Events",
and that the Dynamism of the Dynamic has something to do with the way these
events form a series. This is not materialism, true - unless we are to say
that quality is what we *mean* by the material world. But what it most
certainly is, is numericism: you think that the discrete and countable come
before the continuous. I have two objections to that account which I have
been repeating, but quite possibly have gotten confused one with another.
My first objection is that this account makes no sense. There is no way
that the continuous (DQ) can ammount to the discrete (Quality Events).
Period.
My second objection is a rather less significant matter which is
nevertheless a source of some annoyance, namely that you are quite wrong in
attributing such a nonsensical view to R.M.Pirsig, and quite wrong in going
about as if you were just expounding his veiws when you are actually
maintaining the exact opposite.
Unfortanately you have elected to concentrate on my second objection, and to
ignore the first. Unfortunate this is because: if you fail to appreciate
what utter nonsense it is to suppose that Dynamic Quality (which RMP calls
the "aesthetic continuum") is continuous and yet can consist of a series of
events, you will never be able to appreciate why your exegisis of RMP is
wrong. It is wrong because it ascribes a nonsense veiw to RMP, and does so
quite without warrant.
If you don't understand why it is nonsense, you won't realise the need to
find an appropriate warrant. Hence we find that whatever textual evidence I
cite for the fact that DQ is continuous (and this evidence is everywhere you
look in both Lila and ZAMM), you persist in thinking that the burden of
proof lies on my interpretation of RMP, and so always demand that I cite yet
more textual evidence. Whereas in fact, because it is you that is ascribing
to RMP the nonsense view, it is also you that needs to provide us with some
textual evidence for your claim that RMP thinks that DQ is both continuous
and made up of events.
This is what I find, and, so, how I speak.
Ok. So, when I wrote:
>> Your commitment to the materialist idea of static
>> patterns out there is extraordinarily strong - although
>> this is not, perhaps, extraordinary in this culture.
- the "materialist idea" I was speaking of was this numericism which I see
as central to modern materialism an to our culture. You do indeed think of
static patterns "out there" - and the fact that you substitute 'quality'
for 'matter' doesn't suddenly make you a Pirsigian. Pirsig has quite a
developed account of what this Quality is.
===============================
This has been a long introduction, now to business:
===============================
MARCO:
> I will start from your point that the *outside* reality is dynamic, while
> *inside* the world is static.
ELEPHANT:
This was not my point at all - the inside/outside distinction doesn't really
come into it. I merely meant to deny that there is a distinction between
intellectual tricks and particular realities - which is part of my argument
that Quality *Events* can't be fundamental reality, but must be intellectual
tricks to try to get a grip on the fundamental reality, which is continuous.
This is what I wrote:
> Elephant:
>> Your idea is that there are intellectual tricks, and then there
>> are real particular realities out there. Well no, there aren't.
>
> Marco:
>> More... I say that even intellectual tricks are out there!
>
> Elephant:
>> Neat quip. Doesn't really address the point. Even if
>> intellectual tricks are 'out there' (which is a claim I don't for a
>> minute accept or even really think intelligable), this does
>> nothing to address my point that as an intellectual trick formed
>> in the attempt to get something graspable out of the fluid
>> situation, any object (including the evolutionary
>> history of seagulls) is static, not dynamic.
>> Have you anything to say about that?
MARCO:
> You offer (and Roger seems to agree completely) that the fence between
> *inside* and *outside* is dividing all what's intellectual (the concepts) and
> all what's not intellectual (the Dynamic reality). According to this vision,
> language is in some way on the door and introduces the dynamic perceived
> reality into the realm of concepts. So language, you state, precedes all the
> world: the static world of concepts is built by language.
ELEPHANT:
Yes, I do think language precedes the world of particular objects - that
would be one good way of identifying me as a "Platonist" - although all that
this thesis so far ammounts to is that *something* of language precedes all
the world, and what this *something* is, I haven't yet said. Certainly I
don't take the veiw that English is a language skill we have a-priori, but
certain curious empiricists like Chomsky have argued that there is an
essence to language, a universal "inbuilt" grammar which infants use to
decode the speech around them and reinvent it in their own image - the
pigeon/creole distinction is an interesting one there.
However, I do *not* claim that the intellectual/non-intellectual distinction
is the same as the inside/outside distinction. That's just something you
are trying to put into my mouth so as to have me talk nonsense. Obviously
the inside/outside distinction is one that is only available between
intellectual tricks: indeed we might say that the inside/outside distinction
is *the* prime intellectual trick. For of course inside/outside are notions
dependant on, perhaps equivalent to, the subject/object trick.
