--- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, Hoki Tralala <hoki.tral...@...> wrote:
>
> AIG sama eropa hubungannya apa ya? :-)
reply :
AIG dari bisnis traditional asuransi sudah berubah menjadi raksasa sebagai
HedgeFunD dan hancur lebur.......bisnis AIG yang sudah kait mengkait dengan
ekonomi Europa, dampak domino yang akan membuat system Banking, Insurance,
PensionFund dll berantakan.
"AIG used to be in the conventional insurance business, covering identifiable
risks it knew something about, until it took advantage of deregulation and a
lack of government surveillance to come up with contrived new financial
products. Even Maurice Greenberg, the man who built AIG from the ground up over
a span of 40 years before he was forced out amid corruption charges in 2005,
admits that he didn't understand the newfangled financial gimmicks that the
company was peddling. This week, claiming he too was swindled, Greenberg sued
in federal court, charging the AIG execs who forced him out with "gross, wanton
or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct," over the credit default
swap portfolio that was part of his settlement.
US taxpayers now have ownership of almost 80 percent of AIG, but with the
company's once solid traditional insurance business now suffering a steep loss
of consumer confidence, it's not likely that even the formerly healthy parts of
the company will be worth much. What we have here is all pain and no gain for
the taxpayers roped into this debacle, which is proving to be the story of the
entire banking bailout. '
Reference dibawah ini.
regards
AIG: Billions Dished Out in the Dark
By Robert Scheer
March 4, 2009
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Robert Scheer is the editor of Truthdig, where this article originally
appeared. His latest book is The Pornography of Power: How Defense Hawks
Hijacked 9/11 and Weakened America(Twelve).
This is crazy! Forget the bleating of Rush Limbaugh; the problem is not with
the quite reasonable and, if anything, underfunded stimulus package, which in
any case will be debated long and hard in Congress. The problem is with what is
not being debated: the far more expensive Wall Street bailout that is being
pushed through--as in the case of the latest AIG rescue--in secret, hurried
deal-making primarily by the unelected secretary of the treasury and the
chairman of the Federal Reserve.
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AIG: Billions Dished Out in the Dark
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Robert Scheer: Taxpayers now own 80 percent of virtually worthless
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Good Money After Bad
U.S. Economy
Robert Scheer: Obama's stimulus bill is far too modest to arrest an
economy in free fall. But if it were up to the GOP, which largely created the
mess, we'd be doing nothing at all.
Six months ago, we taxpayers began bailing out AIG with more than $140 billion,
and then it went and lost $61.7 billion in the fourth quarter, more than any
other company in history had ever lost in one quarter. So Timothy Geithner and
Ben Bernanke huddled late into the night last weekend and decided to reward AIG
for its startling failure with thirty billion more of our dollars. Plus, they
sweetened the deal by letting AIG off the hook for interest it had been
obligated to pay on the money we previously gave the company.
AIG doesn't have to pay the 10 percent interest due on the preferred stock the
US government got for the earlier bailout funds because that interest will now
be paid out only at AIG's discretion, which means never. The preferred stock,
which got watered down, carried a cumulative interest, meaning we taxpayers
would have recaptured some money if the company ever got going again, but that
interest obligation was waived in the new deal.
We've already given AIG a total of $170 billion--an amount that dwarfs the $75
billion allocated to helping those millions of homeowners facing foreclosures.
And more will be thrown down the AIG rat hole because President Barack Obama is
blindly following the misguided advice of his top economic advisers, who insist
that AIG is too big to fail.
"AIG provides insurance protection to more than 100,000 entities, including
small businesses, municipalities, 401(k) plans and Fortune 500 companies who
together employ over 100 million Americans," the joint Treasury Department and
Fed statement declared while insisting that for that reason, plus the "systemic
risk AIG continues to pose and the fragility of markets today, the potential
cost to the economy and the taxpayer of government inaction would be extremely
high."
What about the cost of inaction by Treasury and the Fed before this meltdown?
If AIG were so important to the American economy, shouldn't government
regulators have been looking more closely at its activities? They couldn't
then, and even now they don't understand what AIG has been up to, because the
company was allowed to operate in an essentially unregulated global economy in
which multinational corporations have their way. As the Treasury/Fed statement
concedes: "AIG operates in over 130 countries with over 400 regulators and the
company and its regulated and unregulated subsidiaries are subject to very
different resolution frameworks across their broad and diverse operations
without an overarching resolution mechanism."