But you aren't going to catch me saying something that amounts to saying
that that the intellectual/non-intellectual distinction is just a branch of
SOM - that's what you'd like me to be saying isn't it? No, I'm presenting a
case which is altogether more difficult for you to deal with. What's
outside is as intellectual as what's inside, so long as it's a "what" that
you are looking for: a countable something be it an object or an event. And
What's inside is as non-intellectual and dynamic as what's outside, if you
remember that "dynamic" cannot be divided into events or objects, and so
cannot be confined either inside or out. In reality, flux is the everyday
experience of our intuition just as it is the everyday experience of the
intuited, and the intuited and the intution are not to be counted separate
in the way that the known and the knowing are, for intuition is something
pre-grammatical. Attending to an intuition, and attending to the intuited:
these ammount to the same thing, until one verbalises the thought, at which
point it is no longer an intuition one is speaking of, but a proposition.
MARCO:
> .......... the staticity of concepts is due to the
> simple fact that we have build them just to manage the flow. As the flow is
> (by definition, I guess) infinite, we must "define" it. So we create a world
> of definitions in which we put our experience of the flow: concepts are
> created static as we have to manage reality. Their staticity is evident as
> they all have the common characteristic that we create them as definitions of
> the flow, by means of the same tool, with the same purpose to manage the flow.
ELEPHANT:
Well put. We will make a Platonist of you yet. For think: if they are
introduced so as to make the flow manageable, where are they introduced
*from*? They can't be introduced from that very same flow, so, somewhere,
we must have a priori resources for rendering the world into these static
numerically distinct objects....
MARCO:
> After my first contestation that even language and concepts are in some way
> *outside* and dynamic, 'cause as soon as I formulate them, they become part of
> an intellectual reality I cannot control, you state that I'm analyzing
> language as a "natural phenomenon", and therefore participating to the flow,
> while you are focusing to its "essence" of creator of the *inside* static
> world. According to its essence, language precedes and creates all the objects
> we know.
>
> Up to now, your discourse is working.
ELEPHANT:
So, do I understand that you AGREE?
MARCO:
> The Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" is maybe a little surpassed, but it is
> undeniable that I am as I think I am, and this is certain. Said so, it seems
> that every single individual is the bearer of a single personal world, and
> that only of this personal world it is possible to state that it is *true*.
ELEPHANT:
I'm a bit lost suddenly. If I'm a solipsist, then I'm a solipist about
entirely the appropriate thing to be solisistic about: ie opinion (obviously
as far as opinions go each man is in his own world). But I am certainly not
a solipsist about *truth*: the truth is something universal and absolute.
My posts sould have made that much clear, about my veiws at any rate. I
hear strains of Phenomenolgy blowing tunefully behind the scenes of your
comment on Descartes here - er, well, don't tax my mind with heiddegger -
but Sartre I can normally comprehend.
MARCO:
> Hope you will concede that it is just in its possibility to exist also
> *outside* as natural phenomenon, and therefore to be the tool for the
> communication of the *inside* concepts between human beings, that the nature
> of language is expressed.
ELEPHANT:
No. Because I think that (for example) the concept "one" is neither inside
nor outside, but more fundamental than the distinction between inside and
outside: it is *universal*. I take a similar veiw of "Good". "Good" is a
noun, and it certainly isn't a lot of diffent nouns for different "inside
concepts".
MARCO:
> It is by the communication and the usage of a common
> language that we reach in some way for the plausible conclusion that there are
> many other *insides* out there, and that every human being participates to an
> inter-subjective truth depending on a possible social agreement on the truth
> we have *inside*.
ELEPHANT:
Here you are projecting a solution to the 'other minds problem', but that's
(i) a problem which doesn't even exist for a Pirsigian, and (ii) not a
terribly satisfactory solution once you've acknowledged the problem.
Regarding (ii): Usage of a common language cannot *establish* that there are
other minds out there, because if you doubt that there are other mind out
there, you cannot allow yourself to assume that the words you hear
consititute *the use of language* - you will think of them as mechanical
mimicry or some such. Being a mind and being a language user ammount to the
same thing, and so that cuts both ways: it you are prepared to doubt that
I'm a mind then you aren't going to take, as evidence, the suggestion that
I'm a language user. Moreover, the intersubjective truth you are positing
sounds like behaviourism: dependance upon what's public for what's true.
And I just don't find that plausible. All sorts of things are true about
all sorts of things, both me and the universe, which aren't in the least bit
public. OK. Regarding (i): inside/outside is a distinction that applies
after language has got going, and so, far from language being what gets us
out of the solipsistic situation, it is our over-attachment to language and
the products of intellectual trickery is what gets us into it that terrible
solisistic inside/outside fix in the first place.
MARCO:
> Using my terms, concepts "are statically" (within my *inside*) and "interact
> dynamically" (*outside*). It means that while according to their essence (i.e.
> what they are) they can only exist *inside*, according to their nature they
> are also part of the flow *outside*, therefore they interact with other
> concepts of other people.
>
> Up to now, I don't deny all this, and I hope that, leaving aside a probable
> batch of "step by step" rectifications, I've explained yours and Roger's
> common position.
ELEPHANT:
Quite the opposite. You've done some very original thinking and come up with
an account that neither I nor Roger will even glancingling recognise. The
reliance on the inside/outside distincition is all wrong - and if either I
or Roger had said anything along those lines we'd be exiled to SOM land
pronto. But we haven't.
As to what you might mean by being static and interacting dynamically: this,
I fear, is a repitition of your mistaken beleif that the "Dynamic" in
"Dynamic Quality" has something to do with process and reaction. To say
that DQ is dynamic is to say that it is a power, and that it is continuous.
It is not to say that it is dynamic in the sense that a leading business
exective is (or says he is).
MARCO:
> Given that we could agree on the staticity of what's *inside*.....
[which we do *not*!]
> ...... what about the
> *outside*? This staticity does not explain why and how my concepts, as soon as
> I create them, can't stay still more than one millisecond and run *outside* to
> interact with the dynamic world. If this is the Dynamic/static split, it
> doesn't tell me a lot about what's *outside*, therefore I need something else
> to understand the *outside*.
ELEPHANT:
You apparently have experiences with you concepts that I just don't have.
Perhaps you have a concept-poltergiest or something. Speaking personally,
my concepts stay exactly where I put them, and move to exactly where I move
them to. That's what makes them *my* concepts. (Whereas you seem to co-own
yours with some devious sprite, whose idea of fun is to move everything
around when you're not looking - never had that problem myself. What would
you say to a Psychoanalysis of your beleif in this sprite which interferes
with your concepts? Responsibilty is hard to face, and it is often better
to declare that some one else is responsible. Bad faith?)
MARCO:
> So, what about the *outside*? Are we sure that it can be fixated only in
> concepts? Where does it come from the distinction between "this cat" and "this
> dog"? Is it merely an inter-subjective agreement we reach for when we share
> and build together our respective *inside* concepts?
ELEPHANT:
Forgett in/out. But yes, things can only be fixed by concepts, and I *am*
sure about this. No, 'cat' can't merely be intersubjective agreement,
becuase language, which is the origin of subjects, cannot itself originate
with subjects. Yes, insubjective aggrement comes into it, but only as far
as the question "shall we speak english or italian?".
MARCO:
> In one question: is the *outside* completely dynamic and flowing? Maybe I'm
> surprising you. I state "All the pre-conceptual reality (*outside*) I perceive
> is dynamic*". But let me explain what I'm meaning, and where is our
> disagreement.
>
> As said, a purely subjective position can be surpassed thanks to an
> inter-subjective vision, by which we accept the possibility that other human
> beings have my same faculty to manage an *inside* of their own. This is a
> necessary step: without it, knowledge is a nonsense. More, it's probably
> impossible.
ELEPHANT:
I completely disagree. There is such a thing as private knowledge, and in
learning something a child makes that knowledge his own, with a meaning for
his own world. He does not import an "inter-subjective vision" unless the
"knowledge" that he is acquiring is the doctrine or assumptions of some sect
or political power or social orthodoxy, and I would count none of these as
"knowledge". And if we think about the scientist, it is not the
inter-subjective vision that a good scientist seeks, but precisely the
counter-examples which disprove the intersubjective vision, the faulty
theory adherred to by his colleagues. There is no demonstrating truth in
the sciences, only demonstrating falsehood. All that the scientist
positively knows is what he does not know.
MARCO:
> Practically, we must open our personal *inside* to a sort of
> collective environment, where concept can interact thanks to the common
> characteristic we all have to be able to build and share them.