Oh, really? And you're discovering that only now, when you're making us bail
AIG out? It wasn't that long ago that a couple of hustlers operating out of an
AIG office in London were going wild making money off selling insurance on
credit default swaps that no one could understand, but the company execs loved
those huge profit margins. To challenge their maneuvering, as some in Congress
attempted, was said by their defenders, including Geithner, to put them at an
unfair disadvantage in the world market. Ignorance was bliss... until the
bubble burst.
This was all belatedly conceded by Bernanke in his Senate testimony on Tuesday:
"AIG exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system. There was no oversight of
the Financial Products division. This was a hedge fund, basically, that was
attached to a large and stable insurance company, made huge numbers of
irresponsible bets--took huge losses. There was no regulatory oversight because
there was a gap in the system."
AIG used to be in the conventional insurance business, covering identifiable
risks it knew something about, until it took advantage of deregulation and a
lack of government surveillance to come up with contrived new financial
products. Even Maurice Greenberg, the man who built AIG from the ground up over
a span of 40 years before he was forced out amid corruption charges in 2005,
admits that he didn't understand the newfangled financial gimmicks that the
company was peddling. This week, claiming he too was swindled, Greenberg sued
in federal court, charging the AIG execs who forced him out with "gross, wanton
or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct," over the credit default
swap portfolio that was part of his settlement.
US taxpayers now have ownership of almost 80 percent of AIG, but with the
company's once solid traditional insurance business now suffering a steep loss
of consumer confidence, it's not likely that even the formerly healthy parts of
the company will be worth much. What we have here is all pain and no gain for
the taxpayers roped into this debacle, which is proving to be the story of the
entire banking bailout.
>
> On Fri, Mar 6, 2009 at 11:58 PM, adjies2000 <ad2...@...> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hello.
> >
> > ADa yang tahu peraturan delisting NYSE mengenai batasan harga saham untuk
> > Delisting ?
> >
> > Dari Rule 496=501A tidak kelihatan secara spesific.
> >
> > Contoh kasus :
> >
> > Bears Stern - harga terus turun dibawah USD 1. 0.8, 0.4 sampai NOL
> >
> > Citicorp semalam ditutup USD 1.01
> > = Tidak mungkin Delisting meskipun harga dibawah USD 1 (apa betul ?)
> >
> > = To big To fail, 40% saham sudah dibeli Pemerintah US. ? % milik ABU Dhabi
> >
> > = US Banking adalah kunci dari recovery US economy, pasti di Bail-out
> > habis2an(dikeluarkan/diambilalih Toxic asset dari Balancesheet(pakai SPV)
> > dan disuntik modal baru), seperti juga AIG mati2 di suntik karena kejatuhan
> > AIG akan menghancurkan ecomomy Europe
> >
> > IT is the time to Buy Citicorp Stock !
> >
> > Pls comment
> >
> > Salam
> >
> > ======================================================
> > Listing and Delisting (Rule 496501A)
> > Rule 496. Requirements for Independent Agents Acting As or In Lieu of New
> > York City Transfer Agents of Securities Listed on New York Stock Exchange,
> > Inc.
> >
> > [ Rule 496 was removed as part of NYSE-2004-62; please see NYSE Listed
> > Company Manual 601.01 for information regarding Transfer Agents.]
> >
> > Adopted.
> >
> > June 24, 1971.
> >
> > Amended.
> >
> > July 5, 2005 (NYSE-2004-62).
> > Rule 497. Additional Requirements for Listed Securities Issued by NYSE
> > Euronext or its Affiliates
> >
> > (a) For purposes of this Rule 497 the terms below are defined as follows:
> >
> > (1) "NYSE Euronext Affiliate" means NYSE Euronext ( "NYSE Euronext") and
> > any entity that directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries,
> > controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with NYSE Euronext,
> > where "control" means that one entity possesses, directly or indirectly,
> > voting control of the other entity either through ownership of capital stock
> > or other equity securities or through majority representation on the board
> > of directors or other management body of such entity.
> >
> > (2) "Affiliate Security" means any security issued by a NYSE Euronext
> > Affiliate, with the exception of Investment Company Units as defined in
> > Para. 703.16 of the Listed Company Manual.
> >
> > (3) "New York Stock Exchange LLC" (the "Exchange") is a wholly owned
> > subsidiary of NYSE Euronext.
> >
> > (4) "NYSE Market, Inc." ( "NYSE Market") is a wholly owned subsidiary of
> > the Exchange. NYSE Market is the entity that will manage the Floor trading
> > of securities.