ELEPHANT:
Au contraire, my anti-materialist empiricist. *If* you assume an inside and
an outside, Robert Browning would have the better picture:
"Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise
From outward things, whate'er you may beleive.
There is an inmost centre in us all,
Where truth abides in fulness; and around,
Wall upon wall, the gross flesh hems it in,
This perfect, clear perception - which is truth.
A baffling and perverting carnal mesh
Binds it, and makes all error: and to KNOW
Rather consists in opening out a way
Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,
Than in effecting entry for a light
Supposed to be without."
MARCO:
> ... Anyway, it is sure that it is impossible to have two persons
> bearing the same exact set of concepts, (that is: there are not two equal
> *insides* ) but it is equally sure that we can share, communicate and
> replicate concepts. I think I'm not talking here exactly of the Kantian a
> priori pure concepts: even before any analysis of how is it possible a reason,
> it's a fact that a reason is possible; and it is a fact that this possibility
> is by necessity common to all the components of the intellectual environment.
>
> How is it possible such operation? On what assumption I decide I can
> communicate with humans (either directly or "reading" their
> intellectual/artistic products) and not with rocks, trees, airplanes? It is
> evident that one "special" concept make it possible to recognize my fellows.
> The enlargement from the subjective *inside* to the inter-subjective
> environment is possible only thanks to the simple fact that this "special"
> concept is common to all the fellows. It's a sort of "communication protocol"
> that allows the communication; otherwise, no communication is even possible.
> I'm not here talking of the same language (English, Italian... or Art or
> whatever else): I'm here talking of the basilar point that is the foundation
> of every language. In few words, this basilar point is that we can communicate
> with our fellows. This common characteristic is equal in every individual who
> shares with us the participation to the intellectual environment.
ELEPHANT:
Ok. But what are we talking about here - is it any more than that reason
recognises itself? I will not say that there are fundamental particulars -
this is what you seem to be waning to say - but once particulars are
hypothesised, we see that some of them are reasoning particulars. Beyond
this, I don't grasp what you can mean by a communication "protocol". We are
neither embassies nor computers, nor hamsters, so far as I can tell.
MARCO:
[...SNIP...]
> Conclusion.
>
> Dear Roger, I agree with you when you state that the concept of the rock is
> created. I agree with you that the concept of "static pattern of value" has
> been created by R.M.Pirsig.
> In your famous "stand and be counted" (September 99 on MF) post you asked:
>
>> 1) Are all patterns of value also intellectual patterns?
>
> I answered: "YES, everything we are talking about is also an intellectual
> pattern". You asked ALSO, and we were in agreement. But if the question is:
> "Are all patterns of value only intellectual patterns?", my answer must
> necessarily be NO.
ELEPHANT:
"Necessarily"? Gee. That does make me feel dim - because I just haven't
understood this supposed necessity at all. Did you explain it somewhere?
MARCO:
>
>> 2) Were the 4 levels of the MOQ discovered or created?
>
> I answered: "Created, by R. M. Pirsig. Just like gravity law, by Newton". That
> is: the Newton law describes gravitation. The phenomenon of gravitation is a
> static inorganic pattern of value, and Newton has created an intellectual
> pattern to explain it. RMP has created the four levels, but it does not mean
> at all that the four levels exist only in our concepts.
>
> Tell me: what kind of value is the "value that holds together a glass?" A
> dynamic value or a static value? IMO the most sensible answer is that it is a
> static pattern of value, and that this static value is not in our concepts.
ELEPHANT:
I don't understand. Where else would a static pattern of value be but in
our concepts? What is static value, but value conceptualised?
MARCO:
> Of
> course you can offer thousands of answers, but my answer is IMO the most
> simple and sticking to the common experience. And IMO it does not contradict
> the MOQ. I could offer a lot of quotations from Lila and SODaV to support my
> opinion, but as Elephant asserts I use to misread Pirsig, I will not.
ELEPHANT:
No, go right ahead - don't let anyone else tell you what to do with your
concepts Marco.
MARCO:
> Let me just say that it is true that seen from our Western SOMish tradition,
> the MOQ seems very "similar to the Cittamatra tradition in
> Buddhism which asserts that entities exist within the flow of perceptions but
> not as independent external objects". But also it is true that RMP ran away
> from India as it was impossible to accept in toto such a vision of reality.
ELEPHANT:
Is that so? I didn't know that he ran. And I didn't know that he thought
it an "impossible" vision. I thought he said that all that exposure to the
east just slowly sank in and years later helped him to make some kind of
sense out of Plato. Leastways that's what I read. Remember how much he
talks about Northrop and "The meeting of east and west"?
MARCO:
> I guess that seen from a traditional Eastern viewpoint, the MOQ is "very
> similar to the Western tradition of empiricism". The point is IMO that the
> four levels of reality he describes is something different either from
> Buddhism and from SOM.
ELEPHANT:
James was being a bit of a kidder when he presented radical empiricism as a
variety of empirism. Still, he got away with it, so I don't see why Pirsig
shouldn't in his footsteps. Just try to remember the difference between
empiricism and radical empiricism is fairly, well, radical. Empiricism
treats the world as consisting of these discrete things which the senses
reveal to us in their numerical discreteness. Radical Empiricism maintains
the exact opposite, ie that the world is fundamentally continuous and that
discreteness is invented not discovered. Spot the difference. (Not that
hard.)
MARCO:
> Dear Elephant, this is what I mean when I say there must be something static
> *outside* there, even if my intellect perceive it as dynamic. My
> point is that the social protocol we all use when our intellect is working,
> this "me program" we all are sharing, can be described better as a static
> characteristic of another *inside*.. Actually, it is not a concept, but it is
> static: not 'cause I think so, rather because we all, willing or not, can
> think.
ELEPHANT:
Is what you're saying that other minds are non-intectually static but
intellectually dynamic? Ok. Well I can't agree. We can indeed all think,
but the "me program" is not a condition of our thinking, as you seem to
suggest, but most often the most substantial obstacle to thinking. "Me" is
a classic static concept, perhaps *the* classic static concept, and it
really doesn't depend on existing "as a static characteristic of another
*inside*...". Suppose you are a de-socialised human being. There remains a
concept of "me", even where it is not a personality as such. For hunger is
a threat to *my* existence. Moreover, le style c'est l'homme, as Murdoch
was fond of quoting from somewhere. One can still attribute the possession
or lack of certain virtues or character traits to such a lone individual in
our thought experiment, idendtify his strengths and weaknesses, even in a
social vacuum. He may be impatient, or quick witted, or find it hard to
control himself. He may have moments of fear, anger, an inabilty to think
straight. And in these characteristics and their causes we find a "me
programme" - it is not to be done away with by destroying soceity (though
this is an experiment that is currently being attempted). The "me
programme" is something to be transcended, but that doesn't mean that it has
an entirely social existence in the first place. I express myself in
soceity, but that is not the only place. I express myself in my handiness
with a harpoon, or in my patience, or in my private attitude towards my own
thoughts and the world around me. This Robinson Crusoe might be a real
philosopher - for, as I have indicated, I do not think that depriving him
from birth of society would deprive him of language. It would be difficult
for us to appreciate his philosophy untill he learnt english - but that is
another matter.
MARCO:
> And, as I've always said, static is not fixed.
ELEPHANT:
As I've always said, I don't understand that contradiction in terms at all.
MARCO:
> In the end, I want to add here a clarification. The equation I offered...
> seems to show that intellect is "contained
> by" society.
ELEPHANT:
Pause for a moment, and reflect. How can you really think such a thing?
Language is not the product of soceity, soceity is one arena of language -
and not the only one, mind you. Really I think we are sailing the
Wittgenstein sea once more - and I've made most of my points in this area to
Andrea. There is something fundamental about the capacity to apply concepts
and create objects, and soceity is just another object, not the midwife.
Wittgenstein has this wild idea that language is acquired through ostensive
training: as if there were objects out there to be trained in relation to
prior to language use. This doesn't make any sense. And neither does the
idea that the object "soceity" pre-exists language and intellect.
Think about the great poets and philosophers. They did not borrow the
language of soceity, they challenged and rejected it, they created the
soceities of readers that came to understand them - here soceity follows the
invention of the new language, the new way of understanding the world, it
does not preceed it.
Surely one *can* use language such that it is merely a series of borrowings
from soceity. But isn't this precisely a discription of a someone who just
isn't thinking for themselves? We ought to think for ourselves, and, what's
more, we can and do. This thinking for ourselves is the active process of
working out our own meaning for words and arguments, which is the same as to
say that it is the process of working out our own understanding of words and
arguments. For it is individuals that understand, and the individuals that
comes to the truth.
Language is a tool. Individuals manipulate tools, not soceities. Or so it
should be, so it was designed to be. The other way around? That would be
the definition of a totalitarian state.
IMO
Elephant
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