> >
> > (5) "NYSE Regulation, Inc." ( "NYSE Regulation") is a wholly owned
> > subsidiary of the Exchange and will perform the self-regulatory organization
> > responsibilities pertaining to regulating the NYSE Market and the Exchange.
> >
> > (b) Prior to the initial listing of the Affiliate Security on the Exchange,
> > NYSE Regulation shall determine that such securities satisfy New York Stock
> > Exchange LLC's rules for listing, and such finding must be approved by the
> > NYSE Regulation Board of Directors.
> >
> > (c) Throughout the continued listing of the Affiliate Security on the
> > Exchange, NYSE Regulation shall
> >
> > (1) prepare a quarterly report on the Affiliate Security for the NYSE
> > Regulation board of directors that describes: (a) the NYSE Regulation's
> > monitoring of the Affiliate Security's compliance with the Exchange's
> > listing standards, including, (i) the Affiliate Security's compliance with
> > the Exchange's minimum share price requirement and (ii) the Affiliate
> > Security's compliance with each of the quantitative continued listing
> > requirements; and (b) NYSE's Regulation's monitoring of the trading of the
> > Affiliate Security including summaries of all related surveillance alerts,
> > complaints, regulatory referrals, adjusted trades, investigations,
> > examinations, formal and informal disciplinary actions, exception reports
> > and trading data used to ensure that the Affiliate Security's compliance
> > with the Exchange's listing and trading rules. A copy of said report will be
> > forwarded promptly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (
> > "Commission").
> >
> > (2) Once a year, an independent accounting firm shall review the listing
> > standards for the Affiliate Security to insure that the issuer is in
> > compliance with the listing requirements and a copy of the report shall be
> > forwarded promptly to the Commission.
> >
> > (3) In the event that NYSE Regulation determines that the Affiliate
> > Security is not in compliance with any of the Exchange's listing standards,
> > NYSE Regulation shall notify the issuer of such non-compliance promptly and
> > request a plan of compliance. NYSE Regulation shall file a report with the
> > Commission within five business days of providing such notice to the issuer
> > of its non-compliance. The report shall identify the date of the
> > non-compliance, type of non-compliance, and any other material information
> > conveyed to the issuer in the notice of non-compliance. Within five business
> > days of receipt of a plan of compliance from the issuer, NYSE Regulation
> > shall notify the Commission of such receipt, whether the plan was accepted
> > by NYSE Regulation or what other action was taken with respect to the plan
> > and the time period provided to regain compliance with the Exchange's
> > listing standards, if any.
> >
> > Adopted.
> >
> > February 27, 2006, effective March 8, 2006 (NYSE-2005-77).
> >
> > Amended.
> >
> > February 14, 2007 (NYSE-2006-120).
> > Rule 499. Suspension from Dealings or Removal from List by Action of the
> > Exchange
> >
> > [ Rule 499 was removed as part of NYSE-2005-15; please see NYSE Listed
> > Company Manual Sections 801-804 for information regarding delisting.]
> >
> > Amendments.
> >
> > April 15, 1965.
> >
> > May 23, 1968.
> >
> > October 17, 1968.
> >
> > April 17, 1969.
> >
> > July 15, 1971.
> >
> > April 24, 1972.
> >
> > May 2, 1974.
> >
> > May 13, 1976.
> >
> > March 9, 1977.
> >
> > December 21, 1983.
> >
> > May 9, 1984.
> >
> > October 3, 1988.
> >
> > May 5, 1994.
> >
> > October 26, 1998.
> >
> > June 9, 1999.
> >
> > December 1, 1999.
> >
> > May 30, 2000.
> >
> > January 10, 2003.
> >
> > March 1, 2004 (NYSE-2004-02).
> >
> > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15) [Rescinded from Rule book and users referred to
> > Listed Company Manual Sections 801-804.].
> > Rule 500. Removal from the List Upon Request of the Issuer
> >
> > [ Rule 500 was removed as part of NYSE-2003-23.]
> >
> > Amendments.
> >
> > June 21, 1956.
> >
> > July 21, 1999.
> >
> > October 30, 2003 (NYSE-2003-23).
> >
> > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15).
> > Rule 501A. Withdrawal from Listing and Registration Under Securities
> > Exchange Act of 1934
> >
> > [ Rule 501A was removed as part of NYSE-2005-15.]
> >
> > Amendments..
> >
> > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15).
> >
> >
> >
>